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AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FILIPINO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION, 1942-1945
00 A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S Amy Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by LARRY S. SCHMIDT, MAJOR, USMC B.A. The Johns Hopkins University, 1966 M.A. The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1970
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Mindanao; resistance movement; guerrilla warfare, Japanese-Philippines; Americans-Philippines; World War II-Philippines; submarines-World War II; Morms; costwatchers; Allied Intelligence Bureau; Visayan-Mindanao Force; Fe, tig, Wendell W. Col. 2L. ABT RACT (rCA•
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This historical study documents the resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines during World War II and discusses the contribution which American servicemen and civilians made to the guerrilla fighting. The methodology focuses upon a four-part model used to analyze the resistance movement: the island's geography; Filipino culture; Japanese occupation policies; and external support provided by United States forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater. DODI F7
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The study concludes that Americans played a vital role in the guerrilla organThe analysis of the resistance movement discusses ization on Mindanao. the political nature of the decision to resist, the impact of harsh occupation policies on the will of the Filipinos, the unique role American leadership played in the development of the guerrilla organization, bnd the critical importance of external support for the guerrillas.
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AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FILIPINO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION, 1942-1945
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S Amy Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by LARRY S. SCHMIDT, MAJOR, USMC B.A. The Johns Hopkins University, 1966 M.A. The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1970
Fort Leavenworth, 1982
uistribution limited to U.S. Government Agencies only; Proprietary Information; 20 May 1982. Other requests for this document must be referred to: HQ, TRADOC, Attn: ATrS-D, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651 82-5313
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Namk. of candidate
Title of thesis
Major Larry S. Schmidt. USMC AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FILIPINO RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION.
Approved by: -Dr. David Syrett, Ph.D.
Thesis Committee Chairman
Member Graduate Faculty
Sergeant First Class Robert R. Cordell, M.Ed.
Accepted thisF4 day of 6A1982 by
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Amy Command (References to and General Staff College or any other government agency. this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Sri", . .. -
.- .- - .- .- .-.. .
. . .-
----- - -
ABSTRACT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ThE FILIPINO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION, 1942-1945, by Larry S. Schmidt, Major, USMC, 274 pages. This historical study documents the resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines during World War II and discusses the contribution which American servicemen and civilians made to the guerrilla fighting. The methodelogy fo'uses upon a fourpart model used to analyze the resistance riovement: the island's geography; Filipino culture; Japanese occupation policies; and external support provided by United States forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater. The study concludes that Americans played a vital role in the guerrilla organization on Mindanao. The analysis qf tne resistance movement discusses the political nature of the decision to resist, the impact of harsh occupation policies on the will of the Filipinos, the unique role4 American leadership played in the development of the guerrilla nrnivan and the critical importance of external support for the guerrillas.
The inspiratirn for this study came from Dr. David Syrett, Professor of History at Ojeens College, The City University of New York and Visiting John F. Mo!'rison Professor of Military History at the Command and General Staff College. His awn curiosity about the events on Mindanao acted as a gadfl' to my own interest. Dr. Syrett's guidance on the search for inf.yrmation was invaluable and his opinions always illuminating. Sergeant First Class Robert Cordell wields plentiful red ink, and his rigorous adherence to the accepted forms of our mother tongue spared the reader tl'ehiaher flights of prose to which I am prone. I am grateful to the •,imbers ,r the American Guerrillas of Mindanao with whom I have corresponded and spoken. I hope this brief history recognizes in some small way the patriotism and duty to their country demonstrated by these courageous Americans. It is only regretted that all who served on Mindaneo were not recognized. Those who assisted in compiling research sources are too many to name, but their help is deeply appreciated. Sandra Rodgers is a marvelously patient and hardy typist, and her expertise was invaluable. The completion of this paper was a photo finish with the birth of her first child. The unofficial motto of the Command and General Staff College is: "The Best Year of Your Life." Perhaps it was, but only because of the understanding and forebearance of my wife, Deanna, who has her own unofficial motto: "The only thing tougher than being a Marine is being married to a Marine."
TABLE OF C.ONTE~NTS Page ................ ............vi LIST OF MAPS. .. .... ................ ................ ................. vii LIST OF FIGURES. .. ............ viii .................. ..... GLOSSARY OF TERMS .. .... ................ ................ ..............ix CHRONOLOGY. .... .................. *
Chapter ................ ............... 1. INTRODUCTION. .. ............ ..................6 2. RESEARCH SOURCES .. .... .................. ......11 ................ 3. THE RESEARCH PARADIGM .. ............
BACKGROUND TO THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ........ ............19 ON MINDAN4AO. .. .... .................
ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ..............65 GUERRILLA RESISTANCE .. .... ................ .............155 6. THE MOROS OF MINDANAO. .... .................. 7. EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE MINDANAO .............171 RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. .... .................. 8. OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE GUERRILLAS .. ...... ...........202 242 ............... ................ 9. CONCLUSION. .. ............ APPENDIX A. 10th MILITARY DISTRICT UNITS:
JANUARI 31, 1945 .. ...........247
252 ..................... ................ BIBLIOGRAPHY .. ............
LIST OF MAPS Map
1. Philippine Islands ......... 2.
Provinces of Mindanao ..........
xi xii xiii
• ':'- "
- T •.
. . .
. .. ' .
. ** .
LIST OF FIGURES Figure
1. Sample Unit Strengths:
Mindanao Force ...............
Proclamation Establishing USFIP on Mindanao ....
Philippine Islands Military Districts .... ............
Submarine Rendezvous Points .....
8th Amy Organization ..........
X Corps Invasion of Mindanao .....
]indanao Guerrilla Organizition .......
223 .. 224 251
GLOSSARY OF FILIPINO AND JAPANESE WORDS USED IN TEXT abaca - hemp amok - a desperate impulsive frenzied killing; Moro custom with no religous foundation amor proprio - self-esteem anting-arting - Moro charm or amulet. Good luck charn balicuate - (slang) evacuate banca - small boat, very common barong - a large two-handed sword of the Moros barrio - a small native village carabao - water buffalo cargadore - porter dalama - boat datu - Moro title; triba, or community leader hapons - (slang) Japanese hiya - a sense of shame ilustrados - community leaders, land owners juramentado - frenzied, well-prepared ceremonial killing; Moro religious rite kaingineros - nomadic gardeners Valibapi - political party of the Philippine puppet government Keapei Tai (Japanese) - military police kris ý Moro wavy-edged knife mestizo, mestiza - mixed blood nipa - palm; leaves of which are used to make houses pakikisama - desire to avoid placing others in a stressful situation paltik - homemade shotgun fashioned of pipe, wood, w're and a ,iail peso - Philippine currency; approximately 50t during occupation sacada - person captured for forced labor sultan - temporal and spiritual leader of the Moros suyoks - sharpened bamboo stick placed in ground for a trap tankong - fern greens taos - fanners, laborers, share croppers tapa - beef jerky made from water buffalo meat tinghoy - counterfeit, useless (refers to guerrilla currency) tuba - coconut beer tulisan, tulisaffe - (slang) - thief utang na loob - denotes primary debt, reciprocal obligations voluntarios - home guard zona - "zonification." Japanese terror tactic
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR MINDANAO GUERRILLAS 1941 Jul 26 Dec 8 Dec 20
USAFFE formed Japan attacks the Philippires Japanese forces land at Davao
1942 Jan 3 Mar 4 :,zr 13-16 Apr 9 Apr 29 Apr May May May
30 2-3 6-7 7
May 10 Jun Sep Sep Oct Nov Dec
12 18 7 4
Hqtrs, Visayan-Mindanao Force relocated from Cebu to Del Monte, Mindanao Visayan-Mindanao Force divided into two commands Gen. MacArthur on Mindanao. Reviews plans for guerrilla resistance Bataan falls Japanese forces land at Cotabato and Parang on Mindanao Col. Wendell Fertig arrives on Mindanao Japanese forces land at Cagayan and Bugo on Mindanao Corregidor falls Gen. Wainwright orders surrender of all United States ana Philippine soldiers in the Philippines Gen. Sharp surrenders the Visayan-Mindanao Force Capt. Luis Morgan begins consolidation of guerrilla bands in Misamis Oriental Province Morgan offers command to Fertig Fertig establishes Mindanao-Sulu Force Fertig establishes guerrilla Hqtrs in Misamis Morgan departs on unification expedition Capts Smith and Hamner sail to Australia
1943 Jan Jan Jan Feb
1 23 31 13
M~r 5 Apr 14 Jun Jun 26 Jul
Misamis Occidental, Zanrboanga now secured 105th Division established KZOM establishes contact with San Francisco MacArthur appoints Fertig CO of the 10th Military District. Radio communication with GHQ, SWPA authorized The first GHQ, SWPA intelligence teams and supplies arrive on Mindanao by submarine 10 Americans escape from Davao P~nal Colony Morgan expedition returns Japanese attack in force at Misamis. 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Liangen, Lanao Province Morgan revolts, forms Mindanao and Dutch Indies Command ix
1943 Sep Oct Oct 7 Nov Dec Dec
Morgan deported to Australia Laurel government installed. 120-day amnesty period for guerrillas Salipada Pendatun concedes authority to Fertig 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Esperanza, Agusan Province Japanese issue proclamation that all unsurrenderee Americans will be summarily executed 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Esperanza, Agusan Province
1944 Jan 1 Jul Aug-Sep
"A" Corps established. Sulu Archipelago command separated from 10th Military District 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Waloe, Agusan Province First bombings of Davao City
1945 Mar-Sep Apr 18 Sep 7 Sep 15
All guerrilla units deactivated United States forces invade Mindanao Japanese ,-orces on Mindanao formally surrender 6th Infantry Division (PA) reactivated
MINDOR ;2 A
MAP 1 xi
PROVINCES OF MINDANAO
OCCI NT •MISAMIS
//A MAP 2 xii
Surigac MINDANAO SEA Say *Nasipit
Iligan Bay Maczjlar, Dipolog
g ayW1ya *
Malabang agadlar, B3y if otabato
SCALE-MILES 9 o F9
MAP 3 xlii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION December 8, 1941 brought the armed might of Japan to the Philippines as r~art of Jap~an's effort to bring the Filipinos into the Greater East Asia Cc-Prosperity Sphere.
After the long struggle waged by American
and Filipino forces on Luzon and a brief battle fought in the Southern Isldnds. Japan accepted the surrender of the Philippines in May. 1942. As the occupation of the Philippine nation by Japan coimmenced, a resistance movemient was born among the defeated people.
Americans are widely
familiar with the resistance movements in Europe, but very few are aware of this resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese.
Steinberg has written. for the Filipinos "The guerrilla movement has become one of the greatest rom'antic themes of'subsequent Philippine history and lore' because for the Filipinos the "resistance was one of the finest hours for the Philippine people." The Philippine resistance was also "the finest hour" for many Americans who did not surrender to the Japanese but who took to the hills and joined the Filipino guerrillas who gathered to fight the Japanese. As with many guerrilla resistance groups elsewhere of these units were led by Americans.
inWorld War II,many
The Philippin. resistance move-
ment, however, gives us the first historical example of Americans, military and civilian, organizing guerrilla units on a grand scale.
is also prototypical of an effective, coordinated guerrilla resistance, and it iswell worth studying for that reason, iffor no other.
2 There were many guerrilla organizations operating throuighout the 1,000 mile long Philippine Archipelago.
They had names like "Blackburn's
Headhunters," "Marking's Guerrillas," "President Quezon's Own Guerrillas," "Lawin's Patriot and Suicide Forces," and "The Live or Die Unit," among the many.
Some of the groups had an almost opera bouffe character, and
others "were complete and formal organizations,
down to training camps,
maneuvers, CCS, orders of battle, and the usual military red tape."'2 all,
some 260,715 guerrillas in 277 guerrilla units fought in the resist-
ance movement as organized, armed, and tactically employed units. Among the many guerrilla units in the Philippines was the 10th Military District, the Mindanao auerrillas, commanded by Colonel Wendell W. Fertig.
Fertig had been a United States Army Reserve officer and mining
engineer before the war and had found himself in a position to lead the guerrilla resistance on the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. This paper studies the Mindanao guerrilla organization for several reasons.
The sibordinate organizations of Fertig's 10th Military District
were predominantly American led.
This fact makes its study worthwhile
iot only because it was unique among the guerrilla organizations in the Philippines but also because it provides a good historical example against which to measure concepts for the support of resistance movements.
more, the Mindanao guerrilla organization is generally illustrative of the growth of the other guerrilla organizations throughout the Philippine Islands, so a study of its growth will provide clues as to how the other guerrilla organizations were establishea and sustained. Americans -- military, foreign service, or civilian -- may find themselves isolated unexpectedly in territory oa jpied by a nation at war with either the United States or a nation allied with the United States.
3 Initially, the decision which must be made by such an individual is whether or not to surrender to the enemy, and there are many factors which will influence that decision.
If the individual chooses not to
surrender, than as a person non-indigenous to the occupied population, entirely unforeseen hardships may be encountered.
Cunning and ingenuity
coupled with strong courage atnd loyalty are the personal qualities which will become mandatory for survival.
Beyond these personal traits, an
understanding of how resistance movements grow and achieve success will be highly useful.
The decision to resist is,for the people of a conquered
nation, a political decision and therefore has ramifications much beyond the basic decision to survive. This knowledge will also be useful to American military and State Department planners as they measure the potential of a resistance movement to contribute to the overall strategic and tactical plans of the regular forces. The Philippine resistance movement has not been studied in any detail by American historians, yet the United States played a vital role in the organization and ultimate success of the movement.
seeks to fill somec of this void by contributing a historical study of one organization within the resistance movement District on Mindanao.
the 10th Military
The challenges confronted in acquiring source
material for the study will be addressed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 establishes a methodology for the study of the Mindanao guerrilla orlanization by identiifying specific areas which must be addressed when analyzing a resistance movement.
The succeeding chapters apply the model to the
experience on Mindanao. On December 28, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt broadcast the following message to the people of the Philippines:
4 I give the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, inmen and material, of the United States stand behind that pledge.2 Itwas two years and 10 month3 later before that pledge was fulfilled. In the meantime, guerrillas
Filipinos and Americans together
a desperate resistance against a cruel conqueror against very long odds of ach"ieving success.
InGeneral Douglas MacArthur's tribute to the
Filipino guerrillas, he said: We are aided by the militant loyalty of a whole people -- a people who have rallied as one behind the standards of those stalwart patriots who, reduced to wretched material conditions yet sustained by an unconquerable spirit, hate formed an Invincible center to a resolute overall resistance. This paper Is the story of the "invincible center."
CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES 1
David Joel Steinberg, 1967, p. 57.
Philippine Collaboration in World War II,
David Bernstein, The Philippine Stog, 1947, p. 157; see also Patricia McDermott Clement7,'"The Fh111ppine Archives," May 8, 1981, p. 11. 3
Recognition of guerrillas by the American and Philippine governments was important because recognition carried with it post-war veteran's benefits .ld political qualifications. Many individuals and units had fought the Japanese in one fashion or another but had failed to P-hieve recognition. 1.172 guerrilla units claimed guerrilla status of which only 277 were recognized. 1,277,767 individuals submitted claims that they were guerrillas. Only 260,715 of these claims were approved. In the Southern Islands, the focus of this paper, 1% of the population are recognized as having fought as guerrillas. Details and figures on the recognition poiicy can be found in Headquarters Philippines Command, United States Amy, "U.S. Amy Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date. 4 5
Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, 1942, p.
General Headquarters, October 25, 1944.
Southwest Pacific Area, "Special Release,"
CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH SOURCES After reading thousands of pages of literature on thie Philippine resistance and the exploits of the Filipino guerrillas, a simple obser-4ation finally hits the reader:
the faces of the prominent characters
of the resistance rwiain a mystery because there are virtually no photographs of the guerrillas.
Almost none of' the p~ersonal accounts have
pictures of any kind, and few of the secondary sources do.
symptomatic of the general phenomenon, which is that the Philippine resistance did not nave its chroniclers moving with the guerrillas to detail its adventures and accomplishmnents.
It is understandable why there
were no cameras or photographers on the Japanese occupied islands, of course, but this one small observation underscores the reason why so little isknown of the resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese. Several auth',rs have alluded to the fact that the "definitive bock" on the Philippine resistance movement has yet to be published. Whereas historians have been provided with multitudinous accounts and analyses of the European resistance movements and the general public satisfied with novels and movies showing the daring of these resistance fighters, few in the West are even aware of the Filipino's struggle against the .Japanese. That is not to say that accounts of the Philippine resistance do not exist
they do, and in large numibers in the Philippines.
The void lies in English language accounts available in the West.
are some English language accounts available, but judicious use must be 6
7 made of them in order to create an accurate picture of the events inthe Phiiippines during the resistance. Accounts of the Philippine resistance generally focus eithe*r on the Japanese treatment of prisoners in the internment camps or upon the collaboration issue.
Personal ac~counts written by or about members of
the various guerrilla organizations for the most part do not deal *
adequately with the problems of guerrilla organization, logistics, relationship to the civil government, tactics or the politics of the guerrilla resistance. unit histories in ax-grinding.
The various accounts
including the guerrilla
tend to be self-serving, short on facts, and exercises But this problem is surmountable, given enough sources
from which to glean information and make comparisons.
Many diaries were
kept by guerrillas, and some very good personal accounts have been written from them.
Official documents can sometimes serve as the catayst to Nevertheless, there is no one
extract the truth from this information.
book which isa scholarly, in-depth account of the Philippine resistance movement as a whole, and there is no exhaustive record published on the guerrilla organization on Mindanao. Research for this paper relied heavily upon personal accounts and upon United States Government documents.
Because little was known of
their activities during the war, governmr~nt documents provide information on the guerrillas sparingly. The personal accounts are subject to the criticisms already given.
One heretofore untapped source for information
on the Philippine guerrillas which was used for research on the paper is the Philippine Archives in the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri.
Virtually unknown to the academic world, the
Philippine Archives are Lhe repository for all of the Filipino guerrilla
8 records used by the United States Army to implemient the guerrilla recognition policy both during and after the war.
It is still used for
this purpose today, and the Archives staff routinely researches and acts upon inqujiries concerning Filipino guerrillas by using these files.
holdings are quite extensive, considering that the guerrilla units did not have a large record keeping task such as found in conventional Amy units. [he Archives have about 850 cubic feet of organizational records, organized by unit.
The holdings were inventoried in 1981 for eventual accession
into the National Archives. The files contain general orders, special orders, proclamations and regulations published by the various guerrilla organizations. Casualty reports, periodic personnel reports, correspondence, transfer orders, promotion, demotion and court-martial results are also in the files.
Some unit histories are contained in the Archives.
for the 10th Military District, the Mindanao guerrillas, are the largest of the 10 military district files, filling some eight large file cabinets. Much of the material appears to have never been viewed, and the paper reflects tile field conditions under which the documents were prepared. The annotated bibliography of this paper displays some of the research which went into its composition.
Still, there are several major
sources of information left unexplored which could yield huge dividends ifpursued f rther.
Given the time constraints placed on writing this
paper, it was not possible to pursue these sources to an exhaustion of their potential. Probably the most fertile source of information, and one which would pay the highest dividends if used, would be an oral history program surviving Americans who fought with the guerrillas on pursued with tile
They have an organization called the Ameri- an Guerrillas of
Mindanao, and telephone co,,versations with a number of these former guerrillas have been very usefu'.
The use of information provided by
the guerrillas should wait pending a thouough and methodical effort to gather information from them. A second source of information is the 10th Military District files in the Philippine Archives in St. Louis.
Some of the information
available in the Archives was used, but time was not available for a Jetailed document-by-document analysis of the many thousands of documents in the files. Such an investigation would have been beyond the scope of this paper in any case. A third source which was not available for this research is the personal papers of Brigadier General Courtney Whitney who was General MacArthur's principal staff officer with responsibility for coordinating the guerrilla activities in the Philippines.
The Whitney papers fill 21
boxes and are located at RG 16, MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
These papers may illuminate the relationship betweer
GHQ, SWPA and the various guerrilla organizations. The last of the four sources which was unavailable for research on this paper were the personal diary kept by Colonel Fertig, leader of the Mindanao guerrillas, and the unpublished manuscript of a book on the Mindanao guerrillas written by him immediately after the war.
time of his death in March 1975 Colonel Fertig also had in his possession the sole copy of the official unit history of the 10th Military District: "Historical Record Mindanao Guerrilla Resistance Movement,
District, from 16 September 1942 to 30 June 1945 Colonel Wendell W. Fertig Commanding."
These materials are
n the possession of the Fertig
10 family and copies have not been made available to the historian for the American Guerrillas of Mindanao organization nor to the archives of any United States Government agency. Of these four sources described, an oral history program, the Fertig papers and the 10th Military District "Historical Record" would be the most valuable.
They would provide the greatest insight
into the politics Involved in organizing the Mindanao resistance move-
thereby filling a void which currently exists inthe research on this subject.
CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH PARADIGM4 Throughout history, the resistance of a conquered peoplc against the foreign invader has become one of the most romanticized of events. Many resistance movements have become the inspiration for national folklore, and many have been celebrated through the writings of novelists and historians.
The Tyrolese uprising against Napoleon's armies, the
legendary French Maguis, and the Yugoslav "Sons of the Eagle" are wellknown examples.
From these accounts the researcher is enabled to derive
a paradigm for the successful resistance movement.
It is also from the
study of these movements that one is able to construct the model against which a resistance movement may be measured to gauge its success.
whereas the exercise may be of interest only to students of the social sciences, the paradigm can be used to derive basic concepts for the successful initiation and sustainment of resistance movements as well. In short, the historical model for a successful resistance movement may become the doctrine f-<-iy nation which contemplates supporting a resistance movement. The United States provides in its military doctrine for the support of resistance movements engendered by a people friendly to iescale
United States interests.
That provision lies at one extreme of
of policy contingencies.
Along this scale of contingencies lies the
possibility that members of the American armed forces will be isolated behind enemy lines of the conquered territory of an American ally, whether by design or by circumstance.
Inthe most extreme case--to
12 which the doctrine does not, presumably, speak--is the possibility that 0-
a conquered America would evolve its own resistance movement.
of resistance movements and how they are led and supported by external sources iswithin the purview of the United States Army Special Forces. !W1
But as the contingency scale alluded to suggests, the understanding of the dynamics of resistance movements is of general interest to all Americans who serve in an area where during war they could become isolated behind enemy lines.
This scenario includes the majority of Americans
serving in overseas posts today. The subject of this thesis deals directly with the abrupt change of fortune which can thrust Americans into participating ina resistance movement on foreign soil.
The sudden, dramatic and wholly unexpected
Japanese successes in the Pacific in December 1941 found American *
as well as Americans in the Coammonwealth oF the Philippines government, totally unprepared for the conditions forced upon them by the conquering Japanese. The Filipino resistance to the Japanese represents a near classic example of the conditions which encourage and sustain a resistance movement.
And it is no diminution of the courage and leadership of the
Filipinos to say that the Americans who fought by their side contributed substantially to the success of the movement, particularly on the island of Mindanao.
To understand why the resistance movement in the Philippines
was so successful
it is useful to estab ish in this thesis the model
against which the Filipino resistance can he measured.
The focus of
this model will narrow on the resistance movement on Mindanao which provides the clearest example of the strength of the paradigm as an analytical tool.
Inbroad terms the model which describes the potential for growth and direction of a resistance movement is defined by:
terrain of the occupied country; (2)the culture of the conquered people; (3)the policies implemented by the occupying power to control the indigeneous population; and (4)the sources of assistance to the partisans from sources external to the country itself.
ditions when present will tend to strengthen the prospects for success of a resistance movement. A wide cross-section of the population will ideally be sympathetic to the aims of the resistance movement, and a people which are tenacious and hardy will provide a more fertile base from which to support the movement.
Those who take up arms against the
occupier must fight on terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare, the ground must be of their own choosing, and the terrain must not be geographically confining to the guerrillas. must come in several forms:
Support for the guerrillas
basic needs should be provided from within
the populition itself, and the movement must be supported by a regular armny or receive political and ether assistance from an external source. The resistance movement must be susceptible to organization with some degree of pyramidal leadership, and itmust evince the potential for establishing a civil administration once the occupying force is evicted.' To this latter end resistance forces will fight not only against the oppression of the conqueror, but they will fight for one of two goals to be met once the oppressor has been ejected:
restoration of the pre-
2 invasion regime or the establishment of a new political order.
A resistance movement may be divided into three comparatively distinct elements.
Although the categories tend to blur as one moves
along the continuum, the three elements are nevertheless discernible
14 and the definitions workable.
The three elements are the guerrilla
force itself, the auxiliary, and the underground.3 The guerrillas are the most easily identified and defined of these categories. Generally, they are conmmitted to furtherance of the movement on a full-time basis; p
carry arms or provide a combat support furnction; and, they are
joined together ina paramilitary organization.
The auxiliary provides
combat service support f~unctions such as food, medical support, labor,
local security, or cottage industry craftsmanship.
The underground is
the most amorphous because it conceals its affiliation while providing important services to the resistance forces. U
Taxi drivers and mistresses
relay intelligence information coaxed from their customers, the military personnel and civilian administrators of the occupying force.
civil administrators act as buffers to protect the citizens while serving in the government under the auspices of the occupying force. This paper focuses on the guerrilla organization on Mindanao, so some further 4 elaboration on guerrilla forces isuseful.
Without the conditions favorable to a resistance movement the guerrilla force would not be able to survive an aggressive elimination effort by the occupying force. U
The guerrilla forces conduct military
paramilitary operations to further their own strategy or to "cctnple-
ment, support, or extend conventional military operations." 5 These operations are characteristically violent and brief, and depend upon surprise and mobility.
Successful operations lower enemy morale and
prestige, increase support for the guerrillas, and inflict casualties upon the enemy's forces and his political and economic infrastructure p
causing him to divert manpower and resources to combat the guerrilla. The guerrilla force generally receives food and clothing from lical
15 sources, and arms, azmmunition and craimiinications equipment from external sources.
The latter isabsolutely essential Inorder for the guerrilla
force to be effective.
The guerrilla forces may be militarily and politically useful to invading liberation forces.
The guerrillas can be used to execute a
wide variety of missions ranging from employment as a conventional military force to the control of refugees, stragglers and prisoners.
provide sabotage, information col~ection, reconnaissance, guides, and a well-trained counterguerrilla force. Individuals will join the guerrillas ina resistance movement for any number of reasons.
Some are motivated by ideology, and some seek
personal or political gain through the acquisition of power or rank within the guerrilla organization itself.
Many will Join because of hatred
for the enemy caused by loss of loved ones or property.
will Join the guerrillas because it is safer to be a guerrilla or because they cannot find work in an economically damaged country. Some *
7 will become guerrillas as a result of coercion or intimidation.
This thesis will not deal to any length with the legdl Status Of guerrillas under the Law of Land Warfare. *
In the accepted sense of
international law, the legaC status of guerrillas was not a factor in the Japanese-Filipino relationship berause the Japanese did not recognize the international codes concerning prisoners of war and the status of belligerent soldiers.
In this regard, however, the Filipino resistance
movement differs little from the historical prototype, because conquering 8 powers have rarely granted guerrillas a recognized legal status.
The resistance movement on Mindanao -will be measured against the model discussed above inorder to weigh its success and to determine if
16 the mnodel does, in fact, serve as an adequate analytical tool. F_
so, a disclaimer should be made at the outset in regard to U. S. Army doctrine on leadership of resistance movements.
Although some may per-
ceive Army doctrine as envisioning the employment of American personnel as leaders and organizers of indigenous guerrilla forces in an area of operations, this is clearly not the Army's intention. 9 The Army has concluded that "The history of resistance movements shows conclusively that the guerrilla leadership must be indigenous--not imported from outside." 10 Therefore, Americdn personnel (the doctrine speaks directly to U. S. Army Special Forces) are not to seek cormmand of guerrilla forces with whom they have contact.
The experience on Mindanao would suggest a
major departure from this principle, but as this paper will demonstrate, the introduction of Americans as leaders of Filipino guerrilla units was a direct result of the unusual nature of the American experience in the Philippines prior to the war.
Insome measure it is the exception w'Ich
proves the rule. Chapter Four in this paper will discuss three of the four elements included in the resistance movement model:
(1)the terrain of Mindanao
and what impact it had upon the resistance movement; (2)the culture of the Filipino people in the broad sense and the cultural aspects peculiar to the resistance on Mindanao; and
(3)the policies of the Japanese in
the Philippines in general and on Mindanao in'particular. Chapter Five will focus entirely upon the leaders who guided the resistance movement on Mindanao and how they organized the guerrilla organization. Chapter Six continues the discussion of the Filipino culture on Mindanao but addresses a very specifi
aspect of the island's culture
17 the Filipino Mohaimmedans, or !4oros.
The discussion of the Moros is
better appreciated after having read how the guerrillas were organized, and so it is placed after the chapter on organization. The same is also true of the subject of Chapter Seven which is the external support received by the Mindanao resistarce movement. The fourth element in the model used in the thesis is external support to the movement, and its role In the Mindanao resistance is better'understood after having read how the guerrillas were organized. Chapter Eight discusses the operational employment of the guerrilla force and details the methods under which it functioned; the 9
response of the Japanese to the guerrilla forces; and, what effectiveness the guerrillas demonstrated as the combat amn of the Mindanao resistance. Chapter Nine draw conclusions from the discussion presented in the paper.
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES 1
F.O. Miksche, Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements, 1950, p. 96; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (U), Field Manual 31-20, September 30, 1977, 4-47. 2
Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution,
1956, p. 108. Headquarters, Department of the Army, "The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces," Training Circular 31-20-1, October 22, 1976, pp. 16-17. 3
The definition of a guerrilla may vary depending upon the specificity desired by the writer. Irwin R. Blacker, for, example, distinguishes "guerrillas" who fight outside of cities from "partisans" who 1iy4t within cities. Irwin R. Blacker, Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas: Great Stories From Rogers' Rangers to the Haganah, 1954, p. xvi. 5
Role of Special Forces, p. 17. For example, see "Logistical Support of Guerrilla Warfare," The Review, May-June 1962. 6
Special Forces Operations, pp. 55-56.
Useful, succinct discussions of the legal status of partisans and guerrillas under international law can be found in: Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 1962, Chapter 10, pp. 143-148; Robert D. Powers, Jr., "Guerrillas "andthe Laws of War," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare, 1963, pp. 23-27. 9
For example, see Marco J. Caraccia, "Guerrilla Logistics," Student Thesis, U.S. Army War College, April 8, 1966, p. 36. 10HQ, DA,
Special Forces Operations, p.
CHAPTER 4 BACKGROUND TO THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO Geography of Mindanao There are 7,083 islands within the Philippine Archpelago,
From the northernmost island of Luzon south to
of which have no names.
Mindanao lie great expanses of jungle, mountains and generally roadless terrain broken up by 11,000 miles of codstline.
The island chain is
divided roughly into three sections, the northern islands (Luzon), Negros, Cebu, Bohol,
central islands (Panay,
collectively as the Visayas),
Samar and Leyte:
and the southern islands (Mindanao, The comparative size of these areas
Palawan, and the Sulu Archipelago).
can be expressed in percentage of land area and population within the Philippine Archipelago:
The southern islands are the largest In land area and smallest in population, a factor which would affect the g'owth of the resistance movement on Mindanao. Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippine Archipelago with 36,537 square miles, about the size of the state of Indiana19
20 or the island of Hokkaido in the Japanese frame of reference.
island's coastline measures 1,400 miles and is defined by many gulfs, bays, inlets, capes, points and large peninsulas.
Described by General
Robert Eichelberger as "bewildering," the island has five major mountain systemis with a varied and complex topography that includes numerous rivers and a number of lakes. 2 Elevations in the mountain ranges r-un from 2,000 feet at the plateaus to a high at Mount Apo of 9,690 feet. There are two major river systems. in the Davao island.
The Agusan River flows for 100 miles
Agusan Trough from south to north on the east side of the
Inthe southwest the Cotabato Lowlands surround the Mindanao
River which flows from east to west through large swampy stretches. Bukidnon
Lanao Highlands with peaks rising to 9,500 feet contain the
134 square mile Lake Lanao.
Colonel Wendell Fertig described this area
as being "nearest to paradise.
A high, cool, grassy plateau, cut by deep
vertical walled canyons with blue-black mountains arising on all sides" 3 which reminded him of New Mexico.
Mindanao isactually divided into Zamboanga and Central Mindanao, "central" Mindanao including the eastern portion of the island as well. The island narrows to a width of nine miles between Illigan and Pagadian *
Bays, separating Zamboanga from Central Mindanao.
island is a single entity, but from a military tactical perspective, the island represents two distinct entities because of the narrowness of the strip 3f land which joins the two portions.
Zamboanga, the westernmost
portion, rises to a height of 8,420 feet just west of the narrow juncture of the two portions and tapers to a long narrow peninsula to the southwest. The terrain Is rugged and inhospitable.
21 of the island's geography has been portrayed by the recent discovery of the Tasaday tribe.
This primitive tribe had lived undetected ina rain
forest among 200 foot trees in an unexplored area of Cotabato Province near Supu for an estimated 500 to 1,000 years.
The irony is that this
tribe, which has no word in its vocabulary for "war," was never accidentally discovered by the Filipino guerrillas who hid from the Japanese in this area. The existence of the tribe was reported in 1971. 4In 1939 Mindanao's population density was 53 persons per square mile, with the population concentrated for the most part in the more hospitable coastal areas. Two main roads bisected Mindanao: Highway One running east and the Sayre Highway running north
These main arteries were
little more than improved trails, and roads throughout the entire island totalled only 790 miles.
There were many short, fast-running streams
which hindered even foot traffic along jungle trails.
On one 145 mile
stretch along Highway One from Parang to Davao, bridges averaged one to each mile and one-half of road. 6 Normnally considered obstacles, the two major water systems inMindanao
the Mindanao and Agusan Rivers
used for troop transport, resupply and evacuation by all the military forces which operated on Mindanao. By the end of the Japanese occupation, Mindanao had 60 airfields, of which from 11 to 22 were operational for normal operations, depending on whose figures are used: American, or guerrilla intelligence.
The island had eight major ports
7 with anchorages at three of them for capital ships.
Earthquakes occasionally shook Mindanao with little effect on the hardwood timber which was two feet thick and so hard with silicon that a gang of men with axes needed four days to chop one down.
22 black bees that could kill carabaos Cwater buffalo) and pythons that would kill men were conmmon.The natives would smear their legs with tobacco leaves to repel one-half inch long leeches which lived on shrubs and in slimy streams.
Swarmis of mosquitoes infested the island, along with
cobras, poisonous snakes, and crocodiles which dogged the footsteps of the unwary.
Farmers were subjected to recurring locust plagues, and
during the period of the
occupation vast hordes of rats left
the forests to destroy entire rice crops.
Not least of the hazards werie
inch-long rattan needles, bamboo spike traps set along trails for wild pigs, deer, and humans, and headhunters who inhabited the interior. 9
Avoidance of these hazards was no guarantee of long continued health, however, for disease abounded. Yaws, filariarsis, scabies, tropical ulcers, worm infestations, dysentary, dengue, cholera, typhoid, scrub typhus and fungus infections were prevalent In varying degrees. The largest killer was malaria.
Davao received rainfall of up to 11
8 inches a year, making the area a breeding ground for disease.
The Mindanao terrain was, in short, ideal guerrilla territory. The Japanese were unable to bring the strength of their army to bear upon the guerrillas:
the airplanes, ships, trucks, and conventional
tactical formations were only marginally effective in this terrain.
the terrain is neutral, and the advantage the guerrillas gained by withdrawing to the island's Interior was often negated by the reduced ability of the guerrillas to move' quickly and to communicate in the mountains and jungle. And, of course, by withdrawing to the interior, the guerrillas were to take a very heavy toll in casualties from disease and the natujral hazards of the jungle.
The generally accepted figure
for the percentage of the island controlled by the guerrillas is 95
The Japanese were "confined" to the roadways, ports, air-
fields, best agricultural areas on the island, and the major cities with their running water and electricity. In 1938 Vic Hurley reflected upon this rugged island and penned
this prophetic observation: There is a feeling of permanence about Mindanao that seems t;ohang in the air. One has but to step upon its gritty sand beaches and look back along the rolling jungled hills to know that here is a land whici" is pregnant with unpleasant memories and bristling with unwritten stories. It had been stained with the blood of a dozen races of men. It was a land where illusions and men had died -- and where more men were to die.10 The Culture of Mindanao On the eve of the Japanese invasion in 1939, the population of the Philippines was 16,000,303 Filipinos. were 8,709 Americans,
Throughout the islands there
117,000 Chinese, 1.149 Germans,
and 29,200 Japanese.
Unofficial estimates of the Japanese population ran as high as 50,000.12 There were three primary religious croups in the islands: Christians, and Mohammedans.
The Census Bureau defined two classifica-
tions, Chvistians and non-Christians.
The Christians represented 90
percent of the population, and 88 percent of these were Roman Catholic, the religion inherited from the Spanish. Filipinos, or Moros as they are called. 13
There were 500,000 Mohammedan On Mindanao the Christians
were the largest religious group, and they were made up mainly of Visayans who had migrated to Mirdanao from Cebu,
Panay and Rohol and
settled along the island's northern coast in the Misamis Oriental rtlion. Although largest in number, this group was second in political power to the Filipino Christians of Spanish and Chinese descent, the Mestizos.
The Filipinos were divided racially into three broad grcups -Negrito, Indonesian and Malay
and many subgroups, almost indistinguishable
24 from one another, resulting from centuries of intermarriage.
sequently, the best test for distinguishing one group from another was the language spoken by each.
Language grouping is generally accepted
as the primary means of cultural difierentiation among the Filipinos, rather than race, religion or socio-economic levels.
The 1939 census reported eight major native languages with 60 different dialects.1
Of the eight major languages known collectively
as the Lowland Christian languages,
Ilokano and Pangasinan were spoken
on Northern Luzon, and Cebuano, Tagalog, Ilongo, and Pampangan were spoken south of Luzon.
Cebuano was the major
language spoken on Mindanao, with many dialects found additionally among the Moros and tribes of the interior.
In 1939 English was the second
language with approximately 28 percent of the Filipino population able to speak or understand the language.
The ability to communicate among
the various guerrilla groups was important to the success of the resistance movement, and an appreciation for the subtleties of the Filipino expression of ideas was crucial to the non-Filipino. dialects are "flowery languages,
principally because it is possible to
transmit exact ideas only by means of the ellipsis and the illusion," and in this respect they differ from the Japanese and Western languages. The ability to communicate ideas using Filipino expressions was fundamental to Colonel Fertipl's success in organizing the Filipino guerrillas on Mindanao; conversely, tihe evidence woul,
iggest that the Japanese
failed to make the attempt. "Mindanao has always been something of 'another country'' wrote Beth Day in her account of the Philippines.20 invasion assessment had it,
Or, as the Japanese pre-
Mindanao was the "most uncivilized" island
25 in the archipelago.21
Malay had fought against Ming,
quistadore, Moro against Anerican regulars, Constabulary, and now Moros,
Moro against con-
Moro against Philippine
Anericans and Christian Filipinos were to
fight against the Japanese and amongst each other. 2 2
Portuguese, English and Japanese, no strangers to warfare on Mindanao, would sit this one out. The recorded history of Mindanao dates from 1521 A.D.,
Magellan sailed through the Surigao Strait and landed at the mouth of the Agusan River, thereby making Mindanao the first island in the archipelago known to have been walked upon by a white man.
the 13th Century, Mohammedan missionaries from Java had converted the Filipino natives from their Hindu influences and had colonized the island to some extent.
There followed centuries of warfare under Spanish rule
through 1898, and Mindanao was then to become the scene of bitter fighting between the Moros and the Americans through 1913. Mindanac is geographically divided chiefly between the plains and the mountains.
Broadly speaking, the Moros lived in the mountains,
and the Christians lived in the lowlands, with little or no interchange among the people.
The warrior-like mountain people despised the low-
landers as cowards and would occasionally raid their villages for women and slaves. ians.
The lowlanders thought the mountaineers ingnorant barbar-
tribes were nomadic ano lived both in the
interior and along the coast, engaging in fishing, rice cultivation, and the raising of livestock and poultry. Manobos,
Included in this group were the
Bagobos, Mandayas, Bukidnons, Titurays, Subanums, Bilaans,
Magahats and Negritos.
The latter, the Negritos, were black nomadic
aborigines of near-pygmy proportions who slept in nests of leaves in the
26 trees and hunted with potassium cyanide-tipped arrows. inhabitants were principally Cebuanos and M~estizos.
The Principal Moro
tribes, on whom a later chapter is devoted, were the Maranaos and Magindanaos.
the Christians, Moros and Pagans
spoke different dialects, warfare could break out between them on the slightest pretense, and traders normally represented the only link among the groups. The guerrilla leader was handicapped from the start with an island people that were not homogeneous in any way other than their connon racial heritage
virtually all were of Malayan descent.
Itwas not uncoimmon
as the American guerrillas moved deep into the interior to come upon tribes who had never seen a white man before, far less be able to understarl or care about the resistance movement against the Japanese.
they chose to garrison only t?,e port cities and principal lowland agricultural areas of cne island, the cultural make-up of the island was of commuensurately less consequence to the Japanese. Citizens of the principal antaronists in the general conflict lived on Mindanao.
The Chinese, whose country was ravaged by the Japan-
ese, might have been expected to take up arms against the Japanese, but this was not the case.
Eleven percent of the Chinese in the Philippine
Islands lived on Mindanao, but they played a negligible role in the resistance. 24 They were primarily shopkeepers who endeavored to divorce themselves of the attentions of both adversarias.
There were 570 German
males in the Philippines in 1939, only 32 of whom we,-e on Mindanao.
were concentrated in Davao City and Zamboanga City, both occupied by the Japanese. 25Only one German appears to have made his mark in the resistance, and he was an officer in the Mindanao guerrilla "coastal navy." The American population in the Philippines was not as large as
27 the Japanese population which numbered 29,000. military personnel,
Excluding active duty
the number of Americans totalled 8,707 (5,129 males).
On Mindanao in 1939 there were 712 Americans, primarily businessmen, clergy and retired soldiers who had served in the Philippines during the Philippine Pacification. nent residents.
Many had taken Filipino wives and were perma-
Where the Americans were located at the time of the
Japanese landings on Mindanao dictated in large measure what role they would play in the
asistance movement, if any.
the locations of Americans on Mindanao in 1939.
The chart below depicts The chart does not in-
clude active duty members of the United States or Philippine Commonwealth Armed Forces, nor is there any way to know exactly how many of these people departed from Mindanao when war with Japan appeared imminent. AMERICANS AND JAPANESE ON MINDANAO 1939 PROVINCE Agusan
AMERICANS* 7 (6)
*( ) indicates number of males. **(
) 50% of these mnles were between 20 and 64 years of age.
28 The chart also contains figures for the Japanese presence on Mindanao for comparison with the location of the Americans.
The population of Mindanao was reported by the census to be 1,997,304, so the impact of the Americans and Japanese on the population would appear to be negligible.
But the influence of each was dispro-
portionate to its percentage, because within the social and economic fabric of the Mindanao culture, each played a ledding role both in 1939 and for the next six years. The Japanese Occupation Policies In the decade preceding Japan's invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese had established strong economic ties with the Filipinos.
focus of this activity was centered upon Davao Province in Mindanao.
the period 1930 to 1939, 18,946 Japanese immigrants had come to the Philippine Islands, averaging Just over 2,000 a year.
these immigrants were males, over half of whom were 20 to 44 years of age.
Eighty percent of the immigrants settled In Davao, Manila and the
Mountain Province of Luzon.
The Japanese lived in every province In
the Philippines except Romblon, and every tovn had at least one or two Japanese nationals living in it. Most of the Japanese owned small shops which sold Japanese goods. terization today to say it,
Although it sounds like a trite overcharacmany carried cameras,
and "They knew the
countryside in sope localities as its own nationals did not; they were sometimes called upon to conduct strangers through little known districts." Of some 29,000 Japanese in the islands, 64 percent (18,733) were living on Mindanao, and approximately 95 percent of those on Mindanao lived in Davao Province (17,888 residents).30
29 Japanese economic penetration of Davao was begun in 1907 by the Ohta Development Company which initially imported 150 Japanese laborers to work in the abaca fieids. 31
This early foothold grew into Japanese
interests inshipping, fishing, lumber, and in the iron, manganese and copper mines.
The immuigrants established their own schools, newspapers,
stores and banks.
The crown piece of the economic exploitation rernaineo
the abaca plantations, however, for ultimately the Japanese owned 70 percent of the hemp produced in Davao, and they controlled the remainder through one means or another. The Japanese investment in the Philippines was over 64 million pesos (32 million dollars), 50 million pesos of qhich 32
was invested in Davao.
Japanese ownership of Philippine land ultimately caught the attention of the Philippine central government.
To stem the Japanese
investments, the Coemmonwealth government passed the Public Land Act of 1936 which required that at least 60 percent of the capital of any corpopublic be owned by Filipinos. ration dealing with thon
circumnvented this law, and by 1939 Japanese investors owned between 142,000 and 148,000 acres of land in Davao of which only 70,000 (apjproximately) acres were legally acquired.33 The Filipinos began to view Japanese manipulation of the laws with concern, and itbecame a commonly held view inboth Manila and Davao that once the Philippines gained independence from America in July, 1946, the Japanese would increasingly gain political and economic control of the islands.
This was not viewed
by most Filipinos with any real alarnn, however, because generally speaking the Japanese had been good citizens and had brought economic growth to Davao.
30 The opposing view was that the Japanese represented a real threat to the Philippines as a whole.
Some Filipinos did hold to the view that
the Japanese were arrogant, and there was a pre-war saying in Tagalog which went:
"Pasukab kung tumingin, parang Hon
treacherous manner like a Jap.".
eyes you in a
Americans complained of Japanese
pirates in the waters around the Philippines who raided merchant shipping, causing American and Filipinc businesses to close down because they could 1 14no
longer pay the prohibitive shipping rates caused by the pirating.3 In addition, Japan's war on China had taught many Filipinos what they might expect from Japan in the long run, and "America's unconcealed symipathy for China brought her in turn the hatred of Japan and as a 37 side Issue left the Filipino. .. to face the direct enmity of Japan."1
The large number of Chinese in the Philippines led also to the popularity of the idea that China was "waging the war of the democracies," a direct 38 affront to the Japanese. The upshot of this was passage of the Immigration Act of 1940 whereby the Philippine government established a quota on the number of foreigners who could enter the Philippines as immigrants.
The quota limit, set at 500 immigrants per country, was
viewed by the Japanese as an open challenge and consequent "loss of *
face," although the logic of the Japanese position could not bear close argument for the Filipino limnigrants inJapan were barred from owning land inJapan. *
the war itself the Japanese niot only recognized the
importance of Mindanao to the prosecution of their war efforts in the Southwest Pacific, but they also realized the necessity for ensuring the *
security of the long-held interests inDavao Province.
The First Air
Fleet Headquarters with the Army's 15th Air Regiment was located here,
31 as was the Army headquarters for the Mindanao forces.
placed some sy.mbolic importance upon Mindanao as an expression of the Japanese claims on the Philippines because of the pre-war commitments in the Davao area, and one may conclude that the Japanese knew at least as much about the island of Mindanao as they did about any island in the archipelago because of their pre-war comnitmnent in Davao. 40
the knowledge which the Japanese had gained in their years of cultural and economic exchange with the Filipinos was either ignored or not understood, for the Japanese occupation policies demonstrated a profound ignorance of the Filipino culture. Japanese success in the Philippines was necessary if they were to expect to weld the Far East into an anti-Western bloc.
But in the
application of their Greater Far East Co-Prosperity Sphere policies, the Japanese demonstrated a twisted formn of logic, as expressed in the following proclamation, the substance of which wa3 to be published many times in different forms in the Philippines:
We have no intention of conquering any Asiatic people, nor do we have any territorial desire on any Oriental nation... .But ifyou fail to understand the true and lofty purpose of Japan, and instead obstruct the successful prosecution of the military activities and tactics of the Imperial Japanese Forces, whoever you are, we shall come and crush you with our might and power, thus compel you to realize by means of force the true significance and meaning of our mission in the Far East.ComneInhiffte Imperial Fort-es February 1942 The Japanese occupation policy in the Philippines developed in
three phases. 1941 through May 1942.
The first phase was the early months, December This phase was characterized by military cruelty
and Japanese irritation, befuddlement and impatience caused by the reaction
32 of the Filipino population
the Filipinos were sullen, unfriendly, and
openly unenthusiastic with their "liberation" by the Japanese conquerors. The second phase began with the fall of Bdtaan and Corregidor and lasted through August 1944.
During this period, the occupation government
emphasized the principles of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Filipino puppet government with its Japanese dictated constitution was established. Nevertheless, harsh treatment of the populace continued dur~ilg 'his phase. The Japanese referred to the period covered by the first two phases as the "quiet period."4
The beginning of the third and final phase was
marked by the first Allied air attacks on Davao City and Manila in August and September 1944.
Japanese policy quickly became hysterical and the
brutality was less calculated and moie wanton. The Japanese began econom-ic exploitation of the Philippines soon after their invasion. This exploitation and the mistreatmient of the people exposed the real nature of Japan's true purposes.
businesses and small shops were closed, utilities were turned off, transportation shut down, and theaters, radios and newspapers banned. By 1943 there were 1,149 Filipino businesses with Japanese administrators, from dancing schools to banks. 43 The economic infrastructure was stripped and exported to other Japanese occupied areas inAsia.
equipment was dismantled and .jhipped away, and thousands of automobiles, trucks, and piece~s of farm equipment were dismantled, pressed, baled and shipped to Japan as scrap. 44Grain and rice harvests were seized by the Japanese to provide supplies for the Imperial Forces, and those not seized were oftentimes burned. 45 This policy was especially damaging on Mindanao where the staple of the Filipino diet, rice, could be grown only in the coastal regicns and river basins, areas controlled by the
33 Japanese or easily accessible to them.
The Japanese destroyed not only
the mining and manufacturing infrastructure of the economy, but they dismantled the support system for the peasant farmiers as well.
Japanese slaughtered carabaos for meat, leaving the Tamier without the animal labor needed to cultivate the fields at the same time that they were taking approximately one-third of the fertile land out of cultivation through destruction.
The results of the economic disruption caused by the occupation policies were nearly disastrous.
There was a high rate of unemployment,
inflation drove prices very high, and goods needed for dally living wel-e no longer available, which led to a thriving black market.
duction and import of medicines stopped with the Japanese occupation allowing disease to take hold on the population
beriberi and typhus in particular.
The Japanese administrators never really seemed able to come to grips with the problem.
They perceived that the populace was "gradually"
turning against them, but they blamed this on the failure of the Filipinos themselves to support the "Philippine industry" whose policies of "unsuitable employments (sic) resulted in a mark~ed increase in numbers of the poor." 48 In other words, they blamed it on the Filipinos themselves. The Japanese believed that their "subjugative operations" brought peace and order to this Filipino problem, however. 49
When American forces
invaded Mindanao, they found plentiful food stores in the Japanese garrisons, providing futher evidence of' how the Japanese had misperceived their responsibility to the people of the country they were administering. In fact, the Japanese had used food as a weapon, rewarding collaborators 50 with food and withholding it from those who did not collaborate.
34 The Japan~ese had not completely ignored the generally hostile attitude of the Filipinos.
Nevertheless, as they did with other guerrilla
and resistance movements elsewhere, they gave the Filipino resistance short shrift.
A Japanese battle order for the Philippines directed
soldiers to "Shoot guerrillas. 51
All who oppose the Emperor.. .will be
The Japanese perceived the guerrillas to be a manifestation
of Filipino dissatisfaction and this can be seen in their terminology. Guerrillas were "bandits," and counterguerrilla operations were called
"punitive expeditions" in internal Japanese documents. 52 Japanese radio broadcasts in both Japan and the Philippines assured the listeners that all was "quiet and secure' in the Philippines, and, in Mindanao's case, 53 the "Peace and order in Mindanao and Sulu are highly satisfactory."
The Fil pinos themselves had become "very astute at identifying contradictions and rationalizing discrepancies" in both Allied and Japanese radio broadcasts, for by now they could gather in the barrio (village) plaza ,nd listen to each on the short-wave radio, provided Japanese soldiers were not in the area. 54 At five o'clock P.M. everyday, an Allied broadcast would be beamed at the Philippines.
with General Mackrthur intoning "I shall return" and end promptly at six o'clock P.M. with another promise to return. 55Ultimately, although the Japanese continued to underestimate
or at the very least understate
the degree of unrest and popular support for the guerrillas, they did come to recognize the growing support for the guerrillas and the impact that this support would have when the Americans eventually returned to the Philippines inforce.
Japanese prc'oaganda belied the real struggle that was on-going between the guerrilla resistance and the Japanese forces.
35 a "bitter, endless struggle," the war between the guerrillas and the Japanese was played out with no quarter given by either side.
and American guerrillas shot down Japanese whenever they could."
Japanese would retaliate by placing the severed heads of guerrillas "on stakes around the Philippine barrios as a warning to others not to ,join the Resistance movement."5
Ultimately, the Japanese used the full rp'nge
of tools traditionally available to a government to fight guerrillas. They coordinated the activities of regular military units, national and local police, national intelligence and security elements, special police, agents, informers, and the public colmmunications system.5 dead guerrillas were paid to Filipinos in the form of food
Bounties for --
a bag of rice or passes for meat or other foodstuffs would be exchanged for the head of a guerrilla. 59These tactics rarely worked, for few Filipinos would involve themselves with bribes, rewards or bounties.
Japanese "concept of counterinsurgency was still rudimentary" because in the end their tactics boiled down to saturation of a particular area with combat troops in the hopes of isolating and eliminating the guerrilla leadership. 60 The tactic rarely worked.
The tools described above,
although utilized by the Japanese, were often employed ina manner most likely to ensure failure.
In today's expression, the Japanese were either
simply not intercsted in "winning the hearts and minds" of the Filipinos, or they had no clue as to how to go about doing so.
The remainder of
this chapter will deal with this failure and the impact it had upon the guerrilla movement. One student of Philippine history wrote of the Japanese occupation policies:
"There seems to have been such an unshakable prepossession with
Japan's inherent superiority, divine mission, and giorious destiny that 61 The magnitude of the very idea of resistance was intolerable heresy."
this tolerance is found in the estimate that one out of every 20 6 ~Filipinos died at the hands of the Japanese during the occupation.6 The most fearsome instrument through which the Japanese dealt with those who resisted was the Kempei Tai. 63 Administered by the War
Ministry, the Kempei Tai was the Amy's military police which had fu11 authority for the arrest and investigation of civilians and combatants alike.
Experts inthe application of torture and the implementation of
terror, the Kemnpel Tai, worked
with the occupation atmy and civil
administrators, which sought to turn the people against the guerrillas through brute force. 64The Kempei Tai even had a training manual P
entitled Notes for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War.
methods for gaining information were "the magic eye" and "zona," (or "zonification"). Under "zoniflcation" the Japanese would seize a barrio or town and zone it off (encircle it). be herded into the town square.
The men of the barrio would then
After proclamations, denunciations, and
general haranguing was finished, a hooded man with eyelets cut In the hood would be brought out; "the Magic eye". spy or purported captured guerrilla
would scan the crowd and pick out
guerrilla spies, guerrillas or sympathizers.
These unfortunates would
then be publicly tortured, roasted alive, drawn and quartered, buried alive, or, the end result inmost cases, beheaded.
Needless to say, the
approach of the Japanese to any barrio normally resulted In immediate evacuation and flight to the hills. On return to their barrios, people would find ransacked homes, homes leveled for their lumber or just burned to the Iround, and half-eaten animals and fowls left rotting in the street. V
Bodies would have been disinterred in a search for jewelry and family belongings buried around the houses dug up. 65 The International War
Commission used detailed information of this sort collected by
guerrilla units in its post-war deliberations. Japanese treatment of pr',soners held in their internment camps was also widely known by Filipinos outside the prison walls.66
internment camp on Mindanao was the Davao Penal Colony which remained agonizingly just beyond the reach of the Mindanao guerrillas.
period April 1942 to September 1942, no fewer than 200 prisoners were buried each day in this Japanese internment camp. were buriad in all.
In this period 27,000
The Filipino prisoners generally fared even worse
than American prisoners in these camps,
presumably because their heresy
to th2 Japanese cause hds greater than the crime of just being a Westerner.
The Filipinos often worked things out, however.
the Japanese would not give Red Cross packages sent from the United States to the American prisoners.
The Filipino cooks in the prison camp
would pilfer portions of the food when preparing it for the Japanese guards and give it to the prisoners -- a unique logistics chain.
The Japanese dealt with captured guerrillas accurling to their ancient code of Bushido.70
Lisisting that captured Americans and
Filipinos were "captives of war," not prisoners of war, they were told that they could expect nothing. as guerrillas.
This applied to Army regulars as well
The Japanese again demonstrated a twist in logic, for
Japanese officials declared on the one hand "unprecedented clemency of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines," yet on the other hand they would declare that all captives were merely bandits and that they had "every right to kill all prisoners." and extent of Japanese me-
An indication of the severity
Is in dealing with the guerrillas can be
found in records of trials held for captured guerrillas.
38 contain the names of hundreds of Filipino guerrillas who were tried and summarily sentenced to death on charges of "baneful action" and being a "guerrilla.'
The Japanese certainly ignored the wisdrn of Sun Tzu,
whose writings had served the Samurai well.
Sun Tzu had written, "Treat
the captives well, and care for them...All soldiers taken must be cared for with magnaninity and sincerity so that they may be used by us."'
Of the Japanese treatment of prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony, General Douglas MacArthur had this to say:
"This unimpeachable record
of savagery and merciless brutality to captured prisoners-of-war fills me with unspeakable horror."
.ihe Japanese were particularly picqued by the protection provided by the Filipinos to the Americans still remaining unsurrendered throughout the islands.
This gro,,p included priests, women and children
as well as American guerrillas.
The continued freedom of the Americans
was a testament to the courage of the Filipinos, for any Filipinos found to have sheltered or protected an American were summarily executed after much torture.
The courage was widely distributed, for there are many
accounts of Americans coming down from the hills, having been ordered to appear for public execution by the local Japanese military commander,
order to save entire villages from being put to the sword for having harbored them. proclamation: safety ar'
In December 1943, the Japanese published the following "The amnesty under which Americans have been guaranteed
internment by the Imperial Japanese Government is about to
After January 25, 1944, any American found in the Islands, 76 exect'ted."' whether unsurrendered soldier or civilian, will be summa-Ily expire.
The Japanese were true to their word, for aggressive Japanese patrols hunted down American families hiding in the mountains and killed many
39 prior to the January 25th deadline.
This proclamation led General
MacArthur to drastically increase his efforts to extract by submarine Americans who were not fighting with the guerrillas.
coordinated by Colonel Fertig on Mindanao for the most part, isgenerally viewed as one of the most significant contributir sthe guerrillas made during the war.
That the Japanese would become so obsessed with a hand-
ful of women, babies and elderly men hiding decep in the mountainous rain forests speaks volumes about their hatred for the Americans and the bankruptcy of their policies to achieve total domination of the Filipinos. The extreme actions implemented by the Japanese merely served to increase the bitterness and brutality of the engagements between the guerrillas and Japanese regulars. As the last statement intimates, brutality was not solely within the purview of the Japanese. atrocities, as well.
Guerrilla units commiltted a share of the
As Teodoro A. Agoncillo concludes in his assessment
of the Japanese occupation, the guerrillas often brutalized the Filipino The guerrillas were very hard
civilians far worse than the Japanese did.
on any Filipino who was perceived as willingly giving aid and comfort to the Japar~ese, and Filipinos had been killed for merely talking to the
78Japarsese civilians were not entirely safe from guerrilla reprisals either. When the American invasion forces assaulted Leyte and Luzon, the Japanese began to consolidate the Japanese civilians on Mindanao inorder to evacuate them to Japan.
Ina brutal march from
Surigao to Cagayan, the Japanese Army attempted to conduct a forced march of 5,000 Japanese including women and children to the Cagayan evacuation point.
Less than 3,400 made it,and very few women and children survived
Disease, exhaustion and the guerrillas had taken their toll
40 on the column.
The difference between the Japanese and the guerrillas in these matters ultimately became one of judicial procedures, for General 80 MacArthur had made his influence felt all the way from Australia.
While he would not have condoned much of what the guerrillas did, his insistence that the laws of war, Article 82 of the Philippine Articles of War, and the laws of America be strictly adhered to tempered the
excesses of the guerrillas.
Unlike the Japanese, the guerrillas main-
tained records of trial for informers and spies, testimony was heard and affadavits filed. g
GHQ, SWPA was the Convening Military Authority for
A Judgement of guilty brought a swift and merci-
ful execution as opposed to the prolonged suffering common to the Japanese executions.
As with the Japanese, the preferred method of
execution was decapitation, which the Filipinos delivered with the barong, a large two-handed Moro sword.8 Brutalization of the civilians by the guerrillas is commonly associated with the early phise of the resistance movement, the latter half of 1942.
In these cases the civilians were most often mistreated
for reasons having nothing to do with the Japanese. 82 Itwas during this u
that the few Americans involved w~ith atrocities rose to notoriety.
John P.O'Day on Luzon and Harry Fenton on Cebu were the most notorious of these.
Colonel Fertig was aware of Fenton's practices and was building
a record against him when the effort was made moot nated by his own chief of staff.
Fenton was assassi-
Of the Philippine guerrillas and their standing under international law, this has been said:
"Mo guerrilla movement can operate
entirely within the restrictions of the Articles of War, the Geneva
or the Rules of Land Warfare, and the World War II guerrilla
movement in the Philippines was no exception to this generalization."84 The people who suffered for this extra-legal activity were most often the Filipino civilians.
Although less common on
Mindanao than on other
islands, guerrillas would ambush Japanese patrols on the outskirts of a town.
The Japanese would then come and burn the town in reprisal and kill
everyone in it.
The civilians were happy to help the guerrillas if they
would just confine their ambushes to the unpopulated areas.
guerrillas, in turn, saw no reason to invite the Japanese into their mountain sanctuaries and thought it reprehensible and unpatriotic for the men in the villages to object to being slaughtered along with their wives and children on behalf of the guerrillas.
The rate varied, but the
Japanese would exact a ratio of anywhere from 100:1 to 200:1 to an entire barrio for every Japanese soldier killed.
Generally throughout th- islands, guerrilla units led by Americans did not develop the strategy of attacking Japanese patrols near the villages.87
And the guerrillas on Mindanao were under strict guidance
from Colonel Fertig to avoid situations which would invite Japanese reprisals against the civilian populace. Colonel R. W. Volckmann nevertheless described a dilemma on Luzon which Colonel Fertig had to confront on Mindanao.
"It was generally found that areas which had n- guerrilla for long periods were the hardest to bring back under control.
In some instances severe
measures had to be taken against individuals or groups who resisted the move to re-establish control."
fear of the Japs,
created by their barbarous and inhuman acts, was overpowered by the quiet, sometimes ferocious, but always persistent methods of their own
The idea was that once committed to the resistance movement,
irrespective of the motivation for the commitment, an individual was unlikely to turn again to the enemy.
In eastern Mindanao the Japanese
maintained control through most of the war.
In this coastal area a
Japanese captain had treated the population well. into a decision he did not want to make.
This forced Fertig
The Filipinos were either on
the side of the Philippine resistance or they sided with the Japanese. As a principle there could be no neutral, middle ground.
were, therefore, directed to conduct sabotage and assassinate Japanese leaders in the area in order to provoke Japanese reprisals against the towns.
The Japanese, in doing so, would now be exposed as the true
This was done, but it appears to be the only instance recorded
89 where Fertig consciously made such a decision.
In implementing the more brutal aspects of the Philippine occupation policy, the Japanese confronted, unwittingly or otherwise, the fundamental character of the Philippine culture.
"The Filipino holds
sacred beyond all things his church, his family and his home. were systemlatically violated."
By attacking the things held most dear
by the Filipinos, the Japanese calculated that leverage would be achieved over each individual.
The policy had much the same result as the
reprisals, because a situation was created by which each action from either side brought an equal or greater counterreaction from the other. The church inthe Philippines was strengthened during the occupation period, and the Mindanao experience reflects this conclusion. At the war's beginning there were 80 Catholic priests on Mindianao.
August 1944, there were just 40 priests rem~aining alive or out of captivity to administer baptisms, cunduct marriages, and preside over
43 funerals. There clergymen became known as "guerrilla priests" for they T
travelled clandestinely with guerrilla units and were considered to be the most secure means of messenger communuication. 9 1 Father Edward Haggerty, who provides one of the best personal accounts of the Mindanao
guerrillas, gives the reason why this was so: betray, above all, an American priest.
"I knew no Filipino would
I remembered that I once lived
safely with a man who was the chief of Japanese spies."9 The priests would travel to remote areas to conduct services, hear confessions, and conduct mass marriages and baptisms.
One step ahead of the Japanese,
they served as a vital link which helped hold the island population t'igether.
One might also conclude that because of their close relation-
ship with both the guerrilla leaders and the civilian leaders they were able to encourage moderation by the gierrillas in their treatment of the civilians who had to live under the Japanese. The Area Handbook for the Philippines gives this assessment of Filipino social values:
"The system of social values adhered to by
Filipinos of all wialks of life emphasizes a strong sense of personal
honor, dignity, and pride."
Filipinos have "agreat reluctance to act
in any way that might offend or insult other-s." 93
Of paramount importance
within this framework is the family which is the focus of social, economic, religious and, to a degree, political activity.
Loya ty to
the faminly transcends loyalty to the commnunity, the church and to political affiliations. scale of values.
Marriages are especially important within this
Within the framework of these values, it is easy to understand why various Japanese practices in the treatment of the population caused
44 such a strong reaction frolil the Filipinos.
The Japanese treated the
Filipino civilians much the same as they treated their prisoners of war and civilian internees.
Civilians, regardless of station in the society,
were required to bow to the meanest so~ldier or bureaucrat. W
do so would elicit a wide range of responses, the most common of which was a slap in the face. Japanese army.
Slapping was a commnon form of rebuke in the
Therefore, the Japanese perception of the act was not
intended to carry with it the meaning it had for the Filipinos, for whom it was a most grievous insult to the sense of personal honor and machismo inculcated in them by centuries of Spanish rule. 95 But the Japanese were not benignant sovereigns, and failure to bow could carry the severest penalties, such as being executed, trussed and hung in the barrio square or fried alive on galvanized iron in the hot sun.96 Teodoro Agoncillo appraises the Filipino and gives a hint to his likely reaction to Japanese arrogance:
"Generally vindictive, the Filipino does not easily
forget an Insult or an injury inflicted upon him. "9
strong reaction from the people In response to these slapping incidents merely invited a stronger Japanese reaction. The Japanese made one of their most grievous errors through their treatment of the Filipino women.
As one Japanese commnander announced on
Mindanao, "'Fonrmerly women under America, so high' his head
98 'now, under Nippon, so lowl' stooping to the ground."
Daughters were taken from their families to be prostitutes and concubines for the Japanese army.99 When husbands and fathers would not cooperate with the Japanese, wives and daughters were raped and otherwise sexually abused before the man. 100 For the Filipino, personal honor, and in p~articular a woman's honor, "issacred and can only be abused at the risk
of one's life."
As the seasoned Japanese combat units were reassigned
elsewhere in the Pacific after the American surrender, poorly disciplined third rate occupation troops, many of whom were Korean and Formosan conscripts, were brought to Mindanao to garrison the island. 10 2
abuse of the Filipino women and personal wrongs inflicted became widespread, so did the number of men who had a debt to pay. individual
family, or barrio could not pretend to deal with the Japanese
army alone, there was only one alternative
Join the guerrillas as
their means to repay the affront to their honor. In this discussion of Japanese occupation policies a word must be said of the Philippine government which helped administer the Japanese policies.
The discussion in this paper only alludes to the issue of
collaboration and how the puppet government functioned.
This issue is
very complex and emotion-filled with sources an the subject found in the bibliography.
What the government actually did that directly affected
the guerrillas will be discussed here. InAugust 1943 the Japanese sought to persuade the Filipino people to support the Japanese war effort by establishing an independent government and giving the Philippines independence.10 *
Philippine government enabled the Japanese to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Philippines calling for close political, economic and military cooperation for prosecution of the 'military actions to be by Japan."'104 Furthermore, by creating a Philippine govern-
ment, jurisdiction over the guerrillas now reverted to the puppet govarnment.
The Filipino guerrillas were, therefore, no longer combatants in
a war but were now traitors to their own government, or just commnon 1 5 bandits, under the fictions of the new legal code. ]'
46 In an abrupt change of policy in October 1943, the newlyinstalled president Jose P. Laurel deciared amnesty for all political prisoners and set free thousands of imp-isoned guerrillas.
ment further declared amnesty for all guerrillas and set a January 20, 1944 deadline for their surrender after which the government "may take drastic action to force the guerrillas to surrender.'
demonstrated thereby no resolution to carry out the threat, and the guerrillas, sensing the weakness of the government's position, simply ignored the threat.
The consequence of these actions, and one that was
privately supported by some members of the Laurel government, was that the newly-freed prisoners, having survived the brutality of the internment camps,
joined the guerrillas, and the free guerrillas did not turn them-
During the 120 day "pacification program" many Filipino
leaders publicly remonstrated against the guerrillas but privately aided the resistance movement.
The three-month hiatus gave the guerrillas an
opportunity to regroup, and the respite gave the guerrilla units the chance to assimilate and train their new members.107
However, the pro-
gram was given the appearance of success because lists of fictitious names and unserviceable firearms were "surrendered" to the local Filipino authorities.
On paper the amnesty program was working.
Mindanao the standdown in activity came at a critical time.
Fertig had reached a critical point in his organizing of the Mindanao guerrillas, having just weathered a three-month period during which the Japanese had mounted a concerted offensive against his headoiarters and his chief of staff had led a revolt against him.
The Japanese did not initially consider the guerrillas a military threat, but they did fear the power gained by the guerrillas which came
47 from the approval given the guerrillas by the bulk of the population.
deal with the guerrillas the Japanese reconstituted the Philippine Constabulary in February 1942 and gave it limited authority in May 1942. 110 The Japanese hope was that the Constabulary, in confronting the guerrillas, Filipino against Filipino, would bring legitimacy to the Japanese counterguerrilla program and that they would eventually be used against the Amiericans as a conventional force.
The irony here is that the
Japanese tried to use the Philippine Constabulary for the same purpose for which it was originally formed by the Americans, to wit: and eliminate guerrilla bands.
All parties were happy with this decision:
for the Japanese the Constabulary would free Japanese troops for other duty, MacArthur's headquarters believed that the brutal treatment of the Filipino people would lessen, and the guerrillas saw in the Constabulary an impotent if not neutral foe. President Laurel, who categoried the guerrillas as "fools" and "renegades," decided in November 1943 to increase the sizb of the Philippine Constabulary to 40,000, and he recruited or impressed many former officers and noncoimmissioned officers of the Constabulary back into service. Major General Paulino Santos, a former Constabuldry officer, Governor of Lanao and Director of the Land ' ttlement Ackninistration, was appointed February 4, 1944 as Commissioner of Mindanao with quasi-military authority aver the island. The Philippine Constabulary had very limited success in controlling guerrilla activity, so on June 10, 1944 Laurel created the Bureau of Investigation within the Constabulary, apparently to mimic Japanese practices, for the bureau had the powers and mission of the Kempei Tai. By July 14, 1944 Laurel had published Proclamation Number 20 which, in
48 effect, reverted responsibility for dealing with the guerrillas back to the Japanese.
The proclamation made sabotage a violation of Japanese
military law, publicly admitted for the first time the existence of such Filipino activity, and made execution the punishment for interferring with Japanese activitips in the islands.
By October 1944 the Japanese
began to disarm, disband and intern the Constabulary members. The guerrillas had made good use of the Constabulary while it existed.
It was a ready source of weapons, whether turned over con-
spiratorially or won through military action.
The Constabulary felt
an affinity for the guerrillas, often readily assisted the guerrillas Swhiere
possible, and struck tacit agreements on "no contact" zones.
served concurrently with the Constabulary and the guerrillas.
the Constabulary saw little reason to die fighting Filipinos,
course, many knew that to openly engage the guerrillas, who had the support of the local populace, was bargaining for a post-war firing squad. Another means through which the Japanese sought to deal with the PY
guerrillas wa4 through a universal single-party political organization the Kalibapi.
The Japanese launched the Kalibapi in December 1942 as
the sole, exclusive political party for the Philippines.
In actual purpose
it was a prr',ganda arm for the Japanese Military Administration and served to gather intelligence on local populations to assist in their monitoring and control.
The Kalibapi was a Japanese importation which
was a close cousin of the Japanese Imperial Rule Association.
On May 8,
1944 President Laurel made the Kalibapi a Philippine organization, but this was in name only for the continued involvement of the Japanese and 112 the compulsory nature of the organization doomed the effort to failure. The Kalibapi as the political arm of the Japanese Army was tied
into the Japanese-established Neighborhood Associations.
49 The Neighbor-
hood Associations were incorporated into the framework of the Kalibapi and given policing functions in addition to the Association's already existing responsibility for distributing food and co'mmodities. 0
the Japanese not only determined who w~ould receive food and staples, but also created a spy network for rooting out guerrilla symwpathizers.
towns were divided into districts, the districts into sections, and the sections into the smallest element, the unit, which was ten families (or ten houses).
The leader of a unit was responsible for the actions of
every member of each of the ten families.
He was responsible for
periodically reporting the exact number of individuals under his ten roofs and for explaining any additions or reductions to the number.
this manner the Japanese sought to control the movement of the guerrillas
into and out of the barrios and to quickly identify local recruiting efforts by the guerrillas.
Spot checks by Filipinos loyal to the Japan-
ese or by Japanese patrols which revealed unexplainable discrepancies in the unit roster versus the "actual on-board strength" of the ten families would mean very harsh punishment for the unit leader and his family and torture and death for families who were assisting the guerrillas in any way. 113
This method was coupled with the always useful method of seizing
the family of a guerrilla in order to force him to surrender. The long arm of the Kalibapi and the Neighborhood Association q
placed a great strain upon the Filipinos, for it introduced daily the 114 issue if collaboration, both with the Japanese and with the guerrillas.
Each side could be extremely hard on collaborators, and the issue was a very, complex and personal one with which the guerrilla leaders had to contend.
Using the most critical and least critical estimiates, it is
50 thought that between 67 percent and 90 percent of the population as a whole resisted the Japanese in whatever way possible.1 1 5
ators were the elites in Manila, or at least they received the greatest attention for having collaborated.
issue was most often settled "in the trenches," and the guerrillas had 4 good idea of who had supported them and who had not. was no hardliner on collaboration.
He believed that Filipinos who sub-
jected themselves to the Japanese treatment in order to protect their own people were courageous in their own right.
He distinguished these
people from the traitors who purposely aided the Japanese in their fight against the guerrillas.
And, of course, Mindanao was popa"-:ed in the
interior by tribes who had no idea who the Japanese and Americans even were, and any assistance they may have rendered to either side was apolitical from the standpoint of the resistance movement itself.
Important to the resistance movement throughout the Philippines, and critical to the guerrilla effort on Mindanao, was the Filipinos' attitude towards the Americans.
The persistent irony was that the Filipino
guerrillas had established contact with, urged leadership upon, and collaborated with a people who had been the past conquerors of their country.
Unlike most other Asian peoples who had been sympathetic to
Japan's "Asia for the Asians" theme, the Filipinos did not react the way the Japanese had expected them to react.i
The Filipino early response
to the Japanese had been sufficiently vexing to cause General Masaharu Homna,
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Amy, to declare that
Filipinos with "pro-Arnerican sympathies" would "be annihilated without mercy."
As the Japanese policies became increasingly counterproductive,
the Japanese propaganda became more shrill.
A propaganda booklet published
51 in 1943 called Americans in the Philippines "foul water flowing down from 120
the sewerage of a country that has been formed upon impure foundations.'
The Japanese had failed to appreciate that the Filipinos were "no longer true Orientals" but had 'icome
a hybrid of American political
principles coupled with inherited Spanish values and Oriental p.:!•sophy.121 Close on the heels of the Philippine Insurrection the Americans had introduced widespread literacy, improved public health, promoted an expandini prosperity throughout the society, established free speech, increased civil liberties, and founded a representative government that drew upon a people with an increased sense of opportunity.
Japan•ie had not tried to understand the Filipinos, or at the very least they had no 'nclination
to tailor thsir occupation policy to the Filipino
The Americans had respected the Filipino dignity, and that had
become the true basis for American power in the Philippines. now pay large dividends.
The 7ilipino people would help Americans
who were complete strangers, providing the best focd and shelter available tc them.
They would transport gravely ill Americans, again
4crangers, miles over treacherous mountain trails to keep them from falling into the hands of the Japanese.
Often, the visit of an American
to a village was enough reason in itself for the village to have a fiesta.
America in the Philippines was supported by the common
1 grips. 2 cit.zen, a fact with whi h the Japanese were unable to come to
The swiftness of Japanese victories in the Pacific had left the Japanese unprepared to cope with the administration of the ronquered countries.
They lacked the trained colonial administrators and tech-
nicians to run the banks, mines and factories.
With no colonial civil
service, the inexperienced bureaucrats assigned for service in the
52 Philippines "were full of condescension toward the local people and were largely ignorant of the~r customs and traditions....They found it easier to bully and intimidate than to under tand strange ways." to the military -- and the military answered to no one.1
They turned The terrorism
and brutality practised by the Japanese was predestined to be counterproductive, a fact well-demonstrated in the history of resistance movements.127
John Keats has Colonel Fertig assessing the situation in
Mindanao in this way:
"It was the civilians whom the Japanese butchered,
and as long as the Japanese were bestial, was assured.
popular support of the resistance
And as long as there was resistance,
continue to be bestial."
the Japanese would
Almost certainly, had the Japanese policies been genuinely benevolent the resistance movement would have been less universal.
the "almost incredible stupidity of the Japanese occupation policies" demunstrated that the Japanese conquerors had routinely underestimated or ignored the role their own policies played in producing the conditions from which a resistance movement could grow.
Again, turning to Sun Tzu,
we find that the Japanese ignored the ancient wisdom available to them: "Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws ano institutions. their governments invincible."129
By these means they make
CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES 1
U.S. War Department, Planning Division, Office of Director of Plans &nd Operations, U.S. Army Service Forces, "Logistic Study for Projected Operations: Philippine Base Development," February 26, 1945, p. 74. 2Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, 1950, p. 216. 3
Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, Undated Manuscript,
p. 24. 4 Kenneth MacLeish, "Stonr Age Cavemen of Mindanao," National Geographic, August 1972, pp. 2 249. 5
War Department, Planning Livision, "Philippine Base Development,"
p. 74. 6
Headquarters, X Corps, History of X Corps on Mindanao 17 April 1945-30 June 1945, June 30, 1945, p. 5. 7
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, "Philippines and Halmahera," CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin 125-44, August 15, 1944. 8See American and Japanese intelligence estimates in Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, "Report of the Commanding General Eighth Army on the Palawan and Zamboanga Operations: Victor III and IV," undated; and General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase I November 1941 to July 1942" (Originally 14th Army Operations Vol. I), Japanese Monograph No. 1, undated (circa October 1946). Excellent descriptions of the terrain are found in Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, 1946; Steve Mellnik, Philippine Diary 19391945, 1969; Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, 1928. 9
Eichelberger, Jungle Road, p. 218.
Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol: stabulary, 1938, p. 254. 11
The Story of the Philippine Con-
Office of Strategic Services, "Studies Based on Census of the Philippines, 1939," March 19, 1942. 12It was rumored that the Japanese hae assisted in taking the census and had purposely understated the true Japanese presence in Davao Province, Mindanao. See Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, 1942 for discussion of the Japanese Activities in the Philippines before the invasion. 53
S4 13David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 1947, pp. 12-13, 20. 14X Corps, History..
Mindanao, p. 9.
1 Bernstein, Philippine Stor, p. 12 and Nena Vreeland and others, Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1976, p. 7b. However, in political terms, the real division in the Philippines was probably along class lines, divided into two classes. Five percent of the population were the wealthy and educated elite, and the remainder were the taos - the small farmers, manual laborers and share croppers. See Berns'tein, Philippine Story, p. 21. 16
Office of Strategic Services, "Studies Based on Census," p. 6. As many as 87 different dialects have been recorded, however. See Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 3. 17 Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 75. 18
Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 17.
The Philippines at this
time was the third largest English-speaking country in the world. 19
Beth Day, The Philippines: Asia, 1975, p. 181. 21
Shattered Showcase of Democracy in
Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 1,
p. 5. 22
In the early 1970's The fighting has not ceased on Mindanao. the Moros and Huks engaged the Filipino government in open warfare. The fighting continues today, in much the same fashion has has been customary on the island. See "Charlies Angels," Newsweek, March 13, 1982, p. 42. 23
These raids had virtually ceased under American rule. But the surrender of the Americans and the intrusion of the Japanese created a vacuum and the centuries-old custom was quickly revived. 24
Office of Strategic Services,
"Studies Based on Census," p. 12.
26Ibid., pp. 27-29. 27
Ibid., pp. 21, 24.
Porter, Crisis, p. 104. After the invasion many of these Japanese donned Japanese Army officer insignia; others became local civil administrators.
55 Gencral Robert L. Eichelberger, who commanded the American Eighth Army, put the pre-war Japanese civilian population in Davao at 40,000. He believed many of these people entered the Japanese A.rmy, which many did as American invasion forces neared the islands. Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberer's War in the Pacific. 1942 - 1945, 1972, contains valuable ob:ervations of the situation on Mindanao. 30
The Ohta Company was established by Oda Kyosaburo, known to the as "K.S. Ohta." He was the frontier tycoon of Davao Province. Filipinos He died in 1917. Hemp, the famous "Manila rope," is made from abaca.
Porter, Crisis, pp. 99, 102.
1bid., pp. 99-100; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: an's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945, 1965, pp. 48-49; X Corps. orY...Mindanao, p. 10. Japanese investors circumvented the Public Land Law by establishing dummy corporations. Women from the interior tribes were purchased as wives for Japanese investors, land purchased in tribes in the mountains. their names, and then they were returned to the' Americans and Filipinos purchased land and sublet it to the Japanese, and Japanese nationals were adopted by Filipino families, thereby giving them the legal rights under Philippine law that any Filipino citizen would have. Another ploy was to bring in American-born and Hawaiian-born Japanese to form land-holding corporations with them. See Florence Horn, Orphans of TWl)58, the Pacific, 1941, p. 269; Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedo-m-p. 226. 34
porter, Crisis, p. 5. The Japanese in Davao Province represented a small minority oftffe-300,000 population (Davao City, one of three chartered cities on Mindanao, had 103,000 citizens). The Japanese paid one-half of the collected taxes and employed nearly 14,000 Filipinos. They were described as "thrifty, orderly, Deaceful." Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 49. Davao City was also known as "Little Tokyo" among the Filipinos. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, Operations of the Courner Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, July 29, 1948, p. 78. 35
Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 647.
"The Deisher-Couch Papers," no date, p. 31. Mr. Deisher claimed that there were as many as 35,000 Japanese farmers on Mindanao and said of them that "These Japanese are becoming real insolent, showing their teeth at the slightest provocation." See also Horn, Orphans, p. 284. 37
Carlos P. Romulo, Mother America:
A Living Story of Democracy,
p. 66. 38 39
Porter, Crisis, p. 97.
Romulo, Mother America, p. 51. Actually, this was just the The United States had passed the'Oriental latest in a series of ripostes. Exclusion Act in 1923, and the Japanese had excluded any foreigner from owning any land in Japan before that.
Early in the occupation the Japanese considered Cebu City to be second in importance to Manila for controlliig the garrisons among the islands. As the war progressed and the Americans invaded the Philippines, this Army headquarters was moved to Davao because the 15,000 Japanese residents in Davao needed safeguarding and Mindanao was considered to be General Headquarters, the most defensible for the remainder of the Ariny. Far East Command, "Philippines Operations Record, Phase III, Defense of Monograph No. 6 October Leyte by the 35th Army, 1944-1945," ,r Universty, The Role s ute, 1946, p. 127; U.S. Aerospace Studies of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare JWorld War II1, December 1962, p. 106. The Japanese were concerned witl the ove lives of their soldiers and civilians in Davao "who are on the front lines of colonization." (That is a quote from a Japanese radio broadcast - the word "colonization" appears to show their true purpose in Mindanao.) The Japanese governmerit made a direct plea to the people of Japan to go to Davao to "solve the problems of the matrimonial front." Found in Office of Strategic Services, "The Program of Japan in the Philippines," July 29, 1944, p. 263. 41
Bernstein, Philippine Story, p.
General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase II" (December 1942 - June 1944), Japanese Mono2raph No. 3., apanese, but it October 1946, entire. It may have been "quiet" or te' was anything but that for the Filipinos. 43
Patricia McDermott Clement,
"The Philippine Archives," May 8,
1981, p. 13. 44Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldlers in the-Phiippnes 1945, pp. 133, 162. 45
Never Say Die, 1961,
Bernstein, PhilippIn Story, p. 7. Before the war there were an It was estimated estimated three mill on cara aos n the Philippines. that by the end of the Japanese occupation nearly 7C% of these animals had been lost. 47
1ngham, Rendezvous, p.
134. Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 3,
p. 12. 49 50
Ibid., p. 10.
William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: Infantry Division, 1948, p. 154. 51
A History of the 41st
Roberl D. Powers, Jr., "Guerrillas and the Laws of War," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare, United States Naval Institute, 1903, p. 12.
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," E Publications, No. 359 (Part 1), April 28, 1945 (hereirafterATIS, Part I), entire; and General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines, E Publications, No. 359 (Part II), April 28, 1945 (hereinafter ATIS Part II), entire. 53 Office of Strategic Services, "The Programs of Japan in the Philippines," July 29, 1944, p. 74. This broadcast was made in February 1944 during a period when one of the largest punitive expeditions was combing Mindanao trying to staunch the flood of guerrilla radio broadcasts and submarine drops. 54
Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 260. The Japanese propaganda was sometimes outrageously unbelievable. The Japanese commander on Mindanao once broadcast that the Japanese had invaded San Francisco, bombed Washington, D.C., seized Hawaii and captured five million Russians. The Filipinos, of course, knew that the Allied broadcasts came from San Francisco, the supply submarines from Australia, and that Japan and Russia were not yet at war. 55
56ATIS, Part I, pp. C, 2. Japanese Monograph No.
General Headquarters, Far East Command,
3, pp. 41-42.
Trevnr Nevitt Dupuy, Asian and Axis Resistance Movements,
Department of the Amy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations," December 1, 1960, p. 41. 59
Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines, 1946, p.
David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, 1967, p. 94. 6 lSmith, Philippine Freedom, p. 108. 6
Shattered Showcase, p. 106.
The Kempei Tai ("Military Police") was similar in purpose to the Nazi Gestapo and the Russian KGB (Ogpu, N.K.V.D.), except that as Beth Day put it, "The Gestapo, vicious as it was, was no match for the efficient Oriental terrorism practiced by the Japanese." Ibid., p. 105. 64
Edward F.L. Russell, The Knights of Bushido: of Japanese War Atrocities, 1958, pp. 274-275.
The Shocking History
See especially Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 185-191. For atrocities on Mindanao; and Jose Demandante Dormal, The War in Panay: A d ar Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay DuiW 111 152, entire; and Fourteenth Antiaircraft Wing, "Japanese Atrocities," August 20, 1945, entire. 6
6 Beyond the scope of this paper, a lengthy discussion of the treatment of prisoners will not be attempted. It is recorded that 50,297 American and Filipiro prisoners of war died in the internment camps. A selection of books about life in these camps is found in the bibliography. 67
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 116.
Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces During World War II," 1973, p. 20. 69
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 157.
Bushido translates as "the way of the warrior." A deep-rooted belief In tRhec6de led the Japanese to decide against signing the Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war. Bushido equates compassion with weakness, a principle in contradiction with the Geneva Convention. For the Japanese soldier, surrender to the enemy was forbidden under the code, and a soldier was required to commit suicide or suffer eternal disgrace. Not surprisingly, prisoners seized by the Japanese were the For elaboration on objects of Japanese contempt, and therefore, abuse. the Bushido code see Russell, Knights of Bushido. A concise description 1977, p. 150. n Arthur Zich, The RisingSun, is fou---n 71
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 117.
7General Headquarters, Sruthwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, "Trial Records of Filipino and Chinese Guerrillas and Civilians and Japanese Soldiers and Civilians," Enemy Publications, No. 398, September 22, 1945, p. 76. 73
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, 1963,
p. 76. 74
Quoted •n Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: History, 1956, p. 148. 75 76 U
His Rendezvous with
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 160.
7 Louise Reid Spencer in her book Guerril•*a Wife, 1945 details the island of Panay. Well frightening account of one of these patrols on hile along in her pregnancy, Mrs. Spencer, her husband and Claude and Laverne Fertig with their two month old daughter stayed barely ahead of Japanese The Americans and Filipinos patrols as they fled chrough the mountains. who had been living with them in their mountain hideout did not escape. The Japanese slaughtered all in the small village. Major Claude Fertig was Colonel Wendell Fertig's brother. Also a mining engineer, he was the Chief Engineer of the 6th Militdry Distri-t and ran a radio net. The two families successfully escaped by submarine in March 1944, and the Spencer's baby was born in Brisbane in May 1944.
Forbes J. Monaghan, Under the Red Sun:
59 A Letter From Manila, 1946,
p. 142. 79 John Keats, Th29 ltAoe, 1963, p. 407. The Japanese themselves concluded th;at te "Evacua~tion was not handled in a satisfactory manner," for the evacuees suffered "huge casualties" from "enemy fi re and air attack." From General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 6, p. 138. 80 Dormal, The War In Panay, pp. 61-62. 8 There was some grisly logic to this. Until late 1944 bullets were a scarce, and therefore precious, commodity for the guerrillas. Beheading combined swiftness with efficient economy. Itmay also have been a response to the Japanese custom ("eye for an eye") or it may plausibly have reflected centuries of Moro custom. For the Japanese, the honor of beheading a prisoner was, literally speaking, somethin~g to write home to mother about. The honor was taken seriously, and young officers were judged on how clearly they executed the coRd gae See Inghiam, Rendezvous, pp. 124-125, and Joseph E.S~t_. JolTh, ey~te Calling... 1945, pp. 1314 82
This phase will be covered indetail in chapter five.
See Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 761; Ingham,. Rendezvous, pp. 15816n1; Allison Ind, Allied Intliec Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan, 1958, p. 102. 84
Smith, "Status of Members
Monaghan. Red Sun, throughout.
Ibid; and Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, 1979, p. 32. This does not necessarily reflect earlier American experience in the Philippines during the Pacification when reprisals against Filipinos had been practiced by the Americans against the Moros on Mindanao and Sulu. John J. Pershing once wrote his old friend George Meiklejohn: "All the Moros have heard of this act [reprisals] , and it is said to be current among them that the life of an American will cost them 10 Moros. It is fortunate that such ideas prevail among them." As the last sentence suggests, the threat of reprisals was most often just that - a threat. Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing, 1973, pp. 61-62. 87
R.W. Yolckmann, We Remained: inthe Philippines, 1954, pp. 125-126.
Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines
60 89Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 197. There was another instance where it is recorded that Geneva Convention precepts were violated. The Mindanao guerrillas, while they were headquartered in Misamis, had a prison camp for Japanese prisoners (few to none), collaborators and convicted criminals. The camp was guarded by Moros. One night a Japanese soldier and seven collaborators escaped. They were caught the same night, and at daybreak their heads were seen by the remaining prisoners mounted on stakes outside the wire, facing into the compound. The prison camp, called "Happy Valley," was away from Misamis in the mountains; it can be concluded that the method for handling escaped prisoners was a natural one for the Moros and not the response to any kind of established orders. !bid., p. 206. 90
Carlos P. Ror.ulo,
I See the Philippines Rise, 1946, p. 114.
The American, Canadian and Dutch priests joined the guerrillas. The Irish Columbans did to some extend, but generally reflected Ireland's neutrality in the war. The America- Jesuits were located in the northern part of Mindanao, the Dutch of the , cred Heart were in the east, the Canadians of the Quebec Foreign Mission were in Davao and the southeast, and the Irish Columbans in the west. The American and Canadian Oblates of Mary were located in Cotabato in the southwest. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 3, 191. 92 1bid., p. 127. The one exception, Haggerty allowed, would be a "few Moros." 93
Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 114. Four principal values are the primary expression of this system of social values: 1. (Most important) utang na loob: devotes a primary debt, reciprocal obligations.Ththe principal cohesive force in Philippine society. 2. Amor Proprio (amour propre): self-esteem. 3. iTS: a sneof-o'shame. 4. ama: a desire to avoid placing others in a stressful
or un-pleasanTposition. See Vreeland, Area Handbook, pp. 114-118 and Romulo, The Philippines Rise, p. 113 for discussion. 94 Vreeland, Area Handbook, pp. 107-114. 95 See especially Zich, Rising Sun, p. 153 and Romulo, The Philippines Rise, p. 113. 961ngham, Rendezvous, pp. 39-40. 97
Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 648.
An example of the Filipino
reaction to this highhanded policy is found in an incident which occurred
in Misamis City, Mindanao. A minor Japanese bureaucrat was left by the occupying army in the city to administer it for the Japanese. No longer willing to suffer his rebukes, the townspeople tethered him to a stake, stoned him beyond recognition, and left him to be eaten by dogs. Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 102.
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 40.
Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 1942, pp.
10 0 Sex in the Philippines at this time was very open and freely offered. Consequently, rape was commensurately a much greater crime, somewhat akin to robbing a man who will give you his money as a gift. Rape was a crime which bound the girl's family to a blood feud with the perpetrators. The Japanese became the object of a great many blood feuds. Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 73. 101
Agoncillo, Feteful Years,
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 73.
103The sham fooled no one, however, for the Japanese still ran the country and none of the freedoms associated with independence were permitted: free elections, free press, and so forth. The brutal tr~acment of the population by the Japanese occupiers continued as well. 10 4
See Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Japan Yearbook L943pp. 1031-1032.
Gene Z. Hanrahan, p. 17. 106
Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces,
0ffice of Strategic Services, Philippines," pp. 272-273.
"The Program of Japan In the
7 Smith, "Status of Members," p. 48; Steinberg, Philippine Col laboration, pp. 91-92; Alfonso Arellano, "Facts About Filtpino Collaboration: An Analytical Study," 1947, p. 13. 108
Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 58-60. Office of Strategic Services, rcment in the Philippine Islands," September 25, 1944, entire. 109
The organization of the Mindanao guerrillas during this period will be discussed in Chapter Five. 110
The discussion which follows on the Philippine Constabulary is detailed in the following references: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Information Bulletin, "Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands," June 1943, entire; Steinberg7, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 5860, 94; Office of Strategic Services, "Law En orcement in the Philippines," general; Office of Strategic Services, "The Program of Japan in the Philippines," pp. 259-260, 282; ATIS, Part I, pp. 5, 33, 44, 55; "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," undated manuscript, p. 225; Harold Hanne Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1949, pp. 83-132; Office of Strategfc Services, "The Government of the 'New Philippines': (A Study of the Present Puppet Government in the Philippines)," May 15, 1944, p. 44 (Contains a list of the governors of each province on
62 Mindanao, pp. 43-44); Adalia Marquez, Blood on the Rising Sun, 1957, describes the "Peace Army." The "Peace--ny' ofGeneral Artenio Ricarte was not under the Philippine Constabulary. An ardent Japanese sympathizer who had lived in Japan before the war, Ricarte returned to the Philippines to fight the guerrillas with his own private army. He had fought the Spanish and had left the Philippines while it was under the American flag. 11 1
Shortened version of Kapisanan sa Paglillngkod sa Bagang Pilipinas.
2 Office of Strategic Services, "Study of the Present Puppet Government," pp. 4-6. 1 13
1bid. Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 163-164. The general view was that in belonging to the Kalibapi a Filipino automatically became a "spy for the Rising Sun." There was a humorous side to the Kalibapi. The Minister of Education tried to dispose of the Western-adopted handshake and suLstitute nationwide the "Kali~bapi salute" -- the slight bow used by the Japanese. The handshake was dismissed as inefficient, unhygienic, foreign." Abaya, Betrayal, p. 46. 1 14
Filipinos collaborated with the Japanese for any number of reasons, but there were four principal reasons which can be listed: (1) the desire to shield the Filipino people from the harshness of Japanese rule (exiled President Quezon advocated this); (2) protection of family and personal interests (business owners, low-level bureaucrats); (3) sincere belief in Japanese goals, anti-Americanism; (4) personal gain gave loyalty to highest bidder, often played both sides off against each other. Some Filipino youth were drawn to the Japanese cabarets, and many simply yearned for electric lights and running water. Many were sacadas, people captured for forced labor, who were ill-treated and were the first to cross over into American lines when Allied invasion forces returned to Mindanao. 115
Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 170-171. See also Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla inthe Phipnes, 1945, p. 84. 116 The impending American invasion of the Philippines became something more than a matter of ridding the islands of the Japanese, for the nation now had to deal with its collaborators. General MacArthur initially "posited general culpability until the individual could establish his innocence; the OsmeRa policy [Osmena succeeded Quezon on his death posited individual innocence until treasonable motivation could be assessed." D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 1941-1945, Volume II, 1975, p. 529. 117
Keats, The Fou ht Alone, pp. 208-209. One of Fertig's links to Manila was with Ma o 9 o played a central role in the post war collaboration debate. Fertig communicated with Roxas through Jose Ozamis, brother of do-a Carmen (on whom more later) and prewar senator from Mindanao. Ozamis was Vice Commissioner of Sports ir the puppet government. The Commissioner of Sports was a Japanese. One of Ozamis' jobs was to obtain girls for the Japanese Army brothels. Ozamis hired Filipina patriots who gathered intelligence information in the bedroom. Ozamis' link to Fertig was through Dr. Antonio Montalvon, a public health officer assigned to Mindanao, who travelled between Manila and Mindanao on Japanese travel passes.
Dupuy, Resistance Movements,
11 9 Declared April 29, 1942.
See Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration,
Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 25. A Japanese Army Press Bureau report put the "conservative estimate of Filipinos remaining loyal to the U.S. at 50 percent. The pro-Japanese element was "average" for occupied areas, including 10 percent who were given special privileges by the Japanese or who still carried strong pre-war anti-American feelings. Another 30 percent, mostly in the outlying islands and in the mountains "does not know what is going on and does not care." Royal Arch Gunnison, So Sorry, No Peace, 1944, p. 127. By March 1944 an Imperial General Headquarters report identified "a strong undercurrent of proAmerican sentiment.. .which cannot be destroyed" and which was "causing a yearning for the old life of freedom." Imperial General Headquarters, AM Section Report, Saikin Ni Okeru Hito Jijo ("Rece-t Situation in the Philippines"), March 31, 1944, p. 1. 121
pp. 31. 33.
The Filipinos knew that under the American flag an American national could be arrested by Filipino police, charged under Filipino law, tried by a Filipino judge, and imprisoned in a Filipino jail. Such an occurrence with a Japanese national was an impossibility under the Japanese flag, and the Filipinos knew what the difference meant for them. Ibid., p. 34. Perhaps the classic statement of the Filipino understanding of freedom and their decision to resist the Japanese is the famous "Confesor Letter," a nine paqe long letter from Governor Tomas Confesor, Panay, to Dr. Fermin Caram of the City of Iloilo on Panay of February 20, 1943. See Appendix B of Agoncillo, Fateful Years. 12 3 Romulo, Philippines Rise, p. 113. The American policy had not been accidental. An exanple of the instruction given to American military people going to serve in areas like the Philippines is found in United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, which stresses knowledge of the local language and culture and demonstration of a fraternal spirit. 124
There are many examples of this, but some of the better examples o Filipinos are found in Hawkins, Never Sa Die, and Keats, esste and American's would sTing Gd less America" an " Philippines" at any opportunity. Morale was boosted when the Filipinos sang "God Bless America" to the Japanese and the Japanese applauded -they did not understand the language or recognize the tune. James Dean Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, 1959, p. 173. 12 5The average citize was "Juan de la Cruz" ("John Doe") in the Philippines. This was the peasant, not the Manila elite. 126
Zich, Rising Sun, pp. 148-149.
64 See F. 0. Miksche, Secret Forces: The Terhnigue U round Movements, 1950, pp. 157, 163. The Japanese should have had a clue as to what th-eir policies would produce, for they had their experience in Peasant Nationalism China upon which to draw. See Chalmers A. Johnson, and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revoluutionary China 1937-1945, 1962. The U.S. military doctrine for stability operations gives a more enlightened approach to a study of this suLiect. See Department of the Army, Stability Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, Ociober 2, 1972, for a comparison with the policies described In this chapter. 127
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 196.
The Art of War,
CHAPTER 5 ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE GUER'ULLA RESISTANCE Early Roots of the Mindanao Guerrillas The idea of condt'cting guerrilla operations on Mindanao was conreived early in the .:.r by United States officials.
On the eve of
General MacArthur's departure from manila to Corregidor, he apprisc General George C. Marshall of his decision to use the newly-established Visavan-Mindanao Force 'to continue resistance operations by guerrilla mcthods" in order to ensure that a "loci of American resistance" would be ma~ntained in the Philippines.
On the same day MacArthur sent a
letter by courier to Brigadier General William F. Sharp, cominander of the Visayan-Mindanao Force,
. -ating that :'ould communication be broken
would have all the powers of a between their two headquarters Stii.-p Theatat of Operations Commander in order to lead the resistance.I
February 1942 MacArthur had formulated a general concept for guerrilla operations which zallel for guerrilla efforts to disrupt the Japanese lines of communication.
In a preview of his "lie low" policy which he
would issue a full year later, MacArthur wrote: I believe that extensive guerrilla efforts prior to the arrival of reinforcements from the Unit-4 States will be abortive and distructive. I have complete plans to !aunch the guerrilla movement to support the main effort upon arrival of reinforcements. Also ir February, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was considering ordering MacArthur to Mindanao "to continue your command of the Philippines frcm that locality."
ThiE saree message said Roosevelt was considering 6;
66 sending Philippine President Manuel Quezon to Mindanao to effect the transfer of the Philippine government to the southern islands.
ihe focus of attention on Mindanao was logical fur several reasons.
The largest concentration of American forces outside of Luzon
was on Mindanao; at this time the island was lightly garrisoned by the Japanese, and military equipment to 5upport a guerrilla movement could Mindanao was also
be stockpiled in caches in the island's interior.
the most distant island in the archipelago from the concentration of Japanese forces on Luzon, and was the nearest island to Australia, thereby providing the shortest logistic supply line.
While enroute to
Australia, MacArthur remained on Mindanao March 13-16, 1942 at the Del Monte Plantation, which was Brigadier General Sharp's headquarters for Still unaware that there were no American
the Visayan-Mindanao Force.4
ground forces available to the Pacific Theater, MacArthur boasted that "If the Jap does not take Mindanao by Easter is bullets...'5
g1942], all he will receive
Sharp assured MacArthur that "his plans for intensified
guerrilla warfare were well-advanced."'
Sharp had been nominated for
his second star because MacArthur "believed that here was one commander who would carry on guerrilla warfare to the end.
Robert Ross Smith concludes that "In the southern islands, where the light forces, preparations for guerrilla 8 warfare were well aloi., when the surrender came." Japanese initially landod on.,
On December 20, landed at Davao.
1941, the Miura and Sakaguchi Detachments
The Sakaguchi Detachment redeployed soon afterward,
leaving the Miura Detachment, consisting of one combat battalion and one "miscellaneous" battalion,
to penetrate into the interior
The Miura Detachment was unable
beyond Davao,and the 101st Philippine
67 Amy D;vision (PA) was unable to oust then. from Davao.
States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) defense plan for Mindanao had called for a defense at the waterline along the Cotabato coast (east), Davao coast (south), (northeast).
the Misamis coast (northwest) and the Agusan coast
Delaying actions would be conducted with a slow with-
drawal to the central island region where foodstuffs and supplies had been stored.
The force would defend a perimeter on the Bukidnon plateau
until American forces ("The Aid") arrived.
On April 29,
Kuwaguchi Detachment landed near Cotabato and the Kawamura Detachment followed four days later at Cagayan Bay on May 3rd. strength of the opposing forces as follows:
Sharp put the
Philippine Army at 30,784
and the total Japanese forces on the island at 43,700.12 fighting was over.
By May 9th the
The details of the surrender on Corregidor and General Jonathan M. Wainwright's dilemma in ordering the surrender of USFIP forces elsewhere in the Philippines will not be detailed here.
But the surrender,
and the manner in which it was effected, had a major influence upon the formation of a resistance movement on Mindanao.
Before departing for
Australia, MacArthur had divided the Philippines into four separate commands, all co-equal and subordinate to him:
Moore's Harbor Defense
Force, Wainwright's Luzon Force, Sharp's Mindanao Force, and Chynoweth's Visayan FOre' (MacArthur had divided the Visayan-Mindanao Force).
failed to inform the War Dparrnmrt of this reorganization, and later both General Marshall and the conquering General Masaharu Homna v!ere to consider that all American forces in the Philippine Islands were effectively under Wainwright's command.
MacArthur's idea was thac if
one command were destroyed or surrendered, the others (specifically the southern islands commands) could continue the resistance.
68 May 6 through May 10 was one of great confusion, brought on in part by this misunderstanding over cormmand relationships and greatly complicated by the difficulties of colmmunicating by radio and fighting the pressing Japanese attacks. p.
The texts of the final messages which emanated from
the principal headquarters are suimmarized inthe footnotes for the reader. 15 Two major factors led to General Sharp's decision to capitulate: the Japanese wore fully capable of massacring the 10,000 survivors of the Corregidor garrison, and it was now clear that United States reinforcements for the Mindanao Force would not be forthcoming as envisioned.
Still, few cormmanders in the south were so hard pressed as to be incapable of further resistance, and none had any desire to surrender.
Sharp's force were still undefeated, intact and capable of continuing an organized resistance.
Plans had been made for withdrawal to the interior,
and junior commanders awaited only the orders to execute the withdrawal. The Mindanao Force was of questionable military effectiveness, but one may conclude that had the Mindanao guerrillas enjoyed the benefit of uninterrupted military organization and had been given continued access to the hidden arms and supplies of the Mindanao Force, the guerrilla movement would have taken a different course.
To build an effective force
out of the remnants of the Mindanao Force would be a dlffiA-lt task, because the Force had not been very good in the beginning. Coimmonwealth Act Number One of December 21, 1935, the Philippine National Defense Act, provided for the establishmnent of a Philippine Army, both Regular and Reserve. 16 Japanese activities in the Far East had become sufficiently thre,
ing that by July 26, 1941 a Philippine
Fresidential Order transferred all organized military forces of the
69 Commonwealth into the armed forces of the United States.
Amy Forces in the Far East (USAFFE1 ) General Order 46 of December 18, 1941 inducted the Philippine Army into USAFFE. of this force was in question.
The fighting quality
As Colonel Fertig sized-up the force:
The vain boast that tho -. ppine Army could resist a firstclass enemy was empty. The la, . d j;er beautifully in colorful uniforms with much starch, L. . t.•,ic • -dship were met with excuses and not with the underlying str,..,, -'at indicates fighting quality. Fertig did not see this as a derogation of th,
the Filipino people but rather it was a reflection "on the land that mothered them.'lg
This view was echoed in a Japanese intelligence assess-
ment before the war: The Americans have the makings of excellent soldiers, but due to the weather of the torrid zone, there is the tendency to physical and mental laxness and consequent lack of earnestness. The natives.. .lack endurance and responsibilit . Therefore, their milltary ability is lower than the Americans.2U The Filipino force was handicapped by poor training, virtually non-existent supplies, obsolete weapons and military equipment, no artillery, and inadequate leadership, especially in the junior officir and noncommissioned officer ranks.
Training centers had been established
on Mindanao at Cotabato, Butuan, Surigao, Malaybalay, Davao, Zamboanga.
But because mobilization orders had assigned the officers and
NCO's by name, unit leaders were unable to replace inerfective political appointees or even first sergeants and company clerks who could neither 2 read nor write. 1
The USAFFE forces continued to train from December 20, 1941 to April 29, 1942 in central Mindanao. at close order drill, that.
The soldiers wer3 very proficient
but little real training was accomplished beyond
There were no adequate ranges, and no money to build them.
ing ammunition was limited to 10 to 20 rounds per soldier for marý.tsmanship
70 and familiarization training.
Most soldiers on Mindanao had never fired
a live round before they went into their first battle, and troops were trained to have three soldiers assigned to each rifle when they moved forward into battle.
The artillery crews trained as infantry because
they had no service,.ble artillery pieces.
To compound the difficulties
stil7 further the Mindanao forces received no training in guerrilla doctrine.
The Army had no doctrine, and consequently
too many potential guerrilla leaders either became virtually paralyzed or else attempted to employ doctrinaire solutions that defeated the most basic requirements of successful guerrilla operations. The USAFFE leaders who did succeed were those with the 23 imagination necessary to permit them to work out their own salvation. The Philippine Amy had fallen prey from its infancy to an unhappy set of circumstances -- circumstances which were nothing new in American history.
The United States Congress authorized only $10,000,000
to build an entire army which was to be charged with defending the Philippine Archipelago against a modern efficiently led Japanese army. The authorization barely built the training camps and induction centers. To further compound the problem, President Quezon deemphasized the defense program during the two years preceding the Japanese invasion.
Optimism was high, nevertheless, and MacArthur exuded qreat confidence in the abilities of himself, his staff and the untried Filipinu soldiers.
"The Philippine soldiers.
Army simply had no supplies to issue to the
What it did have was either old or did not fit.
were barefooted and lacked clothing, blankets and mosquito bars.
basic infantry weapon was the old Fnfield rifle which had defective extractors
Ind a stock which was too long for most Filipino soldiers.
.50 calibre machine guns were obsolete and lacked necessary water cooling devices.
The .30 calibre mechine guns were unserviceable,
and there were
71 no replacement parts for them or any of the other weapons.
The army used
the old World War I Stokes 3-inch mortar whose shells were almost all duds.
There were only 48 old 75-nmm artillery pieces in the entire
Each rifle company was issued one Browning Automatic Rifle
("BAR"), a few units had the Springfield '03 rifle, but none had the Garand M-1, the American mainstay of World War 11. 26
There were no
anti-tank guns, hand grenades, gas masks or steel helmets, and the signal equipment did not work.2 On February 27, 1942 the supply ship Coast Farmer made its last run with supplies to Mindanao.
The Mindanao Force was now left with
amnunicion which averaged less than one unit of fire per weapon on the whole island.
The artillery consisted of a five-gun 2.95 Gun Detachment.
The detachment had no carriers or prime movers, no sights, no fuze setters, no range tables, and only 2,400 rounds.
The Force Quartermaster
had set up cottage industries to make extractors for the Enfields, grenades (made from bamboo tubes and glass bottles), mines (predictably -
clothing, shoes, naversae2~s and belts.
Also fashioned were
motor parts, outboard motors for the river craft, bolos (large machetetype single-edged blade), and one armored car.
On May 10th there was 12
months' supply of sugar and salt and six months' supply of rice stored in various warehouses along with a large amount of canned goods: beef, beans, and dried fruit.
When Major General Sharp had determined that further resistance would be fruitless, the subordinate commnanders were ordered to surrender their men, weapons, and equipment to the Japanese.
But whereas Sharp
himself had little alternative to surrender, his subordinate coimmanders enjoyed somewhat more flexibility.
The names of new Filipino recruits,
72 for example, were purposely omitted from the surrender rosters, and these men were ordered to return to their homes and bury their weapons.29
addition, a large proportion of officers, both American and Filipino, refused to surrender due to their belief t~at General Wainwright, being in the hands of the Japanese, had no authority to issue orders to General Sharp.
Uldarico Baclagon in his discussion of the surrender gives no
figures but states that the Japanese were "exasperated by the few officers and men who went with General Sharp to the concentration camp" and that "an orgy of rape, mass murder, and other atrocities on helpless civilians soon followed.
The U. S. Army, while not giving any numbers, con-
cluded that the "number of officers who refused to surrender and disappeared into the hills (f Mindana•J other mjor islands combined."
probably exceeded those of all the
The actual number of officers and men,
American and Filipino,
who surrenidered or took flight to the hills is unknown for several reasons. Surrende' documents were fabricated to mislead the Japanese.
Many who in
fact escaped only to be slaughtered on remote trails in the interior were never accounted for or were thought to have died at the hands of the Japanese.
Many Filipino soldiers were from islands in the Visayas and
left Mindanao entii-ly.
The Japanese never provided the Red Cross or the
United States government with a list of the casualties or survivors, so many names can be traced only through the personal accounts of those who survived their internment.
Major Marcos G. Soliman in a letter dated June 5, 1943 to Lieutenant Colonel Macario Peralta, commander of the 6th Military District, states that "only 10% of the officers and enlisted personnel of my regiment surrendered or were c3ught by the Japs."
Soliman's unit was
73 the 81st Infantry Regiment which was located near Davao at the time of the surrender.
Father Haggerty, who was with General Sharp at his head-
quarters in the final days before the surrender, puts the Mindanao Force at an estimated 35,000 Filipinos and 1,000 Americans, the Americans being mostly headquarters and Air Corps personnel. estimated 7,000 entered the internment camps.
He states that of these an The number of Filipino
privates who surrendered Haggerty called "negligible," for the reasons given earlier. 34 The Amy also uses the 7,000 figure for the number of USAFFE troops who surrendered and were sent to Camp Casiang, Malaybalay, 35 an old 101st Division (PA) camp.
Father Haggerty estimated that approximately 200 Americans fled the Japanese rather than surrender. 36Fertig put the number of unsurrendered Americans at "100 plus,' presumably including civilian residents of Mindanao as well as officers and enlisted men. 37Figure 1 contains personnel strength figures provided to M~ajor General Sharp in a *
memorandum request made to his subordinate commanders on May 19, 1942 in order that he could create a historical record of the Visayan-Mindanao Force.
As indicated in footnote 34 supra, the reports were made with the
knowledge that the Japanese captors would see them; therefore, the figures cannot be wholly relied upon.
The difference between the April 29 and
May 10 figures is attributed to "missing in action," and no further explanation isgiven for the missing soldiers.
Finally all units in the
force are not accounted for In the reports, and some subordinate units are double accounted indivision figures. 38 As a broad S-uge, the chart gives an idea of the number of soldiers who would not surrender and what the potential for forming a guerrilla force from soldiers with some training might be.
FIGURE1 FORCE SAnPLEUNIT STRENGTHS: MINDANAO Pro-Surrender Stretgth
(April 29. 1942) Americans
Unit Slst Division (PA) (BG G.O. Fort)
No figuresgiven. Fort claims 80% Filipio strength Figure for U.S. troops lost to KIA, MIA, desertion. is 76%.
Cotabto-Davas Force (Bs J.P. Vachon)
IN + HQ Det, YIF
19 102d Division (includes 103d Inf)
HO Co. Serv Trps. 102d Div
103d 1nf, 102d Div
Engr 8n, 102d Div
1O2d Mt Co.
GQServ Co, 102d Div 1
l02d Div Hospital
43d 1nf (PS)
C + E Co.. 43d 1nf (PS)
Air Bast NO. 862dIf
HQ102d Div 4Q,Service Troops
92 1952 4
Chart Constructed from Figures in sF Historical Reot pp. 286, 294, ?1-"'Y371137019t7177. 380-381. 514, 349, 352-254. 356-358. 36 318-317, 516.
75 After the surrender on May 10th, "A deep, black pall of silence settled over the whole archipelago."
There were no transmissions from
unsurrendered forces, the Japanese would not acknowledge the casualties from the closing campaign, and even Japanese propaganda failed to give any hint to Allied intelligence of any resistance activity:
from the Philippines was as lacking as though the Islands had been physically blotted off the face of the map."' 4 0
Still, MacArthur was certain
that there would be resistance, although what form and organization it would take no one could know.
studies on gue,'rilla warfare:
As Virgil Ney concluded in his two "The source of the guerrilla idea was
essentially and traditionally Filipino.
To take to the hills and from
there resist the invader has always been normal proce6ure in the Philippines, since the earliest Spanish days.'42
This phenomenun which had been tra-
dition for the Philippines was something of an historical imperative on the island of Mindanao. The junior Filipino enlisted soldiers left the field in ldrge numbers and did not surrender.
Few could be expected to have acquired a
loyalty to the American-commanded or Filipino-officered units to which they had so recently been assigned.
Many decided to go home to wait and
see what the new conqueror would do.
Others did what historically the
Mindanaons always did -- they took to the hills to fight.
But for the
American and Filipino officers who were sworn to obey their orders, and who had made a career of doing so, the decision to surrender or not was much more difficult. 81st Division (PA),
Brigadier General Guy 0. Fort, commander of the had vigorously contested Sharp's and Wainwright's
orders to cease all resistance.
Upon finally being persuaded that the
surrender ordevs must I)efaithfully carried out, General Fort admonished
76 his troops: obey orders. tolerated."'43
"As a soldier, I have no other alternative to follow but to I expect you to do the same.
No desertions will be
This clear statement of the soldier's duty caused deep
soul-searching for many, and most dutifully laid down their arms.
The reasons some did not surrender are as varied as the circumstances and the number of men themselves.
Captain Tom Jurika, brother-
in-law of the famous Charles "Chick" Parsons, walked out the door as his commander held him at gunpoint to prevent his "desertion.' ex-patriot Americans,
like Jurika, whose adopted home was the Philippines;
they held Reserve commissions, and they had been called to active duty for the war.
They saw no alternative but to continue the fight.
believed as Colonel Fertig did that both Wainwright and Sharp had surrendered under duress and that there was no valid of the surrender orders.
authority for issuance
Fertig also likened surrender to "castration.'46
In his opinion, the Americans arpeared to follow generally discernible patterns in how they made their decisions. rule:
Fertig derived a general
it was chiefly the city-bred soldiers who surrendered; the cor-
ollary to this rule:
farm boys from the American South and West thought
more highly of personal liberty than those from the northeastern cities. A further sub-corollary of Fertig's rule had it that these same farm boys had a "far keener sense of racial pride," which translated to mean that no Japanese would lock them up in a pen.47 For those who did not surrender the first months were the hardest. Unlike the Americans who had lived in the Philippires for many years, young soldiers had no knowledge of the customs, and the many dangers which aw'aited them.
A typical example was the 103rd
Regiment which had defended the beach at Cagayan.
They had disengaged
77 and marched towards the Del Monte plantation expecting to find Force Headquarters there.
With the surrender they disbanded.
Soon the indi-
viduals and small groups were without food, and many died of malnutrition and malaria.
Still others were set upon by roaming Moro bands
Others, seeking refuge in the mountains,
upon Moro villages or upon the pagan Magahats and were slaughtered.
Some, however, thought they
Still others were made slaves of the Moros.
had found nirvana, for they had been welcomed into tribal villages and were encouraged to impregnate all of the tribal chief's daughters so as to bring honor upon his house.
This wondrous kiss of fate had its
seamier side, however, for these tribal villagers lacked any appreciation and the daily table fare was monkey, dead horse, rats
for sanitation, and locusts.
Still, many saw no reason to leave to go fight the Japanese
with the guerrillas.
Some American soldiers Joined with the few American residents of Mindanao and established camps in the rain forests in the mountains.
of these camps was presided over by Jacob Deisher, an American who had owned two sawmills and five mines near Illigan in Lanao Province.
escape from the island was closed to him (he had requested U. S. passports in February 1941,
and they had still not arrived by December 1941) he
took $20,000, twenty trucks, fuel and provisions for two years and fled 40 miles into the mountains west of Illigan.
With seven or eight Spanish
War Veterans and his family he set up camp, eating wild hogs, shoots, camotes,
wild fruits and nuts (a garden could not be grown for it
would be seen by Japanese air patrols).
described it as a "wet hole in the jungle." were about 30 soldiers and sailors who
Fertig, who visited the camp, He also reported that there
78 wanted only to be left alone. They resented officers, would not take orders, and would do nothing but sit there, rotting in the Sic-] jungle, living off the store of army rations which Deischer 51 an old prospector and boar hunter, had somehow acquired. Deisher was happy to have the company and the extra hands to serve as sentries ageinst Moro raiding parties and Japanese patrols. The first months after the 3urrender saw a total breakdown of authority throughout the islands.
Luzon was shaken by renewed political
rivalries and the emergence of the Hukbalahaps (the Communist "Huks), and the Visayas were beset with rival political factions -- Colonel Allison Ind writes that there were "at least six first-class wars going on not counting the official one" on Leyte.52
Mindanao saw the re-
emergence of the centuries-old feud between the Moros and the Christians, an especially bloody rivalry.
After the surrender wild disorder pre-
vailed as the Moros descended from the Lanao hills to plunder and pillage the lowland Christian settlements and to waylay the USAFFE soldiers making their way towards their homes.
In the Malaybalay area American and
Filipino refugees were lured into apparent safety offered by the Lanao Moros, only to be Killed.
Throughout the war the trails in "ie area
remained littered with "hundreds of weather-whitened skeletons" of the 53 unwary. F. 0. Miksche in his early authoritative study of resistance movements concluded that "A [resistancA movement begins generally with passive underground activities, developing into a resistance movement which reaches its culminating point in cpen guerrilla warfare." as this may be true for most resistance movements, movement on Mindanao.
it is not true of the
For as the level of violence increased and the
margin of security for virtually anyone outside of the few Japanese controlled areas plummetted to near zero, the island became an armed camp.
79 The Philippine Constabulary, which before the invasion hdd maintained the peace, was now demobilized and its 8,000 men were now placed in the same predicament as the Philippine Army soldiers.
As the Moros raided
and the pagans fell upon the unprotected, USAFFE soldiers now "roamed at will, using their weapons to support themnselves."5 the villagers, the farmers
were caught in the middle.
If they kept
guns, the Japanese would learn of their possession, and the penalty was beheading.
the Japanese as required to If they turned their guns in-to
do, then thEy were at the mercy of the marauding bandits.
to the coast to seek Japanese protection from their own countrymen.
Japanese were not altogether sympathetic or helpful, however. 56 Others slowly began to draw together the USAFFE soldiers, American and Filipino, to formn independent bands to provide local security. the genesis of the Mindanao guerrilla movemient families and barrios from Filipinos.
This was for many
the need to protect
The reorienting of the thrust of
the movement to resist the Japanese followed this initial phase. Itwas easy enough to start one of these early guerrilla bands, apart from the demonstrated need for local security. The econtomic and social dislocation caused by the Japanese left many Jobless:
were public servants, school teachers, taxi, bus and truck drivers, boatmen, and former soldiers.
"If these men were not guerrillas, they
were bums. As guerrillas that had a respectable and even advantageous position in their coemn'nities." 57 Unfortunately, the chaotic conditions did not permit the early rise of responsible leaders, so the first leaders of these small guerrilla bands were the "adventurers and 58 Good, desper.Joes,'" the strong men and the "passionate talkers."
well-meaning men as well as brigands would follow these early leaders,
80 and thj reasons they did so were many.
Many joined to avoid starvation
(an armed band could always acquire food), and others were outlaws, Many joined to settle old grudges and feuds, and
driven by avarice.
still others saw political gain in association with a particular leader. Social cnnflict drove many into the ranks cf the guerrillas.
the ancient social conflict pitted the Christians against the Moros,
to a far lesser degree (unlike on Luzon with the Huks) the guerrillas offered a chance to even the score with the wealthy landowners.
many joined for purely patriotic reasons out of allegiance to President Quezon, MacArthur,
the Philippine Commonwealth or America.
Marcos Agustin ("Marking" put it:
of Markings Guerrillas on Luzon) so eloquen~ly
"if the least we do is fertilize the soil where we fall, then
we grow a richer grain for tomorrow's stronger nation."5g These early groups were separated by terrain and poor communications, and it would have been diffi..it to establish one cohesive group even had they so wanted.
For "although the majority of the guerrillas
shared a comnon antipý%ly ff). the Japanese, themseives,
they were often divided among
separated Into irý,ractable rival factions engaged in a bitter
struggle for power."
lnti'necine strife and the struggle for power
were "part and parcel of the guerrilla struggle -- the survival of the fittest -- a distinct evolutionary process to which all guerrilla units were subjected."'61
The Japanese were content to let this local political
drama play itself out, for as Miksche observes,
"When several political
parties are represented in a resistance movement it is of course easier other..." 62 to set them quarreling and fighting with each To propose that politics did not play a major role in this early jockeying for leadership is to disregard the post-war evidence which saw
81 the Philippine national legislature become a "forum for bitter recrimination between collaborators and those purporting to have led anti-Japanese guerrillas.'
Some groups were bitterly opposed to the Quezon-Osmera
leadership in exile in America while others were ardent nationalists who were opposed to both Japanese and American hegemony in the Philippines.
The post-war government was perhaps noted most for its leaders Few of the guerrilla leaders
who had been collaborators during the war.
were of the Philippine political elite, and many were uneducated
stabulary or Philippine Army officers who had no link to the post-war power structure, which itself was a continuation of the pre-war power structure.
The few notable successes for the veterans of the guerrilla
resistance were President Ravmond Magsaysay who led guerrillas in the Zambales near the Bataan
,- ula and President Ferdinand Marcos who
led the 8,000 man Maharlika Guerrillas in Northern Luzon.
Kangleon, 9th Military District Commander, became the Secretary of Defense in the first post-war cabinet, and Colonel Macario Peralta, Commander of the 6th Military District, became Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board, a powerful and influential position, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the reorganized Philippine Army.
David Bt..istein concluded of Kangleon
that "He is not a politician, and was probably appointed as a concession to the guerrillas."
As one observer of the Mindanao resistance movement observed, "As the guerrilla business grew down there [Mindanaqo,
you had all sorts
of people that were more interested in seeing who was going to be the 6 boss of the island than in helping us." E
This was to become a problem
for Colonel Fertig and his American leaders,
for it was perceived that
"After the war a successful guerrillero would be an obvious choice for
82 public off ce, and the less he owed to the Americans the mure obvious a choice he would be.'67
This was certainly true of the attitude oa Major
Salipada Pendatun, who was to become a senator in the post-war legislature. Although most of the American and Filipiro leaders felt that political agitation, other than to promote loyalty to the Philippine and American governments,
had no place in the resistance movement, the suggestion of
its importance ws used as a tool when needed.
Fertig held out the
possibilities to some of his subordinates, and the commanding officer of the 106th Division, Lieuteiant Colonel McGee wrote a letter to Datu Sinsuat in which he denounced Sinsuat as a traitor and urged him to join the anti-Japanese resistance if he wanted any post-war leadership position.
Some Filipinos resented the intimation that they were
jockeying for political power after the war.
Captain Gumbay Piang,
commanding officer of the 119th Regiment, wrote a searing, emotional dec1aration disavowing any political ambitions, asserting that his motives in fighting the Japanese were purely patriotic. 7 0 The Americans were able to lead effectively because they were known not to have any post-war political ambitions in what all knew would be an independent all-Filipino government.
The Americans acted as neutrals
and helped arbitrate the disputes among the Filipinos.
guerrillas did provide the civil leadership on Mindanao after the war. And, as mentioned, Major Pendatun became a senator of the Philippine Republic, and Manalao Mindalano, commanding officer of the Maranao Militil Force, became a Congressman.71
John Keats wrote in 1963 that "Fertig's
Filipino officers are largely the officeholders in Mindanao today."
The development of the guerrilla movement on Mindanao mirrored that of ý.heother Philippine islands in several respects.
guerrilla groups were formed under loose collections of individuals
83 having common short range goals.
With the arrival of the second and third
rate Japanese garrison troops and the rise in banditry, the Filipinos By mid-August 1942 the various
joined together to restore civil order.
groups had consolidated under legitimate leaders and the spread of lawlessness was stdunched.
As the guerrilla bands consolidated, three
general categories of groups emerged.
One type of group formed around a
nucleus of unsurrendered USAFFE soldiers.
Perhaps as high as 50 percent
of thes- units were unsurrendereO USAFFE troops who found the association a natural one.73
Other groups, a second category, w,•re derived from
local pre-invasion leaders, prominent civic leaders or local Constabulary The purpose 3f groups in this category initially was to provide
security against bandits.
A third category of guerrilla groups were
those with a pre-war social or political group identification which was translated
nto anti-Japanese or counterguerrilla purposes.
The Moros on
Mindanao and the Hukbalahaps on Luzon both fit into this category.
It now became apparent to the leaders of these guerrilla groups as they turned their attention to the Japanese that the multiplicity of groups was ineffective and counterproductive to the resistance movement as a whole.
As Fertig put it,
the confident attacks by these groups
made upon Japanese garrisons "failed miserably" and "brought the guerrilla dreamers off their high perch."
They got in each other's way for their
efforts were not coordinated, the multitude of separate groups exceeded the ability of the local populations to support all of them logistically, and their multiplicity greatly increased their security problems.
becoming apparent that to lead a guerrilla unit required some skills in justice, supply, logistics, tactics, diplomacy -nd arbitration. leaders had enough of these skills to be effective.
84 The Guerrillas Have a Leader Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthi"'s Chief of Staff for Intelligence, pointed out the difficult problems confronting the guerrilla leaders and said "some emerged as really strong men, as leaders will always emerge in time of stress and disaster.''76
Colonel Fertig was one
of these men, and it was due primarily to his personal leadership qualities that the Mindanao resistance movement was unified under one leader and became the most successful of all of the guerrilla units in the Philippines. Wendell Fertig had come to the Philippines five years before the invasion during the mining boom of the 1930's with many other American engineers who had heard of great untapped gold and coal resources. Tall, sandy-haired with an athletic build, Fertig is described as being calm, genial, deliberate and possessing a remarkable memory and a great facility for remembering name!.
Keats describes Fertig is embodying the "qualities
of utter honesty, practicality, courage, patriotism, and an absolute faith in his nation and in eventual victory." impression:
Eichelberger records his
"He was a slim man with a pleasing manner, but he was fear-
less and there was iron in his soul."
An aloof man, some said cold and
formal, Fertig carefully nurtured his image as a commander by calculating the impact his various actions would have on those around him.
the local customs, and as Father Haggerty observed, "knew hew to treat Filipinos."
His civilian occupation and methods of attacking problems
would serve him well in the challenges he would face as the leader of the Mindanao guerrillas.77 Early in 1941 Fertig had been on leave in Manila from his engineering job on Samar.78 the Colorado School of Mines,
Like most engineers who had connections with Fertig held a Reserve commission in the
85 Army Engineer Corps. ment of Engineers,
On his trip to Manila, Fertig visited the Depart-
Philippine Department, U. S. Army.
The mining business
was slow, the prospects for war with Japan were growing daily, and the Army needed engineers.
Fertig went on active duty on June 1, 1941 with
the rank of major, and his family left for the United States on the President Taft with the last of the Army families in July.
assignment was as Assistant Engineer, Bataan Field Area, then Engineer, North Luzon Area, and by November he was the Chief of the Construction Section, General Neadquarters.
He spent most of his time before the
invasion overseeing the preparation and improvement of airfields throughout the archipelago.
Hugh Casey, MacArthur's Chief of Engineers, arranged
for the assignment of Fertig to Mindanao to supervise the construction of airfields.
On April 29th he left Corregidor on the last aircraft to
make it out of the island.
The aircraft, a PBY, was to have taken
General Wainwright to Mindanao, but instead it brought the Chief of Chaplains of the Philippine Army and nurses.
The PBY landed on Lake
Lanao April 30th, and Fertig proceeded to Dansalan to meet General Sharp. After confpvring at Sharp's headquarters at Del Monte, Fertig returned to the Dansalan-Illigan area to supervise the demolition of the main roads and bridges, for the Japanese had landed that day at Parang and Malabang and were pushing toward Lake Lanao.
That day Fertig met Charles Hedges,
an engineer friend whom he had not seen in years.
Hedges had been
commissioned by General Fort and placed in command of the Motor Transport Company of the 81st Division (PA).
On May 1 he was joined by Captain
Charles Smith, another civilian engineer.
May 10th Fertig learned of
Sharp's surrender and heard that General Fort was still resisting.
continued his search for Fort until June 1 when he learned that Fort had
86 surrendered on May 27th.
Fertig believed that neither Wainwright nor
Sharp was competent to order his surrender.
He had been functioning as
Casey's assistant, and therefore he was not assigned to any command in the Philippines. From May through August Fertig remained in the vicinity of Abaga and Mumungan in Lanao Province, living within 10 kilometers of the Japanese.
He became a kainginero, a gardener, and grew mongo beans.
also grew a red goatee on the theory that he would look older, and therefore wicer, among a people who believed age implied wisdom.
in a fresh unifcrm; and with his sun helmet, red goatee and lieutenant colonel insignia (he had been promoted on Bataan), of the strange unsurrendered American colonel.
he fostered the image
He appeared to be too
proud to hide and too proud to surrender, se he cast the image of subtle yet open defiance.
The Japanese commander in Mumungan, Captain Yamato,
was aware of his presence and had sent him a personal letter guranteeing his safety if
he would capitulate.
At this point the roving bandit gangs
were more of a threat to Fertig than they were to the Japanese,
Yamato probably felt no compulsion to go pursuing this strange American. On July 4th Fertig and Hedges from hiding witnessed a parade of prisoners along the National Road from Dansalan to Illigan.
had placed General Fort in a truck bed at the head of the column of prisoners who were mostly barefooted and shackled together with wire. The "Independence Day Parade" had the sordid character of the Bataan Death March. this day.
Fertig dates his firm resolution to fight the Japanese from
Throughout July and August Fertig remained in Abaga and
Momungan and continued his gardening, waiting for the chaotic conditioas on Mindanao to subside.
He was to write in his diary:
87 During the months in the forest, I have become acquainted with myself and developed a feeling that I do not walk alone.. .Never have I lost the feeling that my actions have followed a course plotted by some Power, greater than any human agency. Fertig felt himself destined for victory and part of a master plan.
was not recklessly Messianic, however, for he counselled Hedges, who wanted to fight every Japanese he saw, that they must wait until the Filipinos came co themi seeking their leadership.
The time would be
right, and the chances for succe~sful leadership improved, if the Americans did not try to force their leadership upon the Filipinos.
not only demonstrated an understanding of the ways of the Filipino culture, but italso was a recognition of the obvious truth U
the Americans had
been beaten by the Japanese,their leaders had surrendered or left the islands, and the return of American fighting forces to the Philippines in the foreseeable future was not evidenced inany way.
had piomised "The Aid," but the Filipino people unhappily understood who owned the skies and seas aroun,ý the archipelago. So Fertig awaited his opportunity.
In late August he moved to Kolambugan and then on to
Panguil Bay. The Fertig-Morgan Rivalry for Leadership "On Mindanao, as elsewhere in the Philippines, the initial guerrilla organization centered around leaders' personality qualifications,"7 and Fertig had recognized this inherent truth in the situation on Mindanao. By September 1942 a former Constabulary junior lieutenant,' Luis Morgan, had consolidated all small bandit groups in Misamis Occidental under his coimmand.
An American Mestizo, Morgan had designated himself a
captain and had joined forces with Lieutenant William "Nigger" Tait, a Mestizo son of a black Army veterinarian who had served with the~ old
88 Negro Cavalry regiments in the Moro Pacification Campaign.
Tait was "as
purely Negro as his father, but proved to be as wildly harum-scarum as any Moro" -- Tait's mother was a Mora.
Tait's exploits against the
Japanese are legendary, but cannot be recounted here.
superior, Morgan, was a natural leader with a great deal of charisma.
was described by Fertig as a virile, handsome, hard-drinking, absolutely fearless man who compelled the loyalty of men and the passion of women. It had been said among the Filipinos that "If a man is brave, and has a gun, he joins Morgan."
Morgan could not provide tVe leadership necassary to consolidat. a large number of guerrillas into a functional organization which had the necessary degree of logistical and community support to make it effective.
In addition, Morgan, a Christian, was locked in a continuing
war with the Moros.
Soon after the American surrender he had attacked
Baroy, massacred the Moro population, and had subsequently acquired the reputation of being a "Moro killer, not a Jap killer."
The cause for this
feud is not important (an official history records that Morgan was pacifying marauding Moro bandits) but the resolution of the feud was, for there would be no unified effective guerrilla movement on Mindanao without either support from the Moros or their neutrality,
The simplest explanation for Morgan's overtures to Fertig is that "To relieve himself of administrative problems,
Morgan offered the
command to Fertig on condition that he be made his chief of staff with 83 authority to remain in the field."
The courtship was not so simple
as the telling, for a drama matching a Filipino fighter's pride against an American engineer's organizational instincts was played out under the unwritten rules of Filipino custom.
In fact, Tait had played off Fertig
89 against Morgan, and once the question of "face"
a serious Oriental
phenomenon in which the entire community participates -- had become the centerpiece of the drama, the confrontation had to be played out to the end.
Ultimately, Morgan personally came to Fertig for the first time on
September 12, 1942, and perhaps the real beginnings of the guerrilla unification can be dated from then.
summarized the negutiations this way: returned to Lanao and Morgan asked forces than under Morgan.
Fertig, in a letter to Casey, on October 1, 1942 Morgan and Tait
Fertig to take command of the guerrilla
found that he could not control the ambition of the various sector and area commanders. Any officer who had 12 rifles immediately appcinted himself Major or Colonel. 1 realized that should this condition continue, intercine LsiQ strife will (sicJ result and the entire uprising result in a reign of terror for wh4ch the USAFFE would bear the stigma. It was decided that, in order to control these elements, I should assume the title of Brigadier General: this 85 was done. The issue of Fertig's brigadier general stars, fashioned from coins by a Moro silversmith, was almost his undoing.
The agreement with
Morgan (allegedly conceived by Tait) was that Fertig would pose as a general sent by MacArthur to the Philippines to train a guerrilla army. This would give him immediate and absolute seniority over any contenders to the leadership for there had been no grade in the Philippine Amy equal to a brigadier general of the U. S. Amy.
mugz- saw in Fertig
a solution to the seniority issue which would still leave him, Morgan, in charge.
The ploy with the general stars would,
in Morgan's opinion,
still leave him as the de facto leader, and he would use Fertig to his own purposes.
This attitude was explicit in Morgan's insistance that
Fertig must first visit Morgan at his headquarters -- i.e., general, Morgan,
would "lose face" with the Filipinos for appearing to report to a self-appointed captain.
go Colonel Fertig recognized the ploy for what it was, for he appreciated the Filipino code.
And while he found in the general's
stars some practical value, MacArthur did not.
Fertig saw in the stars
the Filipino idea of "The One" or the "Incharge," and he thought that MacArthur did not fully appreciate this. 8 6
Presumably, MacArthur nct
only understood the concept, but he mastered it. Filipinos MacArthur was to be the "Incharge." known as Tai Tai -- "The Old.'' guerrilla organizations,
for there is no fixed table of organization to Lieutenant Colonel McLish noted
this when he said to an American guerrilla:
Fertig would come to be
The issue of rank is a common one within
serve as authority in assigning ranks.
In any case, for the
"The first thing we'll do is
Here with the guerrillas you need the prestige of higher
MacArthur himself recognized the principle, at least for grades
as indicated in t1e celebrated incident on Sulu when
Lieutenant Frank Young was promoted to captain to forestall his execution by Moros who claimed to have a leader of higher rank.8g
to wear the stars, although directed not to do so by MacArthur's headquarters.
Japanese intelligence referred to Fertig as "Major General
Fertig, Commander in Chief in the Philippines" throughout the occupation period and used Japanese military notation in referring to the 10th Military District as the "10 Army Group."'g0 Soon after Fertig and Morgan came to an agreement Fertig promptly ordered Morgan to travel to areas immediately bordering Misamis Occidental
to encourage unification with neighboring guerrilla groups.
Meanwhile, Fertig remained in the new headquarters in Misamis to confront p
the difficult administrative and logistical problems of organizing the resistance movement.
Morgan was successful in Zamboanga and Sulu and
91 returned to
amis in December 1942.
In January 1943,
Morgan off the island to establish communication with guerrilla groups in the Visayan Islands.
During Morgan's absence Fertig had made a truce
with Moro Datu Umpa who represented the Moros at war with Morgan, 9
neutralizing the Moro threat in the Misamis area. l Robert V. Bowler his second in command.
He h .:also appointed
On his return to Misamis in
June, Morgan expressed his ,.trong dissatis-action with this new command arranrement and with Fertig's orders to his guerrillas to avoid contact In July he resigned as chief of staff, pulled the men
with the Japanese.
loyal to him out of Fertig's organization, assamed the rank of brigadier general and formed a new command called the Mindanao and Dutch Indies Command.
In the meantime, Major Angeles Limena,
commanding officer of the
109th Regiment, had led a mutiny which lasted four months.
and then attacked the headquarters of his successor Major Manuel Jaldon. Jaldon,
in turn, made a truce with the Japanese.
The upshot of all of
this was that Bowler broke Limena's revolt, and Fertig united the Moros against Morgan.
Limena helped persuade Morgan to give up his revolt, and
for his help Limena was rewarded with the return of his command.
to gather an effective force under his control, and unwilling to submit to Fertig's command, Morgan reluctantly boarded the submarine Bowfin bound for Australia
in September 1943.
Fertig had seen this alternative
as the only viable one open to him -- Hedges had wanted Mnrgan shot. Morgan's departure, which Fertig directed over MacArthur's orders tu the contrary, marked the end of Fertig's internal problems and enabled him to con;entrate on consoliJating his force, carrying out his instructions from MacArthur, and fighting the Japanese.
92 Birth of the Guerrilla Organization Colonel Fertig wrote the initial proclamation announcing his assumption of command on September 12th on the back of an old court blank which read "Notice of Delinquency in Payment of Real Property Tax."
copy of the proclamation of September 18, 1942 which re-established civil government under the "Philippine Comnonwealth Government" is contained in Figure 2.
As the proclamation letterhead indicates, Colonel Fertig
coiýsidered his guerrilla organization to be a regular part of the American Amy.
At the time the proclamation was signed, Fertig had but
200 guerrillas in a province of 250,000 people. 93 By runner and bamboo telegraph the word of Fertlg's assumption of command was communicated throughout Mindanao.
Many guerrilla chiefs greeted Fertig's messengers
with skepticism Jr open scorn.
Guerrilla leaders rarely knew each other
personally, and -. putations were communicated through the limited capabilities of the bamboo telegraph. after months in the jungle were drawn to the beacon.
Still, many soldiers, disillusioned
from malaria, hunger and exposure,
Many figured that to die fighting the Japanese
made more sense than to die from malnutrition. 9 4 Chief Petty Officer Elwood Offret, a sailor who was a wizard with engines, and who had been believed dead from malaria, came out of tne jungle.
Fertig's old friend Sam Wilson, who had been sent from
Corregidor to Mlndanao In February 1942 on a Naval Intelligence mission, came stumbling out of the hills, half-starved and still accompanied by a cargadore (porter) carry~ng his mattress.
In civilian life Wilson was
the owner of the Wilson Building in Manila.
A millionaire, he had made
his fortune speculating in mining stocks and real estate.
man who knew nothing of the jungle, he had been commissioned a lieutenant
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL IN THE FIELD CF MINDANAO & SULU 18 September 1942 PROC LAM A TI ON On September 18, 1942, our forces under Maj. L.L. MORGAN completed the occupation of Misamis Occidental Province and Northern Zamboanga from the hands of the Japanese Military Government, and raised the American and Filipino flags therein. In behalf of the United States of America, the Philippine Commonwealth Government is reestablished in those regions under the Military All Civil Laws and regulations will Authorities. be followed except in those cases where they conIn such cases Military flict with Military Laws. Laws will prevail. This procedure shall continue to be enforced until such a time when it shall be declared sus. pended, or terminated.
/s/ W. W. FERTIG Brigadier General, USA. Commanding Mindanao & Sulu Force.
94 in the Navy just before Manila fell.
His wife and boys were interned
by the Japanese in Santo Tomds on Luzon, and he feared for their lives should the Japanese learn of his guerrilla activities.
The only man
Fe'tig pleaded with to join the resistance, Wilson ran the money printing press and handled the guerrilla finances -- a comptroller and secretary of the treasury combined.
By joining the resistance he believed that he
had condemned his family to death.
With failing eyesight and hearing,
Wilson was later to accompany the First Cavalry Division into Minila and was with the lead elements as Santo Tomas was liberated.
was still barely alive, and he gave his son a flag presented to Wilson by MacArthur to be raised over Santo Tomas.
Fertig soon cvme to realize in these early weeks that he was not recruiting the people needed to sustain the resistance movement.
enlisting "generally masterless men, adventurous youths, men who wished to get away from their wives, and the kind of men who seemed to have nothing better to do."' 9 6
The average guerrilla soldier was between 17
and 23 years of age, and these were not the people, influence in the society.g7
'h experience and
The ilustrados (community leaders, land
owners), merchants and the majority of the peasantry had held aloof. Morgan, Fertig's chief of staff during this time, was in part the cause for this aloofness.
The Church held Morgan to be bigamous and amoral,
the ilustrados did not trust him, and the merchants and fishermen complained that Morgan stole from them. of influence in Misamis Occidental,
Fertig sought to tap the source
and he focused on wooing the Church
and Dor'a Carmen, wife of former Senator Ozamis and the lady of Casa Ozamis.
Doha Carmen was patroness of Misamis Occidental Province and
the "unofficial owner" o- Misamis.
Her word carried the weight of law,
95 and if she supported Fertig's
organization, the province would as well. Fertig managed a dinner invitation with DoVfa Carmen, her priest Father Calanan and her close adviser, Doctor Coý reras.
Fertig was persuasive
at the dinner, and he would later personally date the real birth of a unified guerrilla movement from this supr r party.
He also ordered all
of the guerrillas in the Misamis headquar*ers to attend Mass on the theory that this demonstration of religinus faith would be in stark contrast to the Japanese suppression of religious expression, and he calculated that the best way to convince the men to join his organization was through their wives, who were devout churchgoers.
benefit was that tne wives w(uld then worx in the cottage arms industry to supply bullets and clothrs for their men, whom they had in turn urged to join the guerrillas.
By late September 1942 Colonel
g had established goals for
his organization and defined its mission.
His foremost aim was to obtain
the unqualified support of the civilians and establish a working civil government.
He had to colloct a-' weapc i from civilians, which meant
that he had to effectively eliminate the bandit groups in order to persuade the civilians to give up their arms, and then he had to ensure the efficie'-
use of every available weapon by guerrilla units.
then harass and confuse the Japanese through guerrilla tactics.
He would Ira
Wolfert claims that Fertig's plan called for securing the mountains, controlling the road nexuses, engaging Japanese main force units, and then seizing the Japanese General Headquarters.
Fertig states that his
tactical objective was limited to keeping his units dispersed and viable until U. S. forces returned to Mindanao.
The guerrilla faced a dilemma in fighting the Japanese at this
FN 96 time.
In order to gain civilian support and recruit new guerrillas
Fertig had to demonstrate that he could, and would, fight the Japanese. On the other hand, he needed to preserve his forces and consolidate his administ.ative .rrol
in order to be effective.
All too often the
guerrilla attacks were inconclusive, as when Major Ernest McLish's guerri -!
had trapped 100 Japanese in a stone schoolhouse and were
reduced to trying to starve them out.
Or, the guerrilla attacks resulted
in swift and severe retallation by the Japanese.100
This was also a
time of great mistrust, for any stranger who happened upon the guerrilla defenses was in peril.
White men were suspected of being German or
Italian agents, and individuals without acceptable explanations or passes were interned and sent inland to work on farms tending cattle and raising crops.'
In establishing a structure for his guerrilla organization Fertig first attempted to use the old Philippine Constabulary system of sectors, subsectors and districts.
But he found that "Every subsector comnander
immediately assumed dictatorial powers," and he decided to use the old 2 By March 1943 he Philippine Army Reserve Division structure instead.10 had established the 105th Division under his direct control and the 108th
Division in Lanao under Hedges.
Ultimately within the 10th Military
District, Fertig established six infantry divisions.
Appendix A con-
tains a condensed chronology of the development of these six divisions. The reader should be aware also "that there was an understandablo tendency on the part of their [guerrillas] leaders to use the rather ambitious military nomenclatures of corps and divisions based on the pre-war District mobilization pattern."103 Because of the concentration of USAFFE furces on Mindanao and the
97 number of officers and PCO's who did not surrender, Fertig had more talent from which to choose for his leadership.
As it ultimately turned
out, the commanders of all six divisions we'. at one time Americans, a fact which distinguishes the Mindanao resistance movement from those on the other islands.
Fertig himself was finally asked by Morgan to lead
the movement, and Frank McGee had been asked by the Cotabato Moros to lead the 106th Division in that area.
Four guerrilla organizations had
been founded by the Americans Bowler, Grinstead, Childress and McClish, and the sixth division was led by Hedges as a power broker for Fertig with the Moros. Colonel Fertig saw obvious political weaknesses in having all But he was deailng with d curious phenonmenon
American senior commanders.
by which a qualified experienced Filipino officer would ask Fertig for an American to lead the Filipino officer's unit.
One legacy of the American
rule in the Philippines had been that the Filipino soldier still believed, that Americans possessed superior
even after the defeat of American arms, wisdom.
Despite the tremendous "loss of face" for America, many
Filipinos still felt uncomfortable seeing Americans working for any but the most gifted Filipino.
Fertig found it necessary to commission junior
enlisted men who had no leadership experience, no tactical training. and no experience in the jungle in order to attract the Filipino leaders he needed for his companies.
The Asrirans were a kine of ai.Wne-anting,
a magic charm, for the Filipino vtficers who could continue to lead in fact.
Many of these young Americans,
selves with very high marks. The infusion
it should be said, acquitted them-
of young Americans into the guerrilla organization
was not withodt its problems.
The young Americans referred to the older
former civilians as the Old-Timers Club.
Fertig, Hedges and Wilson have
98 already been mentioned.
James Grinstead was an old lieutenant colonel
and former member of the Philippine Constabulary turned planter; Major Herbert C. Page was well into his sixties, also a former planter; Cecil Walter was in his fifties, and Fred Varney, who had been a tough old mine operator, was in his fifties as well.
Frank McGee was a retired
officer who was decorated for action in World War I and who had lived on Mindanao Oor many years.
Bowler and McLish were young officers and,
therefore, presumably not lumped in with the "old-timers."
Americans Apparently believed that the Old-Timers Club ran the guerrilla movement for their own benefit and at the expense of Regular service personnel.
Others complained that the "Old Filipinos," as the old hands
referred to themselves, treated the Filipinos themselves "inhumanly."
The historical evidence does not address the validity of these assertions either way, so ,o conclusions on the matter can be drawn. The influx of USAFFE soldiers into Mindanao before the surrender raised yet another problem for Colonel Fertig, and that was the large variety of languages and dialects spoken.
Soldiers from the Visayas and
Luzon were on Mindanao as well as young English-speaking Americans.I
The units themselves were sometimes all-Christian or all-Moro, but some were amazingly heterogeneous.
The 110th Division in Surigao Province
was comprised of Christians, Mohammedans and Americans.
They came from
the Philippine Army, Philippine Scouts, Philippine Constabularý,, Amy, U. S. Navy, U. S. Army Air Corps,
U. S. Merchant Marine, former
civilians, and perhaps even an Australian or two. of the 113th Independent Regimt Khodr, a Syrian mining engineer.
The commanding officer
: of the 110th Division was Major Khalil 107
To successfully deal with this situation on Mindanao Colonel
99 firmness in dealing with
Fertig had to "exercise caution, diplomacy and .... such problems as command assignments."
Fertig's talent for understanding
the Filipino was to a great extent responsible for the welding o•fthe resources of the Island into an effective military unit.
observed that "By perseverance and diplomacy Colonel Fertig gradually won the respect of the other guerrilla leaders,
and by October 1942 he had
built up a fair cohesive guerrilla organization."
Fertig had implemented
the "Ideal" of American doctrine of the time without being aware that such a doctrine for the treatment of "natives" existed.
The doctrine called
for tact, enlightened disciplinary measures, knowledge of the local customs, language and religion and strict avoidance of politicil favoriti-m.1
In many respects, Fertig's leadership in these circumstances serves as a model. Fertig Communicates with GHO, SWPA After establishing the nucleus of the guerrilla organization, Fertig was confronted with the problem of communicating with General Headquarters,
Southwest Pacific Area (IFj,SWPA), MacArthur's head-
quarters, to tell them of his group's existence.
On December 4, 1942 at
their own instigation and over the skepticism voiced by Fertig, Captains J. A. Hamner and Charles Smith left Mindanao by small sailboat with a Moro crew for Australia.
Both Smith and Hamner hao been mining engineers
before the war, both knew Fertig, both had been at Jacob Deisher's mountain camp when it was attacked by Moros, and both thought the guerrilla effort a fruitless exercise without help from outside the Island. odyssey was successful, and all the more so because neither was an accomplished blue water sailor.
100 In the meantime, Australia by radio.
Fertig had initiated attempts to communicate with
Too lengthy to relate in detail here, the story of
how Fertig made radio contact with MacArthur is a fascinating one.
member of Fertig's headquarters, Gerardo Almendres, a high school boy, had books he had received before the war from the International Correspondence School,
With no experience whatsoever,
Almendres took bits and pieces from old radio receivers and sound equipment parts from an old motion picture projector that had been buried in a swamp and tried to duplicate the diagrams in his books.
configuration covered four walls of a nipa shack (grass hut). Ball, an Air Corps radio operator, and Roy Bell,
a school teacher and
ham radio operator from the island of Negros, solved the problem of the aerial and the crystal, which Almendres'
radio lacked, by using wire
coiled erratically around a Joint of bamboo.
The radio was tried every
dry, taken completely apart and tried agai% the next, looking for the right combination of parts.
The signal transmitted did not keep to one
frequency but slid across the kilocycle band interrupting traffic on all frequencies.
When the signal was first picked up by the Station KFS at
Half Moon Bay, San Francisco, the Navy signalman thought the Japanese were trying to jam the radio waves.
In Janaury 1943, Fertig (Station
KZOM) had made contact with Station KFS.
It was many weeks after this
before KFS would acknowledge Fertig's legitimacy as a free American in the Philippines.
His cylindrical encoding devices were outdated and
therefore thought to be in the hands of a Japanese counterintelligence agent posing as Fertig.
FBI and Naval Intelligence agents visited
Fertig's wife in Golden, Colorado and reviewed his military files. break came when KFS called using "MSF" as the call letters.
101 taken this code to Australia with him: Fertig."
it stood for "Mindanao Smith
So now the War Department and GHQ,
was there to vouch for Fertig's existence.
SWPA were involved,
Still, it was not until
February 14, 1943 that KFS was satisfied with Fertig's authenticity and radioed procedural instructions for contacting Station KAZ, MacArthur's headquarters in Australia.
Contact was formally established with KAZ on
February 20, 1943.111 Fertig's first report to MacArthur read: Have strong force in being with comp'..ce civilian support... Large number of enemy motor vehicles and bridges have been destroyed. Many telephone poles have been torn down, food dumps burned, and considerable enemy arms and ammunition captured. Thousands young Filipinos eager to join when arms vailable. Ready and eager to engage the enemy on your orders.12 Father Haggerty recalls that MacArthur's first message read:1 FERTIG ARE NOT GET AID PLEDGE
XXX YOU ARE NAMED GUERRILLA CHIEF XXX YOUR MEN DESERTERS BUT FIGHTERS XXX IN SOE WAYI WILL TO YOU XXX FOR THE FUTURE I REITERATE MY XXX I SHALL RETURN XXX MACARTHUR
This message brought relief to the USAFFE soldiers who were still unsure of their status under military law, and it held out the prospect for help.
A following message appointing Fertig to command was still more
specific:114 LTCOL W W FERTIG IS DESIGNATED TO COMMAND THE TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT (ISLANDS OF MINDANAO AND SULU) XXX HE WILL PLxFECT INTELLIGENCE NET COVERING NINTH MILITARY DISTRICT (SAMAR-LEYTE) XXX NO OFFICER OF RANK OF GENERAL WILL BE DESIGNATED AT PRESENT XXX The designated boundaries for the ten military districts are shown in Figure 3. districts.
The districts matcht4 with the pre-war Philippine Army
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MILITARY DISTRICTS (Directed by GHQ, SWPA, WWII)
(6th Distric -4p
(7th District / •
1th District 1
103 MacArthur Takes Control MacArthur sent a message to both Colonel Fertig and Colonel Peralta on February 13, 1943 which specified several things.
Fertig's command to the 10th Military District (Mindarao including Zamboanga, the four islands in the Province Surigao del Norte, and Basilan Island off the tip of Zamboanga) and Peralta's to the 6th Milltary District (Panay and Romblon).
Fertig was ordered to establish an
intelligence net in the 9th Military District (Leyte and Samar) and Peralta was to do the same, in the 7th and 8th Districts (Negros-Siquijor and Cebu-Bohol Islands).115
The February 13th message declared MacArthur's
intention to develop the guerrilla territorial command area based on prewar military districts.
Command assignments would be made on a tentative
basis and the retention of appointments would be based upnn performance of duty.
All district commanders would function under the control of
MacArthur had not forgotten that a single commander for all
of the islands if captured could surrender all of the forces, although the effectiveness of such a surrender would be very mu.h in doubt.
more important, he wanted no contest among the district comumanders for overall command of all the guerrilla farces. message he spelled this out very clearly:
In the February 13th
"It is directed that there will
be maximum co-operation, mutual support and the avoidance of friction between Commanding Officers of Military Districts operating in a common cause.,116 General MacArthui eliminate competition.
had with good reason emphasized the need to He 'new that strong personalities would rise to
leadership and would begin jockeying for power in the post-war regime. The result would be that guerrilla strength would dissipate in a power struggle and the guerrillas would be much less effective in fighting the
The contest for power in the southern islands is referred to
in several sources, for example:
Guerrilla- "organizations developed...,
merged, consol'dated, and broadened out to extend control over adj3cent islands.
The aspirations of some guerrilla commanders werr suppressed
Colonel Fertig is specifically cited later in this same history
which relates that upon receiving MacArthur's February 13th ;•P~sage Fertig had reduced himself to colonel and "dropped his aspiration for control of the Visayas which had incurred the wrath" of Peralta on Panay, Villamor on Negros and Cushing on Cebu.117 the message was,
There is good evidence that
in good part, directed at Fertig.
In a message to his own units after having received initial recognition, Fertig declared: The recognition of our organization by SWPA is beyond dispute, and at present we stand at the top of the list of military organizations in the Philippine Islands, and do not have a single rival among other military districts. It is my desire to maintain this reputation unblemished, and should we do that, it is glory for all. Our reputation has reached so far that emissaries from guerrilla groups in Luzon have approached this Headquarters for recognition and aid in the organization of their areas.l 1 8 Any military commander will recognize this message as 3 pep talk to the troc ý, but it may have been more than that, or at least the people whom it would affect thought it was. When Commander "Chick" Parsons, USNR, first arrived in Mindanao on February 1, 1943, he had expressed the concern of GHQ, SWPA that Fertig had been audacious enough to establish a Free Philippine Government.
Fertig argued that the civil government was subordinate to the
Commonwealth Government in exile, and the GHQ interest, to wit:
he thought he saw politics behind
those who had deserted the island were
concerned for their political support on their return. 119 accounts of Parson's activities in the Philippines,
105 observation is made:1
Fertig was pleasant enough but Parsons was disturbed by the impression that the colonel was more interested in extending his jurisdiction to other islands than in regular guerrilla operations. He seemed to regard his recognition by MacArthur as a hunting permit to expand his area of command and was actually less interested in improving his organization than in enlarging it. That this was true was eventually substantiated when Parsons later discovered that Peralta... Cushing...and Kangleon.. .were aroused against Fertig. Colonel Fertig wrote to his friend General Casey at GHQ, SWPA:
Both Parsons and Eharle] Smith mentioned the fact that it was felt that I was attempting to grab the control of all units in the archipelago. This was not the case. Lt. ro. Peralta wrote me under date of 27 November, 1942, placing his entire organization under my comiand.. .As previously stated my whole interest in the matter has been to attempt to coordinate our efforts and to preserve the good name of USAFFE. Before Fertig had established communication with MacArthur, Peralta had radioed MacArthur and complained that "certain officers, including one Wendell Fertig, were trying to usurp his command" and had requested that MacArthur recognize forces.
him, Peralta, as the sole commander of the Philippine
That bad blood existed between the two is suggested by Keat's
description of Fertig's reaction when upon later hearing of Peralta's message Fertig went into "a black fury that brought forth all the brutality of which he was so unexpectedly capable.
If Macarlo Peralta had been in
Fertig's office at the moment Fertip would have drawn his pistol and shot Peralta down where he stood."'
In January 1943 Captain Jesus Villamor had arrived in Negros from GHQ,
SWPA, having gone on to Negros after having failed to penetrate the
Japanese defenses around Mindanao.
He left Negros for Panay, and he
concluded after talking with Peralta on Panay that Peralta had a grandiose scheme for control of the Visayan Islands under his IV Philippine Corps. Villamor concluded that Fertig also had such a plan, though less ambitious, and that bloodshed between Peralta and Fertig was probable.
106 He radioed his recommendation to MacArthur that neither commander be permitted to control anything but his own district, primarily because effective control beyond one island was impossible because of insurmountdble conmuni:ation and transportation problems.
Of course, the
view from Panay was different, and a history of the Panay guerrilla organization observes that Fertig had a "scheme to organize the different guerrilla movements in the islands on a much more ambitious plan than that of the IV Philippine Corps."
This account goes on to refer to
Morgan's visit with his company-sized "General Headquarters Expeditionary Force" to "Leyte, Samar and other islands in the Visayas to undertake the organization of a 'unified command.'"
The question, of course,
is how much of this activity was Morgan's doing of his own accord and how much free rein Fertig had given Morgan when he left.
Did Fertig intend
for Morgan to be a liaison officer to encourage coordination, or did he in fact intend for Morgan to explore the possibilities for unification under his command?
What Morgan actually did, and what he was perceived
as doing by Peralta, may also be two different things. Peralta was 30 years of age, and he later attracted this observation from General Eichelberger:
"He looks like a number one cutthroat to
12 me, and I may have to cut his before I get through."'
favorite with other guerrilla commanders.
Peralta was no
He complained to MacArthur
that the guerrillas on Luzon were not carrying their share of the fight against the Japanese; Colonel Cushing ordered Peralta's agents to stay off Cebu on pain of death; and the commander on Bohol never recognized Peralta's authority.126
Perhaps the clearest example of the inter-island
infighting was the struggle for power on Negros.
Peralta backed Colonel
Abcede and Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Mata for leadership.
107 Colonel Gabriel Gador remained neutral,
and M,.jor Placido Aiusejo wanted
to put his command and Negros Oriental under Fertig's command.
wrote to Fertig on January 20, 1943 and appealed to him to .elinquish his support of Ausejo:
"Your laying claims to control Oriental Negros
without controlling the whole island has [resulted in] unpleasant incidents."
SWPA recognized the 7th Military District and
appointed Villamor as its commander on May 14, 1943,
Ausejo from the 10th Military District and ceased.all activities on Negros.
Fertig and Peralta were opposed elsewhere, also.
Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing for leadership on Samar, while Peralta backed Captain Pedro V. Merritt in a bruising fight for power. arid Peralta supported different aspirants on Leyte, too.
Blas Miranda, and Fertig supported Colonel Ruperto Kangleon. had discussed unification with Lieutenant Hal Richardson,
U. S. Navy,
Kangleon's emissary, and Morgan had appointed Kangleon commanding officer of the 9th Military District on April 20, 1943, which presumably violated MacArthur's February 13th message forbidding such actions.
not have communication with Morgan between February 14th and April 20th, however, for he lacked the radios. November 28, 1943.128 however.
MacArthur recognized Kangleon on
Things were not all bad between Peralta and Fertig,
In February 1943 Peralta sent liaison and intelligence officers
to Fertig's headquarters with a courteous offer information.
j share intelligence
How the two officers fared is not given in the account,
however. 129 Japanese intelligence made an effort to follow these power struggles.
Intelligence reports had both Morgan and Fertig on Bohol
108 Island on March 25, 1944.
Morgan was in Australia, of course, and Fertig
was fending f"or his life against Japanese patrols in the Agusan River Valley on Mindanao.
The Japanese assessed the Fertig-Kangleon reldtion-
ship as a close one, and they credited Fertig with bringing the guerrilla 130 internecine warfare in the Vlsayas to a close.
The issue of GHQ, SUPA
was an extremely important one
to the guerrilla leaders, and Fertig and Peralta were fortunate to have received recognition early.
It enabled them to quickly consolidate their
forces with the respectability and authority derived from their appointments.
Early recognition was advantageous to GHQ also because it could
then pursue within that coimmand what camne to be known as the 'lie low" policy.
What MacArthur needed most from the guerrillas in the Philippines
As Intelligence information gatherers, the guerrillas
could give the American forces a tremendous advantage in planning military operations in and around the Philippines.
The most that was expected of
the guerrillas operationally was sabotage of the Japanese lines of coummunication.
In return for recognition a guerrilla leader would receive
aid, but only upon his meeting four conditions.
The guerrillas were to
remain united under one command within the military district; the guerrillas must not usurp but must support the local civil government; combat activity against the Japanese was to be limited to protection of guerrilla facilities; and the leader was to faithfully carry out his 13
3 responsibility to strengthen his organization and gather intelligence.'
The "lie low' policy was implemented in part to reduce the likelihood of reprisals from the Japanese.
The guerrillas, given their level
of training and sophistication in weapons, could not hope to cope with a Japanese attack in force.
Guerrilla strength would be reduced and the
109 ,bllity to collect intelligence lessened.
Most certainly, the Japanese
would take out their wrath oi the civilian population.
unit, once fixed and pursued by a counterguerrilla force, must focus on the destruction of the pursuing force or must abandon the area to survive.132 During Commander Parson's first visit to Colonel Fertig, he made it clear that MacArthur was serious about the "lie low" policy.
units were to make no more attacks on Japanese strongpoints and were to hold only that territory already under guerrilla control.
security was to extend to the coastwatcher stations being put in on the island.
In addition, the guerrillas were not to try to free the prisoners
interned in Davao Penal Colony.
They were already considered "expended"
by GHQ, and failure to free all of t% prisoners would likely result in the execution of the rindining prisoners.
In any event, Fertig had no
idea what he woul-d do with several hundred Ill and weakened prisoners if he was able to free them.
Colonel Ferti3 did not fully agree with the orders to aioid combat with the Japarnese.
The Filipinos had suffered at the hands of the
Japanese, and the quiet gathering of intelligence did not satisfy the Filipinos, of which there were many, who now had a blood feud with the Japanese.
If the guerrillas did not demonstrate an offensive posture
against the Japanese, the people would no longer support the guerrilla effort, which they had been willing to do at considerable danger to themselves.
In the fall of 1943, Fertig published the organization's
mission to his guerrillas. intelligence for GHQ. on Mindanao.
Their first priority was to gather
Their second priority was to defeat the Japanese
He knew this mission did not fully comply with MacArthur's
directive, but Fertig reasoned that without
continued public sLpport,
110 which meant continued if limited offensive action, the sources of intelligence would dry up.1
As Colonel Fertig was to write to General
Casey, "Instructions were to undertake no offensive action against the enemy.
This has been followed, but the enemy did not receive the same
orders. ,,135 The visit by Commander Parsons to Mindanao marked an important turning point in the resistance movement.
Parsons had embarked on a
heroic saga which would catch the imagination of the Filipino people. His story is a remarkable one which cannot be condensed here.
are several books which detail his exploits as MacArthur's agent to the Philippine resistance movement,
and these are annotated in the
bibliography. Parsons arrived in Mindanao aboard the submarine Tambir with Captain Charles Smith who had left Mindanao four months earlier in a sailboat.
His mission was to learn the extent of the resistance movement
in the Philippines, gauge the ability and trustworthiness of the leaders, and identify those who were capable and willing to accept orders from MacArthur.
Those who could meet the standards would receive official
recognition, which Parsons had the authority to offer, and the assurance of supplies.
Parsons would then integrate these units into an archipelago-
wide intelligence network.136
Parsons was a friend r,(Frtig, and Smith
had given MacArthur the first account of the M.,,uanao guerrilla organization.
Fertig knew that the two had been sent to detemine if
competent to command, and he was told outright that he had nnL dene himself any favors at GHQ by declaring himself a brigadier general. The issue of Fertig's competence was probably never in doubt. Parsons knew McL*sh, Bowler and Hedges personally, and he had confidence in their'
He concluded that the Mindanao resistance movement was stronger
than GHQ had contemplated.
He also concluded that Fertig needed small
arms, ammunition and radio euipment for intra-island comnunication.
confirmed Fertig as the commander of the 10th Military District and produced a set of silver eagles to confirm his promotion to colonel. Bowler, McLish, Hedges, Grinstead and McGee were soon to receive promotions signed by MacArthur, and Fertig would receive the Distinguished Silver Cross on August 20, 1943.
Richardson was to characterize the Fertig-
Parsons relatio3ship like this:
"Fertig and Parsons were a wonderful team.
They were the Nimitz and MacArthur of our little frog-filled pond."
The' Rivalry of Salipada K. Pendatun One of the most important accomplisN..-nts of Parsons'
Mindanao was the assistahic'. he provided in unifying the Mindanao guerrillas.
In a letter to Frank McGee, Robert Bowler wrote of Salipada
a guerrilla leader i:ithe Cotabato Province:
From all of this you can readily see that Pendatun is the Number One trouble-maker as far as Colonel Fertig is concerned. He is undoubtedly the only person on the island of Mindam who is holding up Fertig's report to SWPA that all is clear. Parsons trivrlled to Cotabato to meet with Pendatun, and his help was instrumental
in ultimately persuading Pendatun to submit to Fertig's
authority. In December 1942 Pendatun had offered Fertig a job on Pendatun's staff.
Pendatun was a lawyer and an Influential adviser to the
Governor of Mindanao before the Japanese invasion.
A Cotabato Moro,
Magindanao son of an o'd line of datus, Pendatun was reared in the house of Edward Kuder,
superintendent of schools in the province.
grew up more exposed to American thought and speech than to Moro culture. A promising political figure, he had been a Moro adviser to the Philippine
i=m. - •.
112 Army during the invasio,.
His wife, Matabay, was a graduate of the
Philippine Normal School in Manila, and like her husband had been educated by Kuder.
Raised a Christian in Zamboanga, she had converted to Islam
whnn she married Pendatun.
The couple was childless, and they had
adopted an orphaned American girl with blue eyes and blond hair and pale skin.
Salipada Pendatun was not a typical Moro. A wealthy landowner (rice land in the Cotabato swamps),
had gathered guns and volunteers together to protect his property.
the Japanese cruelty began to reach his people he formed a guerrilla organization from the remnants of General Fort's Moro Bolo Battalions. The force became a large one comprisod of both Christians and Moros, and Pendatun's men acknowledged him as "brigadier general."
described Pendatun as "brainy, proud, and unquestionably as good an organizer as he was a man of action."
Pendatun had a competent staff,
"better than Fertig himse.f" according to Ingham, which included Americans, a former senator, a former governor of Cotabato,
the former chief of
staff of the Philippine Air Corps, and Major Frank McGee. Fertig thought that Pendatun's group was very effective but found Pendatun "headstrong,
brave, glittering" and "overly occupied with the
pleasures of women."
He also found him to be "short, stocky," and "brutally
Fertig was wary of Major Edwin Andrews,
the former Chief of
the Philippine Army Air Corps, and the influence he allegedly had upon Pendatun.
Andrews was an American Mestizo and American citizen, but his
well-known hatred of America had led to his "preaching the most rampant anti-Americanism."
Apparently, Andrews had suffered a racial insult
while training in the American South, and he complained often that he could not sleep at night for his disgust at having American blood flowing
113 in his veins. American.
From this Fertig concluded that Pendatun himself was anti-
Father Haggerty drew the opposite conclusion,
was loyal to the United States. Bowler had been negotiating with Pendatun to join Fertig's command with no success.
Parsons visited Pendatun and travelled with him.
was impressed with his several thousand men and his staff and the manner in which the guerrillas grew their own produce and livestock.
apochryphal tale, Parsons was with Pendatun when he trapped a Japanese patrol inside a schoolhouse. arms,
Unable to reduce the building with small
Pendatun resorted to strapping two bombs on a carabao, lighting its
tail and pcinting the terrified animal at the building.
enjoyed some small degree of success, but Parsons was now able to make it clear to Pendatun that the only way he would ever get heavier weapons would be by acknowledging Fertig as the leader of the Mindanao guerrillas and joining MacArthur's team.
Pendatun gave up his dream of commanding
General Vachon's former 3ukidnon-Cotabato Force,
and Ingham and Wise
relate, perhaps with some poetic license, that Pendatun on the spot removed his gold stars and replaced them with gold oak leaves that Parsons had brought with him.
The transformation was not quite so smooth, however, as Bowler's letter to McGee of October 5, 1943 demonstrates.
In June 1943 Fertig
had written to McGee: As you undoubtedly know, Pendatun's assumption of rank is illegal and without precedent, inasmuch as he had knowledge of the Following the visit organization at the time he assumed the rank. it is hoped that this is water of Commander Parsons 14 2 to that area, under the bridge. It was not until Fertig was moving his headquarters to Agusan in the fall of 1943 that Pendatun capitulated.
A delegation from Cotabato had asked
114 Fertig to replace Pendatun with Major Frank McGee.
McGee was assigned
as copmianding officer of the newly-organized 106th Division on October 7, 1g43, and Pendatun stepped down to take command of the 117th Infantry Regiment, "with a show of extremely bad grace," according to Dissette.1
Frank McGee, Pendatun's new superior officer, was a West Point graduate.
Fifty-focr years old in 1943,
physical stamina." excellent memory,
he still possessed "great
He was "highly principled, had a quick mind, an and great tenacity of purpose."
He had been awarded
the Distinguished Service Cross for Action in World War I, and had retired as a captain on permanent disability.
He had a silver plate in
his head from shrapnel wounds, was subjected to excrutiating headaches, and his speech was slurred.
He had been a planter on Mindanao for 20
years, returning to the U. S. every two years to have the silver plate in
Before the invasion he had sent intelligence reports
on the Japanese activities on Mindanao to the War Department.
broke out he volunteered for active duty, and when the surrender came he went to the hills.
He accepted comnand of the 106th Division and later
was to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Laureta as commander of the 107th Division.
When the invasion furce came to Mindanao McGee was attached
to the 24th Infantry Division as officer in charge of all guerrillas in the division's sector.
Sadly, the story of this courageous patriotic man
does not have a happy ending, for he was killed by a Japanese sniper on August 7, 1943, just eight days before the ceasefire.
McGee's story, as
much as that of any of the guerrillas, is a testament to the real human strength of the resistance movement.
The example of Pendatun is the most important one for demonstrating the gloved fist used by Fertig .c persuade guerrilla leaders to join his
115 Pendatun led a powerful organization, and he had the capability
to spoil Fertig's efforts on Mlndanao.
But there were others to whom
Fertig held out the subtle threat of no aid.
he wrote this
to another leader in Cotabato just after Pendatun had ceded his authority: We are interested in the unification of all guerrilla bands in the province of Cotabato and such unification is to your distinct advantage. Without it you cannot pay your troops, your receipts for food will not be honored by the Army of the United States, your men and your commission will not be recognized. In other words, you will simply be classified as a group of bandits.. .It is believed that you are an intelligent man, and consequently will make the 14 5 proper decision, As the SWPA sutbmarine supply deliveries increased and Fertig's units received much needed ammunition and weapons, this argument became all the more persuasive, especially as it became increasingly apparent as the months passed that the Americans were coming back.
The effect of the
submarine operations is covered in detail in Chapter 7. Establishment of the Headquarters in Misamis Crucial to the development of the Mindanao guerrilla organization was the location in the early months of the guerrilla headquarters and the relationship established with the civilians. ment of Mindanao,
The provincial govern-
it has been noted, continued to function for the seven
months after the fall of Manila.
This factor coupled with the Japanese
garrisoning plan for the island and the concentration of USAFFE soldiers at the time of the surrender provided the "incubator" in which the guerrillas could gain their strength in infancy. After the surrender in May 1942 the Japanese had concentrated their garrison forces in Davao, Lake Lanao and the Cagayan-Illigan-Kolambugan area with garrisons in 12 towns.
They had sent a small guard detachment
to Misamis Occidental Province, but it had been withdrawn.
116 Occidental was of no strategic value to the Japanese, and neither had it been viewed as such by the American island defenders.
But USAFFE soldiers
had drifted into the area to avoid the Japanese, and this was the provi.ice that Luis Morgan and Witliam Tait had so easily secured under their control.
In eastern Misamis Occidental was Misamis City, a small
town situated on Panguil Bay.
Lying Just east of Mount Malindang, this
town was the original site of the guerrilla headquarters. Misamis had been important as a port and business center for the area's agricultural concerns.
It was a trade center and shipping point
for the Kolambugan Lumber Company, and there was an old Spanish fort still standing in the town. 146
Fertig made the fort his headquarters and
flew the Amtr-ian and Filipino flags at equal height from the fort.
province had 25C,000 people living in it, and the civil government had continued to function after the surrender because the Japanese had not bothered with the area. For those guerrillas who came down out of the mountains diseaseridden and half-starved, the business as usual attitude in Misamils City must have made it seem as though they had gone through a time warp to a time before the war.
Schools were open, priests held mass, shops were
open and food was plentiful. visitors wvith beds, as well.
There was even a BOQ for couriers and
and dinner -- Bowler had one at Talakag
Money was being printed, banca boats loaded with trade goods
filled Jhe bay, factories were humming,
and the lights were on.
island trade was flourishing and an estimated 50 percent of the manufactured goods in the Visayas were exported among the southern islands. telephone syster worked:
sod3 pop bottles were used for insulators,
fencing wire replaced copper wire, and telephone batteries were recharged
117 overnight by being soaked in tuba (coconut beer). was also working, and the trucks from Hedges'
The telegraph system
old 81st Infantry Division
motor pool had been retrieved from their hiding places in the jungle. Fertig was communicating by courier with the islands to the north, and one American family hiding deep in the mountains of southern Negros took hope when told of a General Fertig who had been sent by MacArthur to Mindanao to train a guerrilla army. When Parsons arrived on the Tambor in March 1943 he had no expectation that he would encounter anything like Misamis thriving under the two conquered flags, and this situation went far in convincing him that Fertig could lead and that the resistance movement had a chance. The crew of the Tambor was met by an orchestra dressed in white playing "Anchors Aweigh" and by two truckloads of fresh vegetables and fruits: onions, tomatoes, beans.
pineapples, bananas, guabane, coconuts, and fresh
One sailor was heard to remark that the submarine's skipper had
taken a wrong turn and ended up in Hollywood. Fertig's part was multifold:
The purpose of this on
he wanted to impress GHQ,
SWPA that he had
a viable organization; he wanted to drive home to tho Filipinos on Mindanao and elsewhere that American aid was coming to his headquarters; and, probably least important, there was the goodwill welcome to the crew of the submarine.
The situation at Misamis was not all rosy of course.
were laced with barbed wire, a continuing sign that the Japanese could come at any time.
Indeed, every morning a Japanese reconnaissance plane
arrived at exactly eight o'clock, took pictures, and dropped a bomb or two on the old fort.
The people would simply leave the fort area at that
time every day to run errands elsewhere.
Many of the bombs dropped were
duds and these became a reliable and predictable source of gun powder.
118 Fertig had revived the Home Guard, an old Spanish system of voluntarios which required each man to devote so many days of labor per month to the government in lieu of taxes.
The voluntarios were not part
of the regular guerrilla force, and they were used to guard trails and and roads and to provide early warning of Japanese patrols, which passed through the area about once a month.
At this time Fertig claimed a
guerrilla force of 15,000 men with 5,000 rifles.
14e had established
schools for his guerrillas variously described as Officer Candidates School,
Training Schools, and a commando course.
Ne even reported to
GHQin February 1943 the guerrilla possession of two airfields in Bukidnon Province with 2,000 troops available to protect the fields, but 48 he added that no gasoline or trained ground crews were available.1 Further evidence that there was a war going on was the lack of imported items like cotton and silk cloth, tea, spices and gasoline. People were scantily dressed and the children played naked.
in their skivvies or G-strings and the worren wore coarse fiber brassieres and burlap sKirts.
Eleven percent pure alcohol di-tilled from tuba was
used to fuel gasoline engines and refined coconut oil served as fuLl to run diesel engines. placeable:
Some items once consumred or broken were irre-
medicine, batteries and radio tubes are examples.
Fertig very early on established the tenor for the command's administration by makino copies of regulations, troop lists, finance records, orders, and records of guerrilla operations.
He saw the obvious
need for documentation to support post-war claims on the American and Filipino governments.
But he also appeared to believe that the show of
administrative activity gave some kind of mystic legitimacy to his command. The stamp "file copy" somehow created the image of organization and
Fertig was apparently convinced that Filipinos are "impressed
by the flood of official-seeming documents."
As time went on, of course,
the few typewriters fell into disrepair, typewriter ribbons ýhredded, and paper of any kind was at a premium.
As head of the administrative
staff, Fertig also found himself involved in a multitude of seemingly trivial routine matters.
As Fertig saw it:
"Filipinos believe it is
useless to look for any kind of decision from anyone who is not The One. Centuries had taught them that all subordinate functionaries are either thieves or incompetent relatives, or both."
It should be said that Fertig
did not treat the unending requests and appeals for arbitration lightly, w
for he realized that without the support of the peasant or merchant making the request, his guerrilla force could not function.
In some ways, the
flurry of administration was much like leaving the lights in Misamis on at night.
Like the lights, the file copy was symbolic for it showed that
the guerrilla force was there to stay and would not desert the people. In thiscase substance followed form:
the concept was to look and act
an organized force.150 Colonel Fertig was under no illusions that the location of his
headquarters would be permanent. *.
He was equipped for instant mobility,
and he kept his maps, codes, sensitive intelligence information, and current business in a briefcase which he could grab and thus leave quickly. The briefcase, which was brought by Parsons from Australia, was a trick briefcase which was designed to explode into a magnesium fire upon being opened unless a hidden switch was properly activated.
Other records of
his command were buried in camouflaged holes in the ground in sealed tin cans.
120 Civil Government is Established The establishment of civil government in Mindanao under guerrilla auspices did much to further strengthen the resistance movement.
October and November 1942 Fertig ordered the screening of all former government officials for the purpose of filling positions in the newlyestablished civil government of the Free Philippines.
Using as his
authority the instructions given to the resistance leaders by Manuel Roxas for reestablishing the Commonwealth Government in the liberated areas, Fertig ordered the pre-war Mindanao government officials back to work in their former positions.
Fertig was assisted in this work
principally by Edward Kuder and Hedges, both of whom had been long-time Mindanao residents.
The Province of Free Lanao was officially established
on December 1, 1942 under Governor Marcelo T. Paiso at Causwagan near Kolambugan, and Paiso commenced the reorganization of the municipal governments in the unoccupied territories.
The Free Lanao government was
so successful that Fertig sought to achieve the same success in other provinces using the same procedures.
In the areas where the Japanese
were strong and the establishment of a free civil government deemed impractical, District.
Fertig established martial law under the 10th Military This was done in Bukidnon and a portion of Misamis Oriental.
Therefore, in some areas the government officials had to serve two masters, but Fertig considpred the gains were worth the risk. served the resistance movemen everyone knew that.
The question of who
..ould be raised at a later time, and
It came as no surprise then, when President Sergio
Osmena and General MacArthur announced the following policy for the reestablishment of the Philippine government on liberation of occupied areas by the American forces: "So far as possible, provincial and municipal
121 officers last serving under the authority of recognized guerrilla leaders or in recognized free governments will occupy positions of equal or better rank as temporary officials.''
The early bandit groups had given the guerrillas a poor image among the civilian populace.
These groups expropriated property and food
from the civilians, and the new word coined for taking something without payment was "USAFFED" -- as in "the guerrilla USAFFED my carabao." Visayan the new word was "Tulisaffe," which meant USAFFE thief.
Colonel Fertig very early in the establishment of his headquarterabandoned forced requisitions in kind and relied upon a system where the guerrilla organization would pay its own way.
Many guerrillas paid their
own way with personal promissory notes during the occupation.
relied upon funds gained through taxation by the civil government ard the creation of money making projects run by the guerrillas.
Colonel McLish's 110th Division in Agusan had a guerrilla dance band which raised money by playing for weddings and fiestas and by charging 50 centavos for admission to its nightly dances. West of Ford Island, Pearl Harbor."
The band was called the "Best Band Colonel Kangleon on L*!yte was to
become renowned for his famous guerrilla soap factory which sold soap throughout thlesouthern islands for 40 centavos (20t) a pound.
guerrilla money-making projects undoubtedly violated countless U. S. Army regulations dnd Federal Statutes for procurement of goods and ethical corduct. 154 Fertig ran the guerrilla organization lVke a business, form some of its functions took reflected this phenomenon.
fortunate to be on Mindanao, however, for the problems of food supply were less acute here than they were on the other islands, and many of the
122 the better food producing areas were in guerrilla controlled areas. Fertig's problem was one of distribution,
because for food to be delivered
to the guerrillas and civilians in the areas which were barren of agriculture the supply trains had to traverse miles of mountains and pass through Japanese-held territory.
Fertig created the Food Supply Adninis-
tration and the Trading Post Administration to moniter the growing of food, see to the payment of the workers,
and coordinate the movement and
security of the supply columns as they moved off through the mountains. The problem was not an easy one, for a cargadore would often consume more than he could carry for a three week journey through the mountains. of course, he still had to return. carabaos were not uncommon.
Caravans of 100 or more heavily-laden
Many of the cargadores hired were Atas,
nomadic aborigines who hunted and fished, constantly staying just ahead of civilization and areas exhausted of game. tall and weighed
The Atas stood four feet
pounds, but they could carry a 75 pound load with
little effort, and they navigated in the jungle quife easily.
ideal cargo bearers for they could hunt their own meals as well. A Women's Auxiliary Service was formed by Josefa Capistrano, a Chinese Mestiza.
Her husband, Nick Capistrano, a Mestizo and wealthy
engineer, ran the labor groups, cargadores, oversaw the mechanical equipment, and scheduled the collection and distribution of food to the guerrilla force.
After the war there were problems with compensation
for thiose people who had assisted the guerrillas before the GHQ, SWPA official recognition date of February 13,
Fertig had, of course,
been issuing IOU's on the U. S. government before this date.
Fertig established a Civilian Relief Administration which decentralized its powers to the Directors of the Provincial and Municipal
123 Civilian Relief Comnmittees.
The Provincial Relief Commnittee provided
assistance to the families of the guerrilla fighters.
In addition, each
province had its own Director of Civil Affairs who dealt with any unusual 156 problems caused by guerrilla units in the province.
Hoarding and black-market profiteering were not widespread problems, but they could have a major impact on a small village. penalty for ho~arding was a jail sentence.
The Provincial Emergency
Con'~rol Boards created by Fertig fixed the prices on prime conmmodities, but concentrated primarily on the prices of corn and rice because the prices of all other goods appeared to fluctuate in proportion to the price on these two comm~odities.
Early in 1943, exiled President Quezon
authorized the creation of the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board which had the authority to issue its own monetary notes for use as the medium of exchange among the guerrillas.
With wooden plates and paper supplied by
submarine, the guerrillas printed their own currency.
All bills were
carefully numbered and recorded in two separate ledgers, and they were to be redeemable against the U. S. Government at war's end.
The penalty for
counterfeiting was "severe." The issue of pay scales for guerrillas was a confusing and difficult problem.
Through Executive Orders Numbered 21 and 2P exiled
President Osmerna confirmed that the service of the guerrillas would be r~lwarded with recognition and that recognition would bring them pay, *
and benefits of soldiers belonging to the Philippine Army,
which was the same as the pzy for the American sold'er because the Philippine Army was a part of the U. S. Armed Forces. *
GHQ, SWPA inadi-
officially confirmed this in Circular Numiber 100 on November
17, 1943. This was never the intent of either government, for the U. S.
--- - --124 pay scales would be highly inflationary in the post-war Philippine economy and would put the common soldi-'- in the highest pay brackets of the goverrment. To avoid profiteering among the guerrillas their leaders gave them only partial pay: 10 pesos per month for privates and up to 150 pesos per month for field grade officers. Inany case, there was little to btby in the guerrilla-controlled areas, and the guerrilla currency was no good in the Japanese-occupied areas, so the guerrillas called their script "tinghoy," meaning counterfeit or useless.
Osme~a authorized 50 pesos pay per month for each guerrilla to be claimed on the U. S.Government after the war, but the U. S. Government finally allowed only eight pesos per month when the final decisions were made after the cessation of hostilities.
The affects of this were several.
Colonel Fertig's official troop lists for claims purposes were altered after the war by Philippine Army and Philippine Governmient officials in Manila.
Names were deleted, and others were added, usually the names of
relatives of the officials.
The great promise of the United States to
its guerrilla forces and the people who supported them was broken.
hard-won scraps of paper did not mean what they had been promised to mean.
General MacArthur had ordered his guerrilla leaders to assist in maintaining civil urder but to avoid interference which might cause resentment among the Filipinos. 159 Ifone were to graph a continuum of civil-military relations in the resistance movement environment itmight look something like this: (1)
Guerrilla leader rules entirely by decree.
AJoint civilian-guerrilla council existE guerrilla majority governs.
Issues receive a full hearing by both guerrilla and civil leaders but the guerrillas retain veto power to protect the movement.
Balanced; democratic; joint or unanimous decisions among guerrillas and civilians required.
(5) Civil authorities appoint and control guerrilla leaders. Using this scheme the Mindanao resistance movement would seem to fall somewhere around number (3)
for the majority of the period.
The Japanese Seek to Destroy the Guerrilla Organization Between May 10, 1942 and June 26, 1943, honeymoon away from the Japanese.
the guerrillas had had a
The Japanese initially left only the
three battalions of the 10th Independent Garrison plus one air squadron based at Davao after May 22,
When American submarines were
reported to be in the waters around Mindanao, and reports that they were unloading supplies reached the Japanese,
it was only a matter of time
before the Japanese commander of Mindanao and Sulu, General Morimoto, and his subordinate commander of Central Mindanao, Colonel Yashinari Tanaka, were forced to take action.
They knew of "Major General Fertig,"
whom they believed to be the commander of all guerrilla forces in the Philippines, and they had plenty of aerial ph~otographs taken of what they thought to be his headquarters in Misamis City, the old fort. from the new radios brought to Fertig from Australia,
the increase in radio
traffic caused by the escape of the ten Americans from Davao Penal Colony, and Parsons'
reports to GHQ and Task Force 77 had given additional evidence
of Fertig's location.
Two Japanese boats with radio direction finders,
126 one boat located in the Mindanao Sea below Bohol and the other in the Surlgao Sea sout:• of Leyte, had fixed the location of Fertig's transmitter. 161 The ability of General Morimoto to launch an attack upon Misamis was, in his view, limited.
It was difficult for him to ask his superiors
for reinforcements because Mindanao had long since be-n declared conquered and pacified.
To adnit to problems on Mindanao now would prove
him to be either an incompetent commander or of having been untruthful In his reports.
He believed that Fertig's force numbered as many as 20,000
men, and if they burned their lights at night, then they must indeed be powerful.
Morimoto had fougnt guerrillas in China and had presumably
believed that he did not have the forces available to deliver a crushing blow nor to adequately pursue, isolate, surround and destroy individual units as he had attempted to do tactically in China.
So Morimoto made
thorough plans, requested and received reinforcements in May, and prepared beach defenses occupied by a division-sized unit. Operation Big Voice, which the Japanese named it,
The plan for
was designed to silence
the radios, capture or kill Fertig. and destroy as many guerrillas as possible.162 Colonel Fertig's intelligence had indicated that the Japanese attack would come on June 19th.
He knew that he did not have the forces
to successfully engage any kind of serious attack, but he believed that it wcs necessary to put up token resistance and evacuate only when under some pressure in order to allow the guerrilla force to "save face" with the Filipinos.
The Japanese had already launched a series of attacks
along the coast in Cotabato, Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental and Lanao. The invading forces had brought along Filipino labor gangs to harvest the
127 crops of rice, corn, coconuts ard bananas and to confiscate the fishermen's catches to provide food for the army and to deny food sources to the guerrillas.
Reports came into Fertig by runner, days after the
events, and the invading force was rumored to be 20,000 strong with an additional 150,000 soldiers on the way, gross exaggerations of course.
On June 26, 1943, during the lowlands rainy season, the Japanese struck Misamis with an invasion force of three troop transports, three launches,
one destroyer, and five airplanes.164
Trdvis Ingham puts the
size of the Japanese force at 4,000 landing troops which is probably accurate. 165
Dissette and Adamson put the force at 150-200, hardly
enough to conduct the kinds of operations Morimoto had in mind. guerrillas broke and ran,
having put up almost no resistance whatever.
The capital of the Free Philippines, Oroquieta, fight.
had fallen without a
All along the coast towns were deserted, the electricity was out,
schools and churches locked, and the banca fleets gone from the bays. The civil governments with their relief projects, trading posts, and voluntarios had fled to the hills.
As Father Haggerty wrote:
But they were wearing us down, pushing us back from fertile land, closing up our lines of communication, blocking us off from the coast, frightening our bancas off the seas. They are killing aTT- es, destroying crops. We cannot our work animals, burning 1 7 last if this continues. The Japanese landing was not without its quirk of Fate, for among the Japanese who landed at Misamis was a Japanese captain who had once been a high school classmate of Fertig's in La Junta, Colorado. The Japanese officer talked to Father Healy in Tangub and told him that the officer's mission was to find Fertig and kill him.
He told the priest
ef how he had picked cantaloupes with his American classmate and described Fertig's performance i,
high school as a scholar and athlete.
128 by telling Father Healy that he really hpd no desire to successfully complete his mission and asked him to pass word to Fertig so that he would be aware of the price put upon his head by the Japanese.1
Fertig, gripped by a case of dysentary, withdrew northwest into the hills.
Like Father Haggerty, he saw the house-of-cards coming down
around him, and he thought that the guerrillas' only hope lay with Parsons'
early return to Australia to plead thei- cause at GHQ.
was, Parsons did make a drama-packed forced march across Mindanao to meet the submarine Thresher in Pagadian Bay and made his escape to Australia to report on the Philippine resistance movement. In the meantime, Fertig had a more practical problem, which was to relocate his headquarters.
He could not go to Cotabato, for Salipada
Pendatun had still not submitted to his authority, and Fertig would be placed In a very weak position politically by seeking Pendatun's protection.
In addition, the Moros were unpredictable and some were known
to be working for the Japanese in this province.
He could not go to Baroy
in Occidental Misamis because Morgan had returned from his trip to the Visayas and was in full revolt there.
Zamboanga, though safe, was too
far removed for command and control purposes. the Japanese, as was Bukidnon.
Davao was controlled by
Agusan I1ad little food, bandit groups
still roamed the eastern coast, and the Agusan River Valley offered few advantages to a guerrilla force.
But Agusan was under an American
commander, Ernest McLish, whom Fertig had yet to meet, and the area offered some advantages for rendezvous' with submarines.
In the spring
of 1943 an expedition under McLish had cleared Agusan Province of Japanese, although at a heavy price in men and ammunition. captured some launches and diesel fuel.
They had, however,
At this time of decision, Fertig
129 now estimated that he had some 8,000 guerrillas under his command.1
When Fertig left Misamis he first went to Liangan in Lanao Province with his close friend Hodges to be among some trusted Moros. He remained here until the problem with Morgan wat resolved by sending him to Australia and the issue between Pendatun and him was somewhat alleviated.
In September he left Liangan and visited Bowler near Iligan.
Bowler was officially made chief of staff to Fertig, and the groundwork was laid for establishment of "A" 'orps
whichoccuredJanuary 1, 1944.170
Fertig had realized that he needed an alternate command post should he be killed or his communications with GHQ be destroyed.
By November 1943
Fertig had moveo to Esperanza at the Junction of the Agusan and Wawa Rivers.
He remained here until January 1944 when the "Jungle telegraph"
alerted him that the Japanese had become wise to his new location.
pushed farther up-river to Namot Talacogon in the interior Agusan Valley. 171 From early 1944 on conditions began to change rapidly on Mindanao. Coastal towns such as Cagayan in Oriental Misamis were subjected to frequent Japanese patrols and air raids, and the mayor of Cagayan was captured.
The fertile lowlands were abandoned and the small barrios
along the coast were deserted.
Influenza and malaria were killing many,
and starvation was becoming acute, especially among the mal,lourished children.
Medical supplies were totally lacking, and amputations had to
be done without drugs or anesthetic.
One guerrilla, Australian Jock
McLaren, performed an appendectomy on himself with only a mirror and a razor blade.
The self-conducted operation took five hours to perform,
and five days later McLaren took to the jungle just minutes ahead of a Japanese patrol,
his appendix in a Ljttle.
Tropical ulcers were treated
130 with picric acid powder removed from the detonators of Japanese mines -it turned the skin yellow. Malaria was the big killer, with deaths on Mindanao qstimated at anywhere from 100 to 500 per day. down from malaria at any time.
Half of every guerrilla company was
Most types of malaria on Mindanao could
be treated with quinine or atabrine, and Fertig believed that if every submarine was filled with th~s medicine it still would not be enough. Benign tertiary malaria was the less virulent strain and was the most common.
But by October 1944 there was a full-scale malaria epidemic and
cerebral malaria, carried by the anopheles mosquito with its notably distinguishable bite (it within 48 hours.
stood on its head) was killing its victims
The Japanese sold a "quinine" pill in the occupied areas
which was really a useless placebo made of flrur.
Lacking sulphuric acid
(which could only be imported) needed to jar" the quinine crystals from the bark of the cinchona tree, the guerrillas boiled the bark, ground the residue into a powder, and mixed it with coni flour into a pasty pill. The result was a primitive and not very effec:tive medicine.
positive aspect was that the guerrillas controlled the Del Monte plantation region in Bukidnon Province where Colonel Art)iur Fisher, the fovmer director of Forestry, had planted a fnrest of 11 million cinchona trees before the war.
The Japanese were suffering from the epidemic as well,
for when Davao City was later captured by American forces an Army nurse concluded that 20 percent of the Japanese had malaria.1
Two-thirds of the guerrillas were with their families searching for food or they were incavacitated from illness. 150 pesos and a sack of rice 250 pesos.
A sack of corn cost
A guerrilla earned only 10 pesos
a month, and they had not been paid for months because Sam Wilson with
131 his printing presses had been cut off by the Japanese. clearer to the
As it became
iapanese that an American invasion was imminent they began
to move reinforcements to Mindanao. only 50 to 100 soldiers.
Japanese patrols no longer numbered
Now the combat formations were much larger,
and they began to move away from the coastal areas and onto the back These soldiers were not the well-
trails to establish inland garrisons.
disciplined troops that had carried the fight in 1942.
"raped, tortured, bayoneted, burned houses and crops, drove off animals, carried away clothing and even plows."'173
The Japanese command believed
that these patrols, which were meant to seal off Fertig and to gain control of the known submarine rendezvous points, had "created much confusion.'"
They had assessed the situation correctly. Namot Talacogon had been a relatively secure if environmentally inhospitable locaticti for Fertig and his headquarters.
The civil govern-
ment continued to function out of Agusan, for the governor and mayors met there; and Father Joseph Luras,
Superior of the Jesuits in Mindanao,
conducted his business from there,also. projects,
The food adninistration, relief
banca coordination and price control board continued to work out
of Misamis Occidental under the direction of "A" Corps, Western Mindanao. Food was not plentiful,
but the headquarters location was secure enough
that a library was established from which reading material, mostly magazines from the submarine deliveries, could be checked out.
efficiency, the "library rules" required that the materials be returned to code "CPZ" via runner within three days of receipt.
In this way the
guerrilias managed to keep abreast of the progress of the war in Europe and in the Pacific.175
As the news of American victories spread
throughout the island, the Constabulary soldiers began to defect and the
132 76 ranks of the guerrillas grew increasingly larger.1
increased their effort and pressed their attack on Fertig's headquarters, an interesting course of action since the Japanese IGHQ in Manila had already declared him captured and dead.
One of the air raids on the
guerrilla headquarters was very successful, one 3BZ which had been buried.
destroying every radio but
Communication was greatly affected, and
the "A" Corps headquarters stood ready to assume responsibility for It appeared that between 15,000 and 18,000
coim•unication with GHQ, SWPA.
Japanese soldiers were actively pressing the attacks throughout the area and Lieutenant Colonel McLish and his 110th Division were tnIer severe pressure.
The attack on Fertig was being spearheadecd by the Japanese
41st Infantry Regiment of the 30th Division.178
By mid-May Fertig had
begun his withdrawal farther still up-river to Waloe.
Waloe did not represent a significant improvement, for the Japanese continued their advance up the river and conducted aerial attacks daily in the area.
By Fertig's estimate he had a small screening force
of 300 guerrillas delaying a Japanese force of approximately 11,000.110 His guerrillas now also had to patrol against the pagars in the area, the Magahats.
Waloe was in a jungle surrounded by a swamp much like the
and it had been home to Magahat bandits and Christian
outlaws for over a decade.
The local populace for the first timL was not
friendly to the guerrillas, nor was the surrounding environment.1 Hunger was the big enemy now. all the way from Misamis. proximately 320 miles:
Cargadores brought food to the headquarters
The journey took one month and covered ap-
120 miles through Japanese controlled territory
and another 200 over the mountains. gathered fern greens (tankong),
From the Waloe area the guerrillas
coconits, bamboo and caught mud fish.
133 The cargadores packed in rice, corn and camotes from Misamis, and to prevent malnutrition they ate polyvitamin pills brought by the submarines. Waloe was deeper into the bush, ,and to communicate with Australia Fertig had to employ heavy V-beam antennas.
This made triangulation easier for
the Japanese, and when the bombers arrived on target they could spot the antennas,182
By late August the situation on Mindanao and at Fertig's
headquarters seemed grim indeed.
But just when things seemed to be at
their darkest, the first American bombers to appear over the Philippines in two and one-half years unloosed their bombs over Davao City. effect was dramatic and immediate.
The Japanese troops withdrew from
the interior and hastened their preparations of the beach defenses. It is difficult to conclude what size force the Mindanao guerrillas numbered at this time because even though there is an abundant quantity of personnel strength reports available, it must be assumed that the number of guerrillas was still fluctuating considerably as many recently freed from Japanese occupied areas hastened to join the guerrillas before the war was over.
Keats claims a strength of 40,000 guerrillas, which is
undoubtedly on the high side.
He also claims that the Mindanao guerrillas
killed 7,000 Japanese (he does not say what the wounded and non-combat casualties might have been); and he further claims the 10th Military District guerrillas kept 150,000 Japanese tied down on Mindanao trying to break the resistance. 184
These figures are wildly inaccurate for the
Japanese complement of 13 divisions and five brigades deployed In the entire Philippines numbered only 288,028 on October 1, 1944.185
number of lapanese troops on Mindanao on October 1, 1944 at the time the
ted the American main i;Nasion to take place on Min!;inao
was estimated to be at just over 60,000.186
After the American atiaý:s
134 on Leyte and Luzon this figure was reduced to between 22,000 and 25,000 Japanese by February 1945.187
The redeployment of the Japanese forces
had resulted in this estimated Japanese strength distribution on Mindanao as of January 31,
4,500 50 2,000
Zamboanga TOTAL -
SWPA estimated that the total effective Japanese ground
combat forces in the Philippines on September 30, 1944 was 224,000 (a figure nearly 64,000 short of the Japanese figures).
approximately 30 percent were on Mindanao (approximately 61,400).
Japanese 30th DIvision was a Triangular Division with a table of organization strength of 15,566.
The 100th Division was a Brigaded Type B
Division with an organizational strength of 11,000.190 Official sources put the Mindanao guerrilla strength at 37,000 to 38,000 with nearly 20,000 assorted weapons distributed amonq the force:
11,000 6,000 500 700 60 10 144 1,200 19,614
rifles carbines automatic rifles Thompson sub-machine guns .30/.50 calibre machine guns field pieces mortars pistols weapons
135 The comparable Japanese weapons summnary (a sample) for the 30th and 100th Divisions based upon. their tables of equipment would put the mix of weapons for the 30th Division at 7,578 weapons and for the 100th Division 5,656 weapons. 192
Simple ratios versus the guerrillas' weapons inventory
cannot be established, however, because Independent units of the Japanese military forces were located inMindanao from time to time, little is known of ho3w many weaponis were stored in the Davao port facilities, and some of the line units for the two Japanese divisions on Mindanao were sent north to assist in fighting the invading American forces.
number of small arms between the opposing forces was probably comparable in quantity, although the diversity in types of weapons and limited repair capabilities of the guerrilla force would certainly give the edge to the Japanese.
The big difference between the weapons capabilities of the
two forces was the heavy weapons category, for the Japanese had a number of mountain artillery pieces, tanks and anti-tank guns.
These were of
limited use against the guerrillas, however. *
Samuel Eliot Morison differs In his figures for the Mindanao guerrillas, end he puts the strength at 25,000. 193
Dissette and Adamson
give no source for their figure of 35,150 guerrillas but conclude the figure is "decidedly high" and then, oddly, state that GHQ, SWPA took Fertig's claim of 35,150 men "with a grain of salt.' 194 The figures 25,000 to 40,000 are the minimum and maximum figures found for the Mindanao guerrillas which probably indicates as well as any other factor two things:
first, the admnristration and cont-ol of a guerrilla move-
ment isnot a precise administrative undertaking, and second, the movement did attract a large numnber of men who were willing to undertake the hardships and dangers of guerrilla warfare in the jungles of Mindanao.
136 The skills required inthe leaders, and the demands placed daily upon them, equate to those encountered in the most difficult and complex of combat environments.
Luck certainly played its role, but itmay be
presumed that a strong personality, an unwavering sense of duty and mission, and an uncompromising tenacity were the attributes which made a guerrilla leader successful.
The Mindanao organization itself could be
Judged a success had it done nothing more than become unified and survived. It did tmore than that, of course, for it served the Filipino people from which the resistance movement sprang.
Its successes, and they were many,
will be reviewed in succeeding chapters.
CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES 1
Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 December 1941, AG 381 (11-27-41 GEN) Far East, MMRDrIA found in John Jacob Beck, MacArthur and Wainwriiht: Sacrifice of the Phili ines, 1974, p. 37. SreeIarlso U. Report (1941-1942), Army, Visayan-Mindanao Mindanao Force: DefenseForce of the PhilIppinesHistorical 1ISember IV)"4Visayan_1"----)aY _942__. p. 26,' (Hereinafter cited as VMF, Historical Report). 2
Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 178, 1 Feb 1942, AG 381 (21 Dec 1941) Far East Situation *MRDNA found in Beck, MacArthur and in-the Wainwright, pp. 86-87. MacArthur further reported to Marshil•same message that "Guerrilla activity in Mindanao...is now organized and directed by this HQ using various agencies both Filipino and American. It is not deemed fpe'ible nor practical to introduce any outside agents for use in this type of work." This was an overstatement of some magnitude in this first instance, for there was no guerrilla activity per se on Mindanao at this time. His thinking on the agents was to experience
a complete reversal, however,for he was later to send agents to Mindanao over the strong protestations of Colonel Fertig. The only known authorized and directed guerrilla movement in the Philippines prior to May 30, 1942 was that authorized on January 20, 1942 by HQ, USAFFE. LtCol Claude Thorp was directed to infiltrate Japanese lines, gather intelligence, and possibly destroy Japanese airplares at Clark Field. See U.S. Army Headquarters Philippines Command, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date, (hereinafter HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program"). 3 Radlogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 1942, Chief of Staff Super Secret File: MacArthur's move to Australia, MMRDNA in Beck, a h Wanriht, pp. 117-118. An earlier message had stated that and Artrur's stay in Miridanao "would depend on the good you *the lengthf might do toward stimulating guerrilla operations in the Visayas and Mindanao." Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 1942, Quezon File, MMRONA. ibid., p. 91. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson thought that plans for initiating guerrilla fighting in the Philippines was "mostly wind" and lacked "substantial practical value" but nevertheless gave Colonel William J. Donovan permission to proceed with the plans realizing that "some vigorous guerrilla work under American leadership in Mindanao" would give the Japanese trouble and perhaps save valuable time in the long run. Eisenhower, who had the War Plans Division at this time, Marshall and Stimson were agreed that resistance could be continued on Mindanao "after the fall of Corregidor" until sufficient forces could be moved into the Southwest Pacific to launch a counteroffensive. Ibid., p. 117. The plan to send MacArthur to Mindanao to lead the resistance from there was dropped for a request by Australian Prime Minister John Curtin to have MacArthur head up the newly-formed Southwest Pacific Area Command. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 1964, p. 140. 137
The Visayan-Mindanao Force had been given the "impossible task" of defending Military Districts 6 through 10: Panay, Negros, Cebu/Bohol, Leyte/Samar and Mindanao/Jolo. The combined shorelines of these islands totalled seieral thousand miles, most of the potential landing areas were inaccessible by road, and there was very little inter-island shipping available to the VMF. 0. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume I. 1880-1941, 1970, p. 604, and VMF, Historical Record. There appears to be no record which documents the date of activatio' and formation of the VMF. A HQ, USAFFE General Orler #24 dated November 7, 1941 does provide for "acceptance" and "induction" of units in the 6-10 Military District area. Details on the formation of this force can be found in Philippine Archives. File Number 25, "Visayan-Mindanao Forces." 5
MacArthur to Father Haggerty, quoted in Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, 1146, p. 8. 6
MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 144-145.
General Chynoweth quoted in D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, lt75, p. 105. Chynoweth is further quoted as say g: "General Sharp, at the age of fifty-five, had lost physical agility and, even more important, the mental agility to adjust himself to unforeseen conditions. He was simply unfit for that job. It was pathetic to give him the responsibility of commanding combat or guerrilla operations on Mindanao." Ibid. General Sharp had been a staff officer before the war began, and he once confided to Colonel Fertig that he did not want cnmand and had never warted to be a general in the first place. John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963, p. 15. This is confirmod by Father Haggerty, to whom Sharp confided: "Padre, I have the stars of a general; Padre, p. 15. colonel." but I were only a when the warHaggerty, began. Guerrilla We-was promoted to brigadier SharpI wish had beon a colonel general wh~le on Cebu and promoted to major general shortly before the surrender. By his own assessment General Shaep's own staff was unknown tG him when he assumed commatid. The Mindanao leaders had been "appointed arbitrarily," and his makeshift staff had to contend with poo. intelligence, untrained units, and untried, newly-arrived officers. The irony is that Sharp is the one who had to give the surrender. VMF, Historical Report, p. 1 . 8Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces During World War II," June 1973, p. 48. 9 Originally the Japanese had planned for the landing of two battalions at Davao and later revised their estimate up to a..requirement for four battalions. They actually used just the one, the Miura Detachment, under the command of the 16th Army ("the Sixteenth Imperial Guards, General Headconquerors of Singapore and Pride of the Japanese Army"). quarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase I, November 1941 to July 1942, Japanese Monograph Number 1, circa October 1946, pp. 26-27, 43. l 0 Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 1953, p. 508.
Uldarico S. Baclagon, Philippire Campaigns, Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 12. 12 VMF, Historical Record, pp. 72-73, 82-83.
1952, p. 221; and
Little sustained fighting took place in the southern islands except on Mindanao, and then only during the period April 29th-May 9th. One measure of the generally low level of conflict is the fact that between the invasion and the surrender the U.S. forces never did declare martial law. Except for necessary restrictionson the use of radio, telegraph, public utilities and the controlled sale of food and gasoline, the civil government continued to function normally. According to Gereral Sharp: "It is an extraordinary fact that the fiction of civil government was maintained even after the Japanese had landed." Ibid., p. 48. 14James, Years of MacArthur, Volume I1, pp. 141-142; and Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: -His Rendezvous With History, 1956, p. 58. 15
Texts of messages capsulized:
May 6 - Wainwright to Sharp: Sharp to report to MacArthur. Wainwright relinquishing command of VMF. May 6 - MacArthur to Sharp: Wainwright surrendered, Sharp now in charge with full authority; keep fighting; initiate guerrilla operations. VMF.
May 7 - Wainwright to Sharp: Wainwright re-assuming command of Letter orders to follow directing unconditional surrender. May 8 - Sharp to MacArthur:
May 9 - MacArthur to Sharp: Xelease your subcrdinate commanders, no immediate aid.
Need guidance. Wainwright orders have no validity. commence guerrilla activity; expect
May 9 - MacArthur to Marshall: Ignore Wainwright's resumption of command. Wainwright is "unbalanced." May 9 - Sharp to subordinates: guerrilla operations.
You are released from VMF; commence
May 9 - Wainwright to Sharp: Conference my rep. and General Homma's rep. desired with you, your position on May l0th. May ; - Sharp to MacArthur: North front in full retreat, enemy comes through right flank. Nothing further can be done. May sign off any time now. May 10 - Col. Jesse T. Traywick and LtCol Haba meet with Sharp at Impasugorig. Wainwright to Sharp: "There must be on your part no thought Failure of disregarding these instructions [unconditional surrendea. to fully and honestly carry them outf'can have only the most disastrous results."
140 May 10 - Sharp to commanders southern islands: My release order hereby rescinded. Cease operations, stack arms, raise white flag. Orders "imperative and must be carried out in order to save further bloodshed." May 10 - Sharp to MacArthur: ally is final.
Decision to surrender VMF uncondition-
The full text of these messages is found in VMF, Historical Re ort, pp. 76577; 88-114. Also see Morton, Fall of the Phili pinespp51, Whitney, MacArthuir: Rendezvous, pp. 17-58; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Jap-'s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945, IRS, pp. 74Z-743; Hagge. '. Guerrilla Padre, p. 2. 16Under the i.ct, all male citizens were obligated for military service. The United States itself did not yet have legislation providing for the draft in America. 17
USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East) and USFIP (United States Forces in the Philippines) are both used throughout this paper. Their chronology is as follows: December 8, 1941 to March 21,
March 22, 1942 to May 6, 1942:
February 26, 1'43 to June 10, 1945: June 7, 1945 to August 15, 1945:
Or, roughly, USAFFE prior to MacArthur's departure, USFIP after MacArthur's departure. The dates after May 6, 1942 are confusing, and the USAFFE cowmand over guerrilla units was very fuzzy. USAFFE command and staff line charts show no military districts, and the Army order of battle does not list districts. The USAFFE chart shows USFIP February 26, 1943 to an The Philippine Amy is listed undetermined date along with other commands. as a special staff section November 27, 1944 to April 20, 1945. The military districts fel'. under the G-2 (Intelligence Section): WAR DEPARTMENT
USFIP Feb 26, 1943
5th Air Force
j10th Military District
14th AA Cmd Others*
L - t''_14 4 AFWESPAC, USAF NORSOLS, MP Ond, USAFFE
At the time of the American invasion of Mindanao, the 10th Military District was OPCON to 8th Army and was so reflected on some organizational charts. Taken from: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military
141 History, Order of Battle of the United States Army Ground Forces in World War II: Pacific Theater of Operations, 1959, pp. 40, 41 especially. 18 The strength of the Philippine Army (PA), (which included the Philippine Constabulary, Philippine Air Corps and Offshore Patrol) was approximately 120,000 officers and enlisted (76,750 on Luzon and 43,250 on the southern islands). General MacArthur as a Field Marshall of the Philippine Commonwealth commanded the Philippine Army. As USAFFE commander, he commanded U.S. Army and Philippine Army units as well as the Of the 13 PA divisions formed in 1941-1942, Philippine Scouts (PS). nine were commanded by American Army officers and only four by Filipinos. The United States exercised effective command down to battalion level with U.S. Army advisors assigned to the Philippine Army units. See also Ross, "Status of Members," and Letter, Department of the Army, Chief Histories Division, to Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, of June 20, 1973, over Mr. Smith/j.d./3U861, Subject: "Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces during World War II," (hereinafter OCMH, June 20 letter). 19 Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerr'llero,' Part I, no date, p. 1. See also Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 23-24. 20General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph, No.
1, p. 13. 21
VMF, Historical Report, pp. 14-15; James nean Sanderson, Behind Enem Lines, 1959, p. 162; O•CH, June 20 letter; Ward Rutherford, Fal lippines, 1971. StheP 22
Common sense did not necessarily prevail in the field training either. Platoons would set up their shelters in defensive positions between their firing positions and the likely enemy avenues of approach within the area cleared for fields of fire. Or an entire platoon would man a company observation post - and compound the error by all sleeping at once with no watch posted. VMF, Historical Re ort, pp. 19, 168; See also Carlos P. Romulo, I Sew the Fell of the Philippines, 1942, p. 304; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 508. 23
Robert Ross Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors," 1963, p. 31. 24'James, Years of MacArthur, Volume I, pp. 508-609; VMF, Historical
Report, p. 20. 25
Term for "mosquito net." The Mosquito bar was not a luxury on Mindanao but a necessary piece of survival equipment. 26
That the Filipinos did not have the M-1 was no surprise, of course. At the outbreak of World War II the U.S. Congress had still not authorized their production in any quantity for United States forces which were soon to be in combat with the Germans and Japanese.
VMF, Historical Report,
pp. 18-19, 26; Ross,
pp. 49, 71, 173, 540.
"Status of Members,"
pp. 8-9. 28
29William Wise, Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" and the American-Filipino Guerrillas of World War II, pp. 71-73. IV
30Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns p. 281. 31 H, Philippinas Command, "Recognition Program" p. 40. 32
Steve Mellnik, Philippine Diary 1939-1945, 1969, p. 281. This was true thrcughout the islands and was especially problermatical in determining wlho had survived Bataan and Corregidor. 33Elmer %ear, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. Leyte, 1941-1945, June 1961, p. 57 f.n. Colonel Ruperto Kangleon,Comiander of the 9th Military District on Leyte, was also with the 81st Infantry. He was later freed and joined the guerrillas on Leyte, his home. 34
Dissette in his account puts the USAFFE strength on Mindanao at 30,000 before the sLrrender. Edward Dissette and H. C. Adamson, Guerrilla Submarines, 1972, p. 36. The account given by General Sharp was written
from accounts submitted to him by his officers while they were in captivity. The official records of the Visayan-Mindanao Force were lost during the surrender. Because of the fluid nature of events during the December 1941 to May 1942 period, truly accurate records were not possible in any case. The 30,000 to 36,000 figure is probably the best available, although Haggerty's version would dppear to carry the weight of first-hand knowledge. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 15, 23. 35 Headquarters, Army Forces Western Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines 1941-1946, Volume III Enemy Occupation, Japanese, no date, pp. Z5-26. Camp Casiang was designed to house 10,000 troops. Most of the USAFFE troops were later transferred to Davao Penal Colony. One-half of the Americans were sent to labor camps in Japan. By October 1942 the American population in Davao Penal Colony was approximately 2,000 prisoners. This number of Americans reflects the large number of prisoners transferred from prison camps on Luzon to Davao. Melvyn McCoy and S. M. Mellnik, Ten Escape from Tojo, 1944, p. 75. 36 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 23. 37
Letter LtCol W. W. Fertig (CO, 10th MD,USFIP) to Gen. Hugh J. Casey, APO 500, San Francisco (GHQ, SWPA) of July 1, 1943, (hereinafter Ltr Fertig to Casey). Fertig put the enlisted men at 90 "who were abandoned by the Navy and Air Corps when the officers left .he is speaking of their reassignment off the island before the surrender. These boys have attempted to fit in and help as much as possible." Many lacked any combat training or command experierce, and Fertig alluded to "serious psychiatric cases" which had developed among some. Ibid.
'The principal USAFFE units on Mindanao at the time of the surrender were all Philippine Army units (except where noted): HQ, Visayan-Mindanao Force 81st Division (-) 101st Division 102d Division 62d Infantry Regiment 81st Infantry Regiment 93rd Infantry Regiment 61st Field Artillery Regiment 102d Engineer Battalion 203d Engineer Battalion (600 Air Corps personnel from Corregidor - used as infantry) Taken from VMF, Historical Report, pp. 29-32. 39 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 202. 40
See Ibid., p. 128; MacArthur, Reminiscences. Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 22
pp. 202-203; Rafael
Virgil Ney, Notes on Guerrilla Warfare: Principles and Practices, 1961, p. 83; and Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Propaganda," March 1968 which contains a chapter on the Philippine resistance movement in World War II. 43
Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 224. General Fort was executed by the Japanese on November 11, 194. Fort had the distinction of being the American officer with the longest continuous service in the Philippine Constabulary. Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka, the officer who ordered Fort's execution, was himself hanged at Sugano Prison on April 9, 1949 for his war crimes. Harold Hanne Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1949, p. 154. Colonel Fertig later claimed that "the best disciplined" of the American and Filipino officers surrendered. Ltr Fertig to Casey.
"The classification of the legal status of those who did not surrender later by MacArthur was a great boost to the guerrilla recruiting effort, for the soldiers could now join the guerrillas knowing that they had not been declared deserters. Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, 1945, p. 142. 45
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 74.
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 10.
47Ibid., pp. 163-164. The attitude of many of the Americans who refused to surrender was thinly disguised. For example, Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas on North Luzon had a motto which was emblazoned on a patch they wore. It trumpeted "We Remained," a guerrilla response presumably to MacArthur's "I Shall Return." See frontispiece of P. W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines, 1954.
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 15-17.
Keats, They Fought Alone, p.
The Deisher-Couch Papers, no date.
Keats, They Fought Alone, p.
Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan.18, p. 171 (hereinafter Ind, AIB). 53
Hal Richardson, One-Man War:
F. 0. Miksche, Secret Forces: 1950, p. 14.
The Jock McLaren Story, 1957, p.
The Technique of Underground
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 34; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 74.
Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 40.
5 Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 87. 58
59Quote from Steinberg. Return to the Philipines, p. 18; See also David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War I, 1967, pp. 93-94. 60 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, 1966, pp. 298, 302 (hereinafter SCAP, Reports I); see also Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 761. 61
Ney, Notes, p. 99.
Miksche, Secret Forces, p. 158.
Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires: Philippines 1929-1946, 1965, p. 252.
The Ordeal of the
64 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," in "The Philippine Campaign, 1944-1945," Supplement B, no date, p. 228, (hereinafter OCMH, "Resistance Movement"). 65
David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 1947, p. 248; Manuel Roxas, who claimed to be an underground guerrilla leader was a member of the puppet government when it declared war on the United States. Many observers of Philippine politics believed that had the Japanese won the war, Roxas would have been installed as president. The Americans won, and he was made president in any case. As late as 1969 collaboration was still an issue in Philippine politics. Marcos' opponent in 1969 was tainted by accusations of collaborating 0ith the Japanese in World War II. See Nena Vreeland and others, Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1976, p. 66.
"Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum," U.S. Navy (Retired), Tape 13, p. 598. 67
They Fought Alone, p.
Robert Smith Ross, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Political, and Military Factors," 1963, p. 40.
C0, 106th Div. to Datu Sinsuat, Senior, letter of December 1, 1943, in "Correspondence Re: Guerrilla Activities 10th Military District," August 4, 1942 - September 11, 1944 (hereinafter 10 MD Correspondence File). 7
Gumbay Piang to LtCol F. D. McGee of December 15, in 10 MDCorrespondence File. 71 Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. xiii. 72
Keats, TheyFought Alone, p. 418.
Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 84-85. The Hukbalahaps are mentioned occasionally in this paper. Many references to the Philippine resistance movement allude oaily to the Huks, and the reader is misled into believing that only the Huks fought the Japanese. Arthur Campbell's Guerrillas: A History and nalysis is an e ma or ty of Huks were on Luzun with example of this type of account a few on Negros and Panay. By 1950 Mindanao was thne-hFome of a large number of Huks because of a government relocation program. Philippine government counter-guerrilla operations in Mindanao are described in recent literature, for the Huk insurgency continues in 1982 in the Ph ilippines. 73 HQ, 74
Guerrilla Submarines,p. 29.
Charles A. Nilloughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur 1941-1951, 1954, p. 215. 77
For descriptions of Fertig see: Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, 19FO, p. 217; Mellnik, Philippi neisary, pp.--2i , ever Say Die, 265; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 11, 76; Jack 1961, p. 186; Keats, They Fought Alone, throughout. 78
The accounts and quotations detailing the events cf Fertig's activitiPs during the July 1941 - September 1942 pariod are taken from these sources: Keats, The Fought Alone, especially pp. 76, 81, 104-105; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Wendell W. Fertig, "Notes Written from Memory in August 1942 on the Mindanao Invasion," no date, pp. 14-19; Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, especially pp. 1-7, 15, 53, 94-95; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 12; Beck, MacArthur and Wainwright, p. 269
f.n. No. 67. Most accounts of these months gloss over the etail s and cast Fertig's activities in somewhat heroic proportions. One of MacArthur's official histories tells us, for example, that Fertig "had fought on Bhtaan
146 and then, upon its surrender, escaped to Mindanao to serve with General Mindanao, the to Japanese, aSharp.. group .When of officers and inmenturn, intofell the to hills form the Colonel nucleus Fertig of a took responsible guerrilla resistance movement." Quoted from SCAP, Reports, I, p. 308. It did not happen in quite this way, of course. 79
!oKeats, They Fought Alone, pp. 83-84. 81 Ibid., pp. 84-85, 96-97. 82
Ibid., pp. 84-85; HQ,
p. 41; Baclagon,
Philippines Command, "Recognition Program,"
Philippine Campaigns, p.
Quoted in Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 281; See also HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 41, and OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 216. 84
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 96-97. The give ar, take in the neqotiations between Morgan and Fertig fills an entire chapter entitled "Morgan" in Keats' book, pp. 249-298. Oetails on this stand-off are interesting, but would be a paper in themselves. Colonel Robert V. Bowler corroborates the idea that Morgan and Fertig used each other in Headquarters, "A" Corps Western Mindanao, USFIP, Tenth Military District, History of the "A" Corps Western Mindanao Tenth Military District, 1945. p. 369. 85
Ltr Fertig to Casey.
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 195.
1bid., p. 187.
Never Say Die, p.
James, Years of MacArthur, Vol.
II, p. 508.
Kedts, Fouh Alone, p. 390. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific AreaAllied Transl ator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 359 (Part I), pp. 56, (hereinafter ATIS Part I or 11). 91
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 103.
The following sources discuss this phase of the Fertig-Morgan confrontation; Ibid., Chapter 5; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 45; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 58, 93-94; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarinespp. 67, 78; Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 746; Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 282, 284-285. 93
Keat's They Fought Alone,
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 54.
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 6-7, 124-125, 163, 418-419; Ind, AIB, p. 212; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. E4; U.S. Navy, Citation for Legion of Merit, ICO Conmmander Samuel Joseph Wilson, USNR, April 12, 1947. 96
They Fought Alone,
Travis Ingham, RendezvouB Submarine: Th• Stor of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in the Phi lpaý'2s, 1945, pp. 108-109. As a side note, the average Filipino was small :n physical stature, standing between 5'2" and 5'6" tall and weighing 110 to 120 pounds. 98
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp.
Baclagon, Philippine Campaign5, p. 282. Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 128. Fertig's goals were very similar to that of the guerrilla chiefs on the other islands. See Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. 79. 10 0
SCAP, Re orts,I, p. 298; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 251;
Smith, "Status of Members," pp. 48-49. 10
1Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 134; Ingham, Rendezvous,
102Baclagon, Philippine Campaigrs, p. 282; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 41. 10 3
Reports, I, p. 309, f.n.
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 161-162, 169. These commissions granted by Fertig to enlisted personnel caused a curious response from GHQ, SWPA. Asked by Fertig to guarantee that the commissions would remain effective at war's end, Colonel Courtney Whitney replied that once these men left the island they would be reverted to enlisted grade. Whitney apparently saw this policy as stemming a mass exodus from Mindanao before war's end of these young officers by submarine to Austral:a. In what has to be a classic "higher headquarters" assessment of the situation, Whitney wrote; "such knowledge had done much to bolster morale in Fertig's area, and create a desire to remain there for the duration." Keats, The Fought Alone, p. 347. MacArthur, to his credit, overruled Whitney. 10 5 1bid., p. 319. All of this seems pretty tame when compared to a proposel be'ng considered in the United States by President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and the War Department to send Associate Justice Frank Murphy of the U.S. Supreme Ccurt to assist the guerrillas in Mindanao. Murphy had been Philippine High Commissioner in the 1930's and was close to exiled President Sergio Osmena. MacArthur replied to the War Department that Murphy's life would be in jeopardy not only from the Japanese "but by :he guerrilla elements." Apparently, both Murphy and Osme7a had opposed MacArthur's pre-war defense program and had even succeeded in getting defense funds cut. James, Years of MacArthur, Vol. II, p. 516.
148 10 6
The assessments quoted are from (in order): Ney, Notes, p. 100; SCAP, Reports, I, p. 308. 10 9
For example, see U.S. Marine Corps,
Ibid., p. 303;
Small Wars Manual,
pp. 34, 38. 11 0
SCAP, Reports, I, p. 308; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 91.
Mindanao was the fourth station in the Philippines to make contact with KFS, the Signal Intelligence Division station of the Western Defense Command. Colonel Peralta on Panay had succeeded on December 12, 1942; the other two were on Luzon in Dagupan and the Cagayan Valley. The KAZ-KFS net expanded to over 150 stations sending 50 messages daily. KFS often had to serve as a relay station between Australia and the Philippines because of peculiarities of atmospherics and equipment. Unknown to Fertig, there was another transmitter and receiver on Mindanao in guerrilla hands It had belonged to the which was powerful enough to reach Australia. Anakan Lumber Company, and Hawkins and Baclagon record that McLish mad" con'act with Australia before Fertig did. Dissette claims that Fertig So it was all very congot his first radio from the island of Bohol. fusing, and Fertig's frustrated, cynical first acknowledgement to GHQ, SWPA (KAZ) was: "Urgently request via first available transportation necessary drugs to treat venereal disease recently contracted by key personnel XXX Fertig." For story on the first radio contact see. Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 153, 171-175, 186, 188; Western Defense Command, The History of the Western DefensL Command, 17 March 1941 - 30 September 1945, Volume III, no date, p. 16; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 24; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, pp. 134-135; Eichelberger, JunSe Road, p. 218; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarine, p. 33; Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 296; Hawkins, Never Say Die, pp. 150-151; Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 131; HQ, Philippines Coemmand, "Recognition Program," p. 94. 112
Haggirty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 77.
Steinoerg, Return to the Philippines,
SCAP, Reorts, I, p. 302 states that Fertig and Perilta were comnand" of the 7-9 Military Districts. The actual text "temporary 'jiven of the message does not bear this out, however. 1 16
HQ, Philiprli.es Command, "Recognition Program," p. 81 and Appendix It 10, Contains the cý. iete text of the February 13, 1943 message. should be noted that guerrilla divisions were numbered according to military district, e.g. 71st, 72d, and 73d dIvisions were in the 7th See also U.S. Army, HeadDistrict. The same was true for regiments. quarters, Eighth Army, Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Mindanao Operation, Victor V, no date, p. 44.
Quotations are from: Program," pp. 38-39, 43. 1 18 19
Philippines Command, "Recognition
"A Corps," History, pp. 9-10.
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 199.
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 36.
12 1 Ltr, Fertig to Casey. 122
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 184-185.
HQ, Philippine Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 94-95.
Jose Demandante Doromal, The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay During World War II, 1952, p. 41. 12 5
Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1941-1145, 1972, from a February 28, 1945 diary entry. 126
Western Defense Conmand, History, p. 8; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program,- pp. 49-50. 127Quote from Uldarico S. Baclagon, They Chose to Fight: of the Resistance Movement in Negros and Siquijor Islands, 1962, Also see pages 19, 26, 31, 34, 55-56, 59-6V. 128HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 44, Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 136; Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. 12 9 1 30 131
The Story p. 62. 55-56; 44.
Dormal, War in Panay, pp. 67-68. ATIS, Part I, pp. 4-5.
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 31; Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency," p. 43. GHQ on February 13, 1943 established atiin-dardformat and priority for reporting informatien. The guerrilla leaders, especially Peralta, had a tendency to send copious, flowery intelligence reports. The priority was established as follows: enemy strength and dispositions; occupied seaports, cities, towns, villages, enemy unit identifications, captured docunents; operational airfields, type of aircraft, facilities; location of antiaircraft defenses; enemy troop movements; treatment of civilians; naval dispositions; civil administration. See Dormal, War in Panay, pp. 44-45. 132For discussion see Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 133; Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency," pp. 44-45; Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/ Terrorist Operations," 1960, p. 80.
150 13 3Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 97-98. Ten prisoners did escape from Davao Penal Colony and were assisted by the Mindanao guerrillas after their escape. The account of their escape has been the subject of several books which are annotated in the bibliography. 134
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 199, 307. The Japanese had devined MacArthur's "lie low" policy and believed that their punitive expeditions had made the guerrillas less active. They saw the guerrillas as planning for a general uprising on the return of U.S. forces, conserving their forces and building s'-ength, directing efforts towards reconnaissance, and destruction of the l1ltz of cc.,runication. In addition, the Japanese had captured intelligence reports prepared by guerrillas for GHQ, and thus knew the information GHQ was interested in, and in what priority. ATIS, Part I, pp. 3, 19. 13 5 Ltr Fertig to Casey. 13 6
Wise, Secret Miision, p. 76.
Quotation from Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 136. See dlso Wise, Secret Mission, pp. 86-ý9, 111-112; Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 61; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 27; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 97-98. 138
Ltr LtCol R. V. Bowler, CO 109th Div to LtCol F. D. McGee of October 5, 1943 in 10 MDCorrespondence File. 13 9 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 174. 14 0 The following assessment of Salipada Pendatun's character and effectiveness is taken from these sources: Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 86-8V, 109, 147; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 124-125, 174; Wise, Secret Mission, p. 87; BaclCgon Philippine campaigns, p. 288; Ind, AIB, p. 173; John Toland, But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor, 1961, p. 400. 141Wise, Secret Mission, 14 2
p. 104; Ingham, Rendezvous,
Ltr Colonel Fertig to Maj Frank D. McGee re: of June 1, 1943 in 10 MDCorrespondence File.
Cotabato - Bukidnon
Diskette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 37. See also Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 153, Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 81; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 306; Wise, Secret Mission, p. 105. 144
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 131; Keats, The Fought Alone, pp. 306-307; 644 f.n. Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 1963, p. 637 f.n. 145
Ltr Colonel Fertig to Major Frnilan Matas of October 28, 1943 in 10 MDCorrespondence File.
Office of Strategic Services, "Philippine Interview Summary: Misamis, Misamis Occidental Province, Mindanao Island," 1943, p. 13. The fort was of no use against artillery according to the OSS report. The report was filed, ironically, just days after a Japanese landing force drove Fertig and his troops from the town. Taken from interviews with seven people who had lived in Misamis, the report said: "Few Americans have lived in Misamis." 147
Misamis City is described in: Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 59, 73, 107-108; Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. 141; MellnIk, hilippine DIar, pp. 258, 262, 267-268; Ltr Fertiq to Casey; Wolfert, !can Guerr a, pp. 172-173; Keats, They Fought Alone, especially pp. 113-114; the American family on Negros is descri-bed in James and Ethel Chapman, Escape-to the Hills, 147. On current maps, Misamis City no longer exltist7The name for-the town today is Ozamis, presumably named after the Ozamis family. 148 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 73; Keats, They ought Alone, pp. 128-129; Western Defense Comnmand, History, p. 16; InghamRndezvous., pp. 58, 122; Baclagon, Philippine .ampaigns, p. 284; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 217.
149 Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 267-268. 150
Keats, The Fought Alone, pp. 107, 115, 134-135, 290. See also OCMH, "Resistance Movement,' p. 217. Fertig's bureaucratic bent was not so unusual for a guerrilla movement. General Alberto Bayo, Fidel Castro's mentor, states that one of the first things a new guerrilla recruit must do is to "fill out a detailed questionnaire." The guerrilla units maintain "service records" on each guerrilla, and under "skills that a perfect guerrilla fighter should have" General Bayo lists "typewrite." From Alberto Bayo, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, 1963, pp. 19, 35, 67. 15 1
Wolfert, Americati Guerrilla, p. 133; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 235; Steinberg, Return to the ohilippines, p. 28. 152
Quote is from General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Civil Administration and Relief of the Philippines," Standing Operating Procedure Instructions Number 27, November 15, 1944, p. 8. See also Baclagon, Philippine Campaitns, pp. 284, 288-290; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 2T7; Agcncillo, Fateful Years, pp. 746-747. 153
Ltr Fertig to Casey.
Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, p. 170; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, pp. 125, 1M8. 155
Agoncillo, Fateful Years, pp. 746-747; Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 171; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 217; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 203, 210; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 248-249; HQ, Philippines Comnmand, "Recognition Program," p. 134. 15 6
8aclagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 289-290.
152 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 152, 205; Hawkins, Never Say Die, pp. 168-169; Agoncillo, Fateful Years, pp. 746-747; SCAP, Reports, I, p. 309. 157
Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 169; Smith, "Status of Members," pp. 40-41; HQ, Philippines Cmiim--i2, Recognition Program" p. 98, See especially Appendix 13; Friend, Between Two Empires, p. 255; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 413. The benefits available to the guerrillas after the war Mrogh the U.S. Veterans Administration are contained in Dormal, War in Panay, pp. 276-178. 159SCAP, Reports, 1, p. 304. 160The Reminiscences of Captain Stephen Jurika, Jr.,• U.S.
Volume II, no date, p. 9; and Headquarters. Army Forces Far hilippines Air Operations Record: Phase One," Japanese Monograph No. 11, 1952. _______
161Ind, AIB, p. 175. The Japanese order of battle for the 10th Military Distr-ct also carried Fertig as a Brigadier General at times. See Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: erations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1966, p. 311. The Japanese 7 i the guerrillas is sometimes difficult to follow because the ATIS translations use a Japanese pronunciation for the English translation of the names. As a best guess guide, the 10th Military District looked like this: Fertig "Fertig" Hedges "Hej i su" Mortera "Moratera" Grinstead "Guresuten" or "Guresutetto" Chi ldress "Chiudoresu" Page "Peji" McGee "Maggi" Bowler "Borrer" McLish "Makurisshu" Lecouvre "Rapuraru" See for example ATIS, Part II, p. 36. 16
2 Keats does not show a source for this Information, but taken in context with other known facts, it would appear to be accurate enough. See Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 119-121, 127-128, 224-225, 308. 16 3 1bid., pp. 213, 231. 164
Ltr, Fertig to Casey.
16 5 See Ingham, Rendezvous. 166
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 66,
167 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 129.
See Also Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 224-225, 258-259; Wise, Secret Mission, pp. 113-114;HQ, PhMl-ppines Command, "Recognition Program, p. 45. The coastal population had "bucweed," something they would be forced to do often. The term was to become slang usage for Americans. The Filipinos pronounced the English word "evacuate" as "e-bac-whit" which soon became "buckwheat" and finally "bucweed." The word in Visayan was "halikuate." 16 8 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 240-241. 169
See Ibid., Padre, p. 119. 170
pp. 225, 256-257, 281-282, 302-304; Haggerty, Guerrilla
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 159; Baclagon, Philippine Camnpaignsp ,
pp. 284, 290-291; HQ,
"A" Corps, Histony, entire.
17 1 1nd, AIB, p. 207; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p.
For general discussion see Marco .J. Caraccia, "Guerrilla Logistics," U.S. Army War College Student Thesis, 1966, p. 43. For comparison, the malaria rate for U.S. soldiers in SWPA ran as high as 361 per 1000. William F. McCartney, The Jun leers: A History ofithe 41st Infantry Division, 1948, p. 154. For genera scussion eaial problems one n Mindanaosee: Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 65, 153, 232; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Hawkins, Never Say M. pp. 147, 167-168; General Headquarters, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "69 Brigade Combat Report on Philippines Operation," Enen Publications No. 289, January 19, 1945; Richardsnn, One-Man War contains the story on Jock McLaren; Ind, AIB, p. 169; Ingham, Rendezvous,
pp. 138-139; Luvaas, Dear Miss Em, p. 261,VMF, Historical Report. 173 Quote from Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 212; see also pages 204205, 207. 174ATIS, Part I, p. 23.
175Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 285-286; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 118; HQ, "A" Corps, H p. 12. 176 ATIS, Part II, p. 40. 177
1nd, AIB, pp. 212-215. 178ATIS, Part II, p. 3, 8. The Japanese used names to specify units conducting operations in a specific area. Among th- various groups conducting operations on Mindanao were the Kyo Group (also known as the Harada group) and the Hyo, Haqi, Kan and Heidan groups. See ATIS, Parts 179Smith, Triumph in the Philpines, p. 643 f.n. Waloe w - named after Colonel Ol C.Wa.oe, USAI woought in the Moro Pacificb.on Campaigns. Waloe later became a cattle rancher near Malabang, Bukidnon and finally returned to the United States in 1931 and became the Presidcnt of the Philippine Constabulary Association. Elarth, P ine Constabulary, p. 182.
154 180Keats, They Fought Alone. pp. 36;2-363,
The Agusan River Valley was described as being the "home of 40,000 tree dwelling headhunters; thousands of man-eating crocodiles, tropical diseases; insects and not a pl-ice for a white man to even attempt to live." Quote from a book by Martin Johnson in Thirty-first Infantry Division, His the 31st Inf-ntiy Division in Training and Combat, 1940-1945, 1945,9p.70. 18
2Keats, They Fcuqght Alone, pp. 316-317, 367-368.
0ne aircraft bombe-; Davao City each night 6-10 August. 22 attacks were made August 6-22, with 32 planes dropping 41 bombs. On September 1, 1944 Liberators and Lightnings dropped 130 tons of explosives on Oavao, and on September 8th, B-24's struck Davao. One day later, 245 bombers hit Davao in four separate bombing runs. ATIS, Part II, pp. 39, 48, 51, 55, 67, 69; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 402; Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 127. Whitney states the first attacks hit Davao-September Ti asdoes Fertig. Japanese accounts would be correct in this case because they include the first exploratory and harrassment str 4'--. 18 4 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 389. 18 5
This figure comes from the Japanese First and Second Derobilization Bureau Reports, "Strength cf Japanese Forces in the Philippines 1944-1945" found in SCAP, Reports, I. 18 6 1bid., Plate Number 55, p. 192; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 300. 18 7 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Basic Plan for Montclair Operations," February 25, 1945, Enclosure 10, Chart 21. 188Ibid., 189
Enclosure 13, p. 1.
I, p. 192.
1 The chronology of the 30th and 100th Divisions can be found in W. Victor Madej, ed., 4Jaanese Armed Forces Order of Battle 1937-1945, Volume I, 1981, pp. 58-59, 101-102, 154. The book also contains a-rable of Equipment for each division. 191HQ, AFWESPAC, Triumph in -he Philippines, p. 72; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 218; James, Years Of Mc~rtFuri, Vol. II, p. 506; SCAP,
reports, I, p. 309. 192
Order of Battle, Vol.
I, pp. 9, 10, 15, 19, 21.
Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines.
Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1945, 1959, p. 240. 19 4
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines,
THE MOROS OF MINDANAO A separate chapter is presented on the Filipino Mohammedans the Moros
-- because they were unique to the resistance movement on
Mindanao compared to the resistance movements elsewhere.
The Moros had it
within their ability to shift the balance of power to the Japanese or to cause an entirely different relationship among the antagonists by siding with neither.
Sufficient numbers of the Moros actively supported the
guerrillas or remained neutral,
however, for them to ,ave positively
affected the power equation in favor of the guerrillas.
To have persuaded
them to do so was no small accomplishment for the leaders of the Mindanao guerrillas. In 1941 when war camne to the Philippines the Moros reoresented cnly five percent of the population of the entire Cocmmonwealth. Central Mindanao,
however, the Moros represented 20 percent of the pop-
ulation and on the Zamboanga Peninsula the Mcros were fully the population.
Clearly the Moros, as a group, represented a key segment
of the island's population, naturally war-like bent.
and their influence was compounded by their
As a distinct cultural group, the Moros constitute perhaps the single most important exception to the cultural homogeneity of the Philippine population.
Within the Moro cultural group itself, there are
at least 10 distinct groups differing in language and degree of Musiim religious orthodoxy.
The four most prominent Moro groups are the
Magindanan (or Maguindanao) and the Maranao of the Illara Bay Area in the 155
156 central and southwestern section of Central Mindanao; the Tausug and the Samal populate the Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago. Gulf is bordered on all sides by these geographical areas.
include the Ilanon and Sangir of Central Mindanao and the Yakan and Bajau of Zamboanga and Sulu.
The Tausug ire the most religiously
orthodox, and they consider the major groups on Mindanao, the Magindanao and the Maranao,
to be "uncouth." 2
These disparate groups, though known
for their constant aggression against each other, will nevertheless close ranks when confronted with a threat from outside the Moro community. They feel a special spiritual orientation to the Islamic peoples throughout Southeast Asia, and they fear any group or invader who they perceive intends to deprive them of their religion and way of life.
They have a
political heritage and organization that predates the Spanish presence in the Philippines, and they are antagonistic and aggressive towards the Cebuanos and Ilokanos of Mindanao for they fear their expansion into Moro areas. 3 The Moros have preached separatism from well before the Spanish occupation of Mindanao,
and that separatism carries through to today.
In approximately 100 B.C. the Indonesian pagans, a MalayanMongoloid branch of the true Oceanic Malays, conquered the south Philippine islands.
The Moro ancestry can be traced from these early
There was early Hindu influence on Mindanao-Sulu, and Moro
legends speak of a visit to Mindanao by Sinbad the Sailor, and the Sulu Moros tell the legend of Alexander the Great holding court on Jolo Island in 320 B.C. prince.5
Many Moros trace their descent from the great Macedonian
The Moslem influence came to Mindanao from Java and antedated
the Spanish arrival in the Philippines in the 15th Century.
friars with their accompanying conquistadors tried unsuccessfully for
157 four centuries to dislodge the Moro's deep-seated Islamic faith.
At the close of the 19th Century the Americans supplanted the Spanish, but with a fundamentally different policy.
The Americans were
not particularly interested in converting the Moros from Islam but they were intent upon ending the violence on Mindanao and Sulu perpetrated by the Moros.
The Americans employed tactics in their field operations and
introduced firepower to the battle that the Moros had never experienced from the Spanish.
The test was now between the "Krag and the kris" --
the American Krag rifle and the Moro's curved bladed kris.
soldiers themselves were incomprehensible to the Moto,., who had been accustomed to the religious solemnity of the Spaniard.
The Moros found
in the American an antagonist who made a game of war."
would slay Moros on the weekdays and play baseball on Sunday.
could it profit a man if he shaved his head and his eyebrows and slew these people?"
A vicious deadly guerrilla war was to last between the
two enemies until 1913 when the military campaign ended. P
On March 22,
1915 the Sultan of the Moros recognized without reservation the sovereignty of the United States over the Moro people.
In return, the U. S. had
promised the security for the Moros to practice absolute religious freedom. 8 Out of the Moro Pacification Campaign had come the .45 calibre pistol as the standard sidearm for the American Amy.
The .38 calibre
pistol, which had been a satisfactory weapon in Cuba,
did not pack the
wcllop necessary to stop a determined fanatical charge by a Moro warrior. The histories of the campaigns against the Moros are filled with stories of the nearly superhuman feats of Moros locked in mortal combat, and it is easy to understand why the Moro was so widely feared and their
158 ferocity so legendary.
No less legendary were the experiences of John J.
Pershing who served in Mindanao in three different tours to the Philippines. As a captain he had gone alone and unarmed into the Forbidden Kingdom, the heart of the Moro land near Lake Lanao.
No white man had ever entered
the Forbidden Kingdom before, under any circumstances.
been ordered by Brigadier General Davis to "Do everything possible to get in touch with the Moros of central Mindanao and make friends of them.'
He believed that the only way he could truly demonstrate his good intentions was by putting himself entirely at their mercy.
always carefully avoided the issue of slavery and polygamy, appealed to *
self-interest, founded his policies in honesty and justice
and resolutely avoided useless bloodshed.
He led the expedition against
the Moros at Bud Dajo, the Moro Sacred Mountain, where they made one of their last concerted stands against American arms.
The slhughter was
one-sided and great, and Pershing was to try later to refuse the Congressional Medal of Honor awarded to him for his role in this action. In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War, Pershing's superior described his success in this way (Pershing was by now a general and Governor of the Mindanao District): He is today the one great American to the Moro minds. They regird him as a supernatural being and the great mass of Malanaos Dic] are now his fast friends. He always treats them just and fairly, never makes a promise which he cannot fulfill and at the same time he has shown them that he can punish wrongdoers swiftly and well. 1 0 Pershing was made a Moro datu (tribal chief) in one instance and was asked to be the adopted father of their children by three Moro datus. These remarks on General Pershing have been included for two reasons.
First, Pershing's experience demonstrates that American
policies -- and necessarily those who implemented them -- had gained
159 So there was a precedent for good relations
Moro respect and allegiance.
between the Moros and the Americans on Mindanao.
it is extremely
doubtful that Filipino leadership alone could have successfully dealt with the Moros.
The Americans, who by chance and not design, were the
senior leaders of the Mindanao guerrilla organization could act as honest brokers with the Moros on behalf of the Christian Filipinos.
able sources do not record in much detail the dynamics of the relationbut it is safe to assume
ship between the American and Moro leaders,
that in Pershing's example we find some clues as to what made the Americans, especially Fer~ig, Hedges and McGee, successful.
was probably no less difficult than Pershing's. In 1936 Iic Hurley included a prophetic observation in his book on the Moros of Mindanao.
Given arms, the Moro fears no Filipino. Disdrmed, he looks to America for the protection she assured him.. .The Filipino, on the other hand, carries in his mind a memory of the old days of Ju.ramentado and piracy. He has no assurance that these practices will not be resumed when America leaves the islands. And he goes on to quote a Moro chieftain:
"I will never be able to hold
my men in check under the rule of Filipinos. and never submit.
They will take to the hills
The old days of Jungle warfare I saw thirty years ago
will return to Mindanao and Sulu."11
And return it did.
the American surrender reconnaissance patrols in the Cotabato sub-sector had reported civilians fleeing in terror from the Moros who were looting and burning their homes. 12
The Moros w o served in General Fort's Bolo
Battalions appeared to get caught up ir the Moro revanche, deserted Fort and dug up the arms and ammunition he nad cached to be available for future guerrilla resistance.
Hagg .rty estimated that the number of
rifles dug up by the Moros and takr
from slain USAFFE and Japanese
160 4 sold ers numbered as high as 12,000 to 15,000.14
With the surrender of the USAFFE forces and the dissolution of the Constabulary contain the Moros
whose primary mission on Mindanao had been tc
the slaughter began in earnest.
The horos shot or
hacked "every man, woman and child they could find," leaving countless hundreds dead, crippled or limbless.
The Lowland Christians plowed their
fields with bolos at their belts, formed their own vigilante groups and wiped out entire Moro villages. leaders,
One of the more infamous Christian
Froilan Matas, a one-time U. S. sailor, led a band which killed
300 men, women and children.
Christians buried Moros alive, and Moros
returned the favor by burying Christians alive in privies.15 The animosity between the Moros and Christians was deeply rooted in Mindanao history, and it was something of a cultural imperative. Moros were greatly feared, and "There never was a Moro who was afraid to die.
Death on the field of battle is a privilege and they guard their
The importance of that privilege could be found
in the religious rites peculiar to the Islamic Filipinos.
was an elaborately planned ceremony which had connotations of a lihad, or Holy War.
But the Moros were not strictly orthodox Mohammedans,
j uramentado had no foundation in the Koran. kind of suicide-by-murder,
In this strangely ceremonial
the More, after careful preparations of his
body and clothing and a blessing from his religious leader, would in a frenzy set upon as many infidels (Christians) being felled himself.
as he could before finally
This death would bring the Moro warrior a martyr's
crown, ard he would ascend on a white horse to a land of crystal streams and fruit laden trees.
There his passions would be tended to and
gratified by dark-eyed houris, and his Mora wives would be restored to
161 their virgin youth to cortend for his attentions.
Each Lhristian that
he had killed would be his slave to eternity ir this paradise.
Christians killed were borne no particular animosity, for they were victims only by happen-stance.
They were tickets to an end for a man
who sought death as a blessing. The amok, a desperate, hysterically mad killing, was a distant cousin to the furled killing of the baresark, the berserker of Scandinavian 'ogend.
The difference was that the amok was not a killing
in battle but could be a frenzied killing of Christian women and children in the village marketplace.
It had no accepted religious connotation.
The Japanese did not concern themselves to a large degree with the feuds bet.een the Moro and Christian villages.
But the Japanese them-
selves fit the definition of infidels, and so they saw fit to curtail the juramentado. K
The sultans and datus were called together and told that
the punishment for juramertado would be death to the children, parents and grandperents of the Muro who killed.18
The juramentados diminished,
but whether it was due to Japanese or American inflL guess, although it
ce is anybody's
is probably a combination of both.
Not all who were witness to the Moro warriors in action testified oo
Colonel Fertig did not think that the Moros relished
a "stand-up, face-to-face fight," at 'Last not in the Western Loncept of combat, but he did believe that once cornered the Moro would "fall somewhat joyously upon his foe, shouti:,g and shrieking, insensible of his wounds.'"'
After the Amerlcan surrender, General Sharp concluded that
"this evidence of fear or timidity on the part of the Moro [Moro withdrawal during the initial Japanese invasion] should have been sufficient warning to place no faith in the fighting ability of the Moro, but the
162 legend persisted..." 20
Father Haggerty found the Moros to be "very
cowardly" and Lhat they would fight only from an "overvhelming advantage.'
And, of course, there is a difference between courage and stupidity, as Pershing himself observed: No one who is familiar with Moro character is at all surprised at any turn affairs may take. The more foolish and assinine They make d the thing is, the more likely a Moro is to do it. sudden resolve to die and try to get as many people to die with them If they are given some time to think this over it is as they can. often possible to bring them out from under the influence of the spell. One example of this is a Moro wedding reception where an ins, exchanged, the krises were unsheathed,
and minutes later after the melee
had ended 40 of the family and guests lay dead.
This is what Beth Day
is referring to, perhaps, when she talks of the "fight-first -- thinklater" Moros.
Colonel Fertig had good information on the Moros, and the counsel that Edward Kuder gave to him before Kuder was evacuated to the United States must have been invaluable. the motives of the Moros.
Fertig never had any doubt concerning
They had little sense of patriotism as the and they had no loyalty whatsoever to
Americans would have understood it, the Philippine Commonwealth.
Their loyalties were unpredictable.
did actually feel loyalty to the United States. collaborators w. t.the Japanese. goal, and
Others were ardent
Most sought separatism as the ultimate
hese were tenaciously independent Moros who opposed any out-
Once this was understood, Fertig was able to take a
practical approach to his dealings with the Moro chieftains.
what benefits; whose currency was more valuable; who pays spies more and which markets for rice were nearer? objectively.
These questions could be negotiated
The question of most concern to the datus in the long-run,
163 of course, was would the United States return to the Philippines, and if so, when?
As the answer to that question became more and more apparent,
the dealing; with the Moros did become easier.25 Many of the older datu5 were wiley in the ways of politics with the Americans.
A chieftain would oroduce a bamboo tube and withdraw a
personal letter to him signed by "Lieutenant Colonel John J. Pershing" or "General Arthur MacArthur." anting., a magic charm.26
These letters were something of an anting-
That was effective enough when dealing with
Americans -- but not so helpful when talking with the Japanese. old-timer,; did have influence, recognized this. of the Sjlu Moros.
though, and the senior American commanders
Sultan Monammed Jenail Abir Ii was the spiritual ruler A half-century before Abir had fought fiercely against
the American soldiers and had surrendered to Captain John J. Pershing. The Sultan kept the American flag flying throughout the Japanese occupation,
and for this he was paid a personal visit by Douglas 27
MacArthur. Fertig was able to extract promises of support or assurances of neutrality from various Moro chieftains by using different strategems, most tailored to meet the peculiar situation of each datu. a
reported to have made the following threat tc them: We want the Moros on our side, becaus- we have the s,'me cause -- to drive out the invader from our laid. Americans h; e always kept their promises to the Moros, and will continuf to do so. You play Fir with us, and we will play fair with you; but if you don't. if you attack Christians, loot, wound and slay, we will wipe you out, ýnd if we can't, then blank, blank, blank, the American Marines will come to our aid and wipe you out to the last man.!. The datus gave their oaths to Fertig that they would refrain from stealing until the victory over the Japanese was a reality.
Any Moro caught
breaking the oath would be executed by the Moros themselves,
164 of the magnitude of the crime. One of Fertig's strategies was to place Americans in comnmand of Moro units.
The Americans had learned from their early experiments
with the Philippine Constabulary that the Moros had a tendency to lionize their leaders, and if a leader possessed the leadership qualities of courage and fairness the Moros would follow him loyally through any hardship.
But because the Moros identified closely with their leaders,
leadership had to be stablr and leaders not changed often.
would never serve under a Christian Filipino, and Fertig simply did not trust the Moro leaders to carry out his orders with-it some influence or presence from him there.
He remembered too well how General Fort's
Moros had deserted him, and he wanted no resurgence of the bloodletting between the Moros and the Christians.30
Fertig wrote to Frank McGee
when Fertig was trying to unify the Cotabato Moros under the guerrilla organization and neutralize Pendatun:
"I need, desperately, an American
officer to take command of the Cotabato area. handled well by remote control,
This thing cannot be
as witness the imbroglio with Pendatun."
Hedges with his "no nonsense" approach to leadership was given command of the Maranao Militia Force which operated separately for political reasons but was under the operational control of the 108th Division. Fertig occupied much of his time by haggling with Moro leaders over agreements for construction of airfields,
contracts for the delivery
of rice, and negotiations to engage the Japanese, among other things. As an Amy surgeon at Camp Vicars had once put it: n conference with Moros is a matter of hours, not moments. I carin( rnceive anything requiring more tact, patience and courage than is ,iquisite to deal properly with the Moros of Mir.danao, ard to extract the truth from pjgple who pride themselves on their ability to lie and deceive.
165 Sometimes fortune aided Fertig at the critical moment.
Morgan revolted against Fertig, some of the Moro leaders appeared to be This was a clear indication that they would
gravitating towards Morgan.
side with the infidel if need be if
it were seen to be in their best
interest to do so, f-- ".rgan had made his reputation as a Moro killer. In a fortuitous strc'
al supplies a copy of the May 31,
livered among its military 1943 Life Magazine.
i recently arrived submarine had de-
.itained a lengthy article on King
Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabih.
The article was replete with pictures
and expressions of friendship by the king for the United States. impact of all this was not lost on the Moro leaders.
The Moros were
strongly religious in their own way, and the support for America demonstrated by King Saud to the world quickly sealed the decision for the Moro leaders.
One hundred or more Moros on Mindanao had actually made
the pilgrimmage to Mecca,
and the meaning behind the interview with King
Saud meant infinitely more than any promise Fertig could make.
radioed GHQ to send as many of the magazines to him as they could.
Among the Moro datus with whom Fertig negotiated support-was Busran Kalaw who commanied the Fighting Bolo Battalion. pre-war mayor of Mumungan in Lanao.
Kalaw was the
"dis xenophobia was benign.
was merely 'nti everyone who was not a Maranao Moro."
He was celebrated
for his famous letter to the Japanese commander in Lanao, Major Hiramatsu. Hiramatsu hcd ordered Kalaw to report to Japanese headquarters. wrote back, concluding:
"So stup writing and try hiking to attack us so
that we will have some more war trophies. Kalaw." Kalaw.
Your friend and enemy, Busran
Angered, Hiramatsu sent a sizable punitive expedition after It was destroyed to the man, ambushed and trapped in a swamp. 34
166 Datus Lacub and Dimalaung of Basak pulled the same stunt with Captain Taka Ichi, commander at Dansalan.
They destroyed his force of 125
soldiers. Fertig secured the loyalty of the legendary bandit lord Datu Pino by paying him 20 centavos and one bullet for each set of Japanese ears Pino brought him.
By 1945 he was delivering ears by the jar.
swore his loyalty to Fertig, eternal enmity to Morgan, and many matched ears.
Until then he hod been earning his keep by selling carabao bones
to the Japanese represented as the remains of Japanese soldiers sc that they could receive a proper burial according to Japanese custom.36 Sult3n sa Ramain was neutral,
but he agreed with Fertig that he would
sell rice to the Japanese and then tell Fertig when the Japanese trucks would pick up the rice.
He got paid, the Japanese got their rice, and
the guerrillas got both the Japanese and the rice.
Not all Moros supported the guerrillas or were neutral, Datus Pain and Sinsuat Balabaran openly supported the Japanese. played both ends against the mlddle.
of course. Many
Many of the difficulties with
the Moros arose simply because they refused to work with or serve under one another.
Family rank and social standing were more important than the
there were Moro leaders who worked
well with Christians on their staffs, or at least there was no open violence. staff.
Salipada Pendatun has already been cited as having an integrated
Datu Ogtog Matalam, a powerful leader in Cotabato, arranged for
sacraments for his Christian guerrillas.
One of the more picturesque
of the minor guerrilla leaders was Captain Hamid.
Hamid was a Moro who
wore a crucifix, was married to a Christian Filipina, end commanded a battalion of Christian guerrillas.
He was an audacious commander in the
-.-- --- ---
- - - -
167 bargain.40 Japanese intelligence reports were initially bright
on the Moros,
but soon reports began to focus on the American efforts to organize the Moros, Moros."
"carrying on feverish propaganda" and "inciting the rebellious They acknowledged the success achieved by the Americans in
"pacifying the Moros by supplying themi with large sums of emergency paper currency and large amounts of weapons and ammunition."
in an obtuse way, the reports admitted that Japanese failure in dealing with the Moros "was caused by bad treatment of the Moros."41 The Mindanao resistance movement was pulled together against very long odds, certainly against any historical probabilities that the plan would work.
Post-war writers wrote colorful assessments like "never
before in the history of our country did the Moro and Christian Filipinos understand and cooperate with each other more closely than during the resistance movement in Mindanao."
And they extolled the contribution
"towards developing a strong nationalistic feeling among our Moro brothers." 42
The loose alliance was nct long-lasting, but it
enough to keep the guerrilla organization unified and the resistance movement alive.
The fact that the alliance was a success is a tribute to
the quality of leaders fate provided the guerrillas. organization work and survived, alone.
They made the
an important accomplishment of itself
Hal Richardsor perhaps best summed up the American success in this
observation: Those lean Americans were tough, fearless men who had earned the respect of the Moros... They were as much at home on the rough terrain of Mindanao as any Moro. Many of these men were almost legendary in the Moro country. They were faithfully befriended by most of the savage Moros, and knew where to find food and silter when the Japanese sent in special forces to smoke them out.
ENDNOTES ICatherine Porter, Crisis in the Philipines.
1942, p. 103; U.S.
Army, Headquarters Eighth Aty, .eport OfteCo mmnding General Eighth Armx on the Palawan and Za__oanga Operations: Victor II and IV, no date, of X' oHistorr os on Mindanao 17 April 1945p. 31; U.S. An~y, X Corps30 June 1945, June 30, 1945, p. F 2 Nena Vreeland and others, Area Hardbook for the Philippines, fhe X Corps history uses some1976, pp. 85-86; X Corps, History, p. 9. what different spellings and cTassifications, but is included here primarily to reflect the impact the Moro phenomenon had upon the tactical plans. 3
Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 86.
Ltr Helen Deisher to J. D. Couch of April 30, 1972 at Ozamis City, Mindanao, re: Moro guerrilla fighting near the city, f-om the Deisher-Couch Papers, no date. General Eichelberger after having met some Moros on Mindanao in 1945 observed prophetically: "I imagifte those It would not Moros are going to be hard to lick now that they have arms. surprise me if the Filipino goverrment will have many a neadache in years to come." (They have) Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945, 1972, p. 256. 5
Vic Hurley, Swish of the Kris, 1936, p.
W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Vol.
I, 1928, p. 31.
Both quotdtiors taken from Hurley, Swish of the Kris,
Ironically, this put the United States back into the slave business for the Moros openly kept slaves and they were now within a commonwealth with , U.S. territorial limits. gDonald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: Pershing, 1973, p. 65. 10
Hurley, Swish of the Kris,
The Early Life of John J.
p. 109. pp. 273-274.
12U.S. Army, Visayan-Mindanao Force (1941-1942), Historical Report Visayan-Mindanao Force: Defense of the Philiplines 1 Sept1941-10 May 194Z, no date, p. 327. 13John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963,
1 Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla ýadre, 1946, ISlbid., 16
Hurley, Swish of the Kris, p.
1 The j uramentado and amok are discussed in virtually all books discussing the Moros. See fo-rexample: Ibid., pp. 126-131; Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, ,. 162; Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, 1928, pp. 314-315. 18 HQ, 8th Amy, Report, p. 35. 19 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 22. 20
Historical Report, p. 43.
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 201.
Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, pp. 169-170, example at p. 81.
Beth Day, The Philippines: p. 181.
Shattered Showcase of Democracy in
Asia, 1974, 24
For example, see Office of Strategic Services, "Prominent Moros of Mindanao and Sulu," February 16, 1946. 25 SSee Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 201; HQ, 8th Army. Report, p. 31. 26
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 59-60.
Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, 1979, p. 203; Stanley Falk, Liberation ofVhehippines, 1971, P. 137. 28 Undoubtedly paraphrased, but it probably catches the spirit of Fertig's renark.. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 201-202. 29
Keats, They Fought Alone, p.
Ibid., p. 261; Letter LtCol W. W. Fertig to General Hugh J. Casey, July 1, 1943; Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol: The Story f the Philippine to to Frank Constabulary, 1938, p. 20; Ltr Maj H. C. Page 116th yap, Cotabato of Sept 29, 1943 found in 10th Military District Jc',i Correspondence FVle. 31
Ltr Col W. W. Fertig to Maj F. McGee of May 19, 1943 re: unification, Ibid.
Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, pp. 81-82; Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, pp. 23-25. 33
Keats, The_ Fought Alone, p. 275; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, 1956, p. 134.
Jack Hawkins, Never Say Die, 1961, pp. 187-188; Uldarico S. Baclagon, Philippine Campains, 1952, p. 292; Quotes from Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 125, 354-355. 35
p. 293. Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 158. The trade in enemy trophies went both ways. The Japanese paid the Moros 2,000 pesos for the head of an American or Australian. Hal Richardson, One-Man War: The Jock McLaren Story, 1957, p. 64; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 284-285. 36
They Fought Alone, p. 306.
Office of Strategic Services, "The Programs of Japan in the Philippines," July 29, 1944, p. 265; Keats, The Fought Alone, p. 275; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Operat Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, July 29, 1948, p. 79. 39
Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, The Philippine Campaign, 1944-1945, "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement, no date, p. 32; Hurley, Swish of the Kris, p. 32; Ltr Datu Alimain Mamasalakeg to Col W. W. Fertig of Aug 8, 1943, Upper Cotabato Sector in 10 MD, Correspondence File; Ltr LtCol F. D. McGee, CO, 106th Div to Capt Gumbay Piang of Dec 21, 1942, Ibid.; Ltr Col W. W. Fertig to LtCol Frank D. McGee, CAV, of Aug 29, 1943, In the Field of Cotabato, Ibid. 40
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 136, 138; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous B Submarine: The o harles Parsons and the Guerrilla - SId3e~rs in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 90-94. 41
See General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 359, Parts I and II. 42
Baclagon, Phi Strategic Services, 1944, p. 303. 43
e Campaigns, p. 303; See also Office of rrilla esistance in the Philippines," July 21,
Richardson, One-Man War, pp.
CHAPTER 7 EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE MINDANAO RLS ISTANCE MOVEMENT The Need for Logistics Support The practical forms of association between a regular force and the resistance movemient it supports are several.
The most important form
of support would be logistical supply, especially supply of weapons, ammiunition and medicine.
Food may be sent to the guerrillas, although
food is the most difficult to supply and usually the least needed.
sending of officers and agents to act as liaison personnel, training advisers, or perhaps to be actual co~mmanders are other forms.
introduction of non-indigenous personnel into the area of operations, however, can create more problems that itwould solve. 1 The support given to the Philippine resistance mevement by GHQ, SWPA has been viewed as crucial to the success of the movement.
It can be argued, however,
that this aid was more of symbolic value and that the real beneficiary of the aid provided to the guerrillas was GHQ, SWPA itself.
for the aid, GHQ received an abundance of intelligence information which greatly facilitated naval operations in the Southwest Pacific and which greatly assisted in the tactical and strategic planning for the invasion of the Philippines.
Irrespective of who benefitted the most from the
support, it is certain that the assistance was important for it provided some measure of usable military materiel and it served as a symbol oifhope 171
172 to the Filipinos in a most dramatic way. In August 1943 Colonel Fertig wrote a letter to Datu Gumbay Piang which characterizes well the logistic problems faced by the Mindanao guerrillas:
"You will note that it is necessary for every
applicant for induction in the Maglndanao Militia Force to be armed. We do not furnish the arms; the men furnish their own." 2 He had written to GHQ two months earlier that he desperately needed supplies to fight the Japanese and to demonstrate that the United States was coming back to the Philippines else the "civilians will succumb to the cumulative effects of Japanese propaganda."'3 Fertig did not really care how the supplies arrived on Mindanao, although he did believe as early as July 1943 that aerial resupply was feasible.
He had gotten this idea from
William E. Dyess, an aviator who had served on Bataan and later escaped from Davao Penal Colony.
Fertig himself had overseen the construction
of airfields on Mindanao so he knew what the guerrilla capabilities might be.
He wrote to General Hugh Casey that he did 'not believe there are
technical difficulties which could not be overcome ifthe desire were 8 fte50sr~sfont h hlpie. reev4prxmtl there.'4 As it was, aerial supply did not begin in the Philippines until after the Leyte landings in October 1944. Mindanao, Cebu and Panay would
Submarines Deliver Supplies The method used to bring supplies to the guerriilas was the submarine. While on Corregidor, General MacArthur had maintained a topThe folder contained his plans for 6 Although the guerrilla guerrilla warfare in the Philippines. were beginning to ideas envisioned, he had as got started neve~r movement secret file code-named "George.' Uconducting
form inhis mind on how a guerrilla movement might be sustained.
173 that tird submarines were running the Japanese pickets and minefields
to -esupply the beleaguered Bataan-Corregidor garrison.
only a short step to envision submarines resupplying the guerrillas. Thus "Spyron" was born, one of the closest guarded secrets of p
Essentially a one-man operation at its inception, "Spy
World War II.
Squadron" was a code name for Commander Parsons who initially established the Special Mission Unit that provided the supplies and submarines for
the clandestine supply drops in the Philippines.
The Spyron activities
lasted two years, during which time supplies were delivered, evacuees were taken out, and special intelligence teams were landed in the w
U.S. Navy records indicate that of 11 submarine resupply
missions to the Philippines officially conducted, 16 visits were made to Mindanao by six different submarines: 2; Nautilus
1; and Bowfin
The Gudgeon sailed the
very first mission on January 14, 1943 to Negros and the Stingray made the last run on January 1, 1945. 7 Only one submarine was lost during these two years, the Seawolf, which went down enroute to Samar in September 1944.
The Special Mission Unit was dissolved after the last
run in January 1945.
During the two-year period, 1325 tons of supplies
and equipment were delivered with none falling into enemy hands before or at delivery.
Three hundred thirty-one persons were landed, 472
evacuated, and 19 different submarines in all carried out "Spyron" 8 Umissions.
The first submarines used in the resupply missions were patrol submarines (attack submarines in current terminology).
As these sub-
marines left Australia for missions in the Western Pacific they would stop briefly off the Philippine coast and discharge a small amount of
174 cargo or a small penetration party by rubber boats.
The 7th Fleet was
not enthusiastic about t:sing its few submarines to support what appeared to be at best marginally important missions, particularly when the missions called for surfacing in enemy waters virtually under enemy guns.
In addition, any cargo or personnel transported meant the removal
of one torpedo for every man and his gear that came aboard the submarine (the maximum load was six of these Spyron passengers). The benefits of having coastwatchers in the Philippines soon became evident, however.
Reports from the coastwatchers on weather
conditions and on enemy ship and air movements soon caught the Navy's 9
One routine report in particular from an observer near Davao
City caught their attention.
A Navy submarine had sunk a Japaneso ship,
and this had been routinely reported by the observer.
The Navy was
interested in the report because with their "hit and run" tactics submarines often did not have the opportunity to confirm their kills and to assess the damage on their targets. from their mountaintop hideouts.
The coastwatchers could do this
The equation was straightforward.
improve survivability, the Navy needed coastwatchers.
To improve their
survivability, coastwatchers and radio teams needed guerrilla protection. And to improve their survivability, the guerrillas needed weapons, ammunition,
radios anu medicine -- which meant, of course, that they
Initially the patrol submarine's Seawolf and Stingray were assigned to GHQ,
the Navy assigned the Narwhal to and in September 194.2
support the Philippine Regional Section of GHQ.
The Nautilus, the
Pearl Harbor to support GHQ.10 to Brisbane on May 3, 1944 and assigned
Narwhal's sister boat, was reassigned from COMSUBPAC, COMSUBSOWESPAC,
175 The importance of these two vessels is that they were both cargo-carrying T
he small fleet-type submnarines
could carry from five to
ten tons of supplies, and their use was dependent upon the submarine's operational schedule. p
The cargo-carrying sub iarine: with their larger
3,000-ton displacement had dedicated supply missions and could transport 11 from 50 to 100 tons of supplies.
The Narwhal and Nautilus were coimmissioned in 1930 and were
called 'super subs."
With speeds of 17 knots on the surface and eight Their
knots submerged the submarines were large cumbersome workhorses. diving time was not rapid, and their torpedo capacity was limited.
boats had 10 torpedo tubes, carried 26 torpedoes, had two six-inch deck guns and machine guns.
Eich had a boat's complement of eight officers
The crew and torpedoes carried could be reduced to permit
and 80 men.
the submarine to comfortably carry 92 tons of supplies.
to Australia the submarines had been used to land Marines and Amny scouts, evacuate civilians and conduct photographic reconnaissance elsewhere in w
the Pacific. The "super subs" were noted for their engineering problems, and the Nautilus had been undergoing overhaul which had dela~ed her earlier
to the Special Mission Unit within the Philippine Regional
The Narwhal was referred to affectionately by her cr~ew as
"Inchcllff Castle Maru" after a fictional run-down tramp steamer with *-
noisy engines in a then currently popular Saturday Evening Post series. The Narwhal under-went overhaul in the Spring of 1944. sea again on her first trip she "hogged"
When she put to
bent inthe middle
from loading too much cargo in her torpedo rooms.
1944 she was even more noisy and was leaving an oil slick and a smoke
Her best condition for operating was heavy weather.
time the Narwhal was under her new skipper, Lieutenant Commander J. C. Titus.
Commander Frank Latta, who had commanded the Narwhal during her
early trips to Mindanao and had to put the old submarine through her greatest tests, had been reassigned to command the patrol submarine
.13 Lagarto. The first submarine to be sent by GHQ, the Gudgeon,
go to Pagidian Bay, Mindanao to land Major Jesus Villamor and a radio team called the "Plariet Party."
Villamor carried microfilm with a high
grade cipher system for both Fertig on Mindanao and Peralta on Panay in a dental alteration and under a patch on his gym shoes.
was unable to rendezvous at i~indanao so it made for Negros and dropped the landing party there. successful one.
GHQ followed up this attempt with a second,
Charlie Smith and "Chick" Parsons'
"Fifty Party" arrived
in Pagadian Bay four miles southeast of Labangan •board the Tambor.
met by a guerrilla leader on the beach, Parsons asked how the submarine could be unloaded of the supplies he had brought for the guerrillas. The guerrilla promptly produced a lignter to transport the two tons of stores brought aboard the Tambor to th move the shipment:
took 40 minutes to
E0,000 rounds of .30 calibre and 20,000 rounds of
.45 calibre ammunition; radio equipment and spare parts; medicine, clothing, food, soap, cigarettes, bandages and surgical kits.
was even a can of wheat flour for making communion wafers -- and $10,000 in cash. Colonel Fertig was impressed with the amount of supplies brcught and knew that their delivery to him would raise the level of respect for his josition as fledgling leader of the Mindanao guerrilla movement.
177 To a starving man a piece of bread is a banquet, so it is no surprise that Fertig was appreciati,,e of the effort. plentiful to those who had to carry it.
And it must have seemEd
Still, it was very small,
Fertig knew it -- it amounted to only a pound per man in his small force.
When he pressed Parsons on how frequently future deliveries
might come, he was told that supplies were coming only because MacArthur was personally interested in the welfare of the Filipino guerrillas. The War Department was not especially interested in the guerrillas, for it had concerns of much greater magnitude. situation quite differently.
The guerrillas saw the
It is not an overstatement to say that
each action against a Japanese patrol on Mindanao was seen as a great Allied victory by the guerrillas, and for them th&t was the war in the Pacific.
-ander for Mindanao-Sulu
belittled this first supply effort in a puolic communique and said: "The only thing I wish,
should anyone find American cig7-ettes, bring
me a package so I may smoke."'15 The submarine deliveries which arrived on Minda .o were very diverse but limited by the capacity of the submarines, the submarine hatch (23 inches),
the diameter of
and the mission of the iuerrillas.
Items such as radios were brokr down into comoonent parts, and military supplies, magazines,
clothing, cho'colate bars, soap and cigarettes were
put into waterproof tins.
Popular items were sewing ki
, pencils and
shortwave receivers to be smuggled into the villages ar' towns occupied by the Japanese.
If caught by the Kempei Tai,
for possessing a radio receiver.
death was the punishment
Although viewed as fr*,olous by GHQ,
the guerrillas pleaded for heavy duty sewinj machine needles.
village had a sewing machine and a generator, and the heavy burlap
178 material used for dresses was wearing out the sewing machine needles. Oranges sent to the island were stamped "USA" whether they were grown there or not.
Candy wrappers and matchbook covers were stamped "ISRM"
and "I Shall Return MacArthur" as were cigarette packages, wrappers,
pencils, and other small items.
Magazines with news of
America's victories were also brought in large number.
developed considerable propaganda value, and they would often turn up on the desks of Japanese officers.
Five gallon kerosene tins were
three-quarters filled with wheat flour used to make communion wafers, and a half-dozen bottles of Mass wine filled the remaining fourth. *
FReligious medals, among the bottles
rosaries And holy pictures were wedged in
These supplies were highly valued because there was
no wheat for making flour or grapes for making wine in the Philippines. Priests used eyedropperg to serve the wine at communion.
Among the most
'important supplies were cathartic pills, sulfathiazole, and atabrine and quinine for combatting malaria. that the guerrilla leaders'
Parsons even took pains to ensure
pride was assuaged.
saddle soap for his shiny cavalry boots, Kangleon on Leyte received adhesive for his dentures (his gums had shrunk from malnutrition resulting from his internment), and Fertig received six bars of toilet soap. Things did not always go Just right, of course.
printing money and paper arrived on Mindanao, which meant there was Just one more thing to haul around and one more administrative task to perform.
On one occasion,
the guerrillas unloaded 20 mm guns but no shells
They were told the shells would be in the next submarine
the guns were on Navy requisitions but the rounds were on
Army requisition and were not yet available.
Hammocks with zippprs
179 arrived, but the guerrillas needed nrdicine more and ammunition was far more useful than a hammock in a surprise attack.
Several cases arrived
with markings showing that the cuatents were submachine guns. cases actually contained cavalry sabers.
Boxes of whiskey and pesos did
not always make it through the long supply line.
GHQ begdn marking
these boxes "military rations," and the problem ceased.
A shipment of supplies brought in by patrol submarine might have these items.
4 6 radio sets 12 10 cases .45 calibre ammo 13 10 cases hand grenades 3 I aircooled .50 calibre MG Several cases of CL VI (personal items) (medical) supplies
batteries cases .50 ammo Tommy guns .45 calibre Springfield rifles and CL VIII
By MW-:h 1944 the breakdown of supplies by type within a shipment, listed by priority of importance to the guerrillas, would look like this:
Percent 60 8 10 5 10 7
Item Ordnarce Medical Signal and engineering Currency requirements (paper, ink, plates) Sundries (specific requisitions) QMitems and propaganda itums
Dissette and Adamson conclude that the supplies brought in by submarine "gave new life and hope" to the guerrillas throughout the Philippines.
That Is the accepted view, but they go onlto add that
"without them [submarines] the guerrilla movement would have collapsed long before Allied forces could return to the Islands.'' of that latter statement is doubtful,
and it gives little credit to the
very strong hatred the Filipinos hed developed for the Japanese and the Filipino desire to regain their demo:ratic way of life.
180 did make the guerrillas more effective and enabled the leaders who received the supplies to retain control over their organizations.
the submarines undoubtedly facilitated the early return of the invasion force to the Philippines because they brought in the coastwatcners trained in Australia and the radios that transmitted the intelligence
the Japanese strength and dispositions.
The aim of Spyron was to have a rifle ii the hands of every guerrilla by the time the invasion force reached the Philippines.21 This goal was achieved, and some stories of the success of the supply missions are apocryphal: How extensive this work of the submarine was I learned one day when two ladies of the underground came to see me. I outlined Saturnino's project of raiding Muntinlupa for the 2,000 rifles stored 'Only 2,000 there. They only stared at me; they almost sniffed. The other said, It is not worth the rifles! risk 1i22Why that is nothingl' However, the supplies sent to the guerrillas have also been described as a "mere bagatelle," and that characterization is supportable if we look only at the raw figures.
Sources put the tonnage of supplies shipped
by submarine to the Philippines at between 1,325 tons and 1,600 tons.
If we use the figure for the number of guerrillas actually recognized as having fought in the resistance movement,
260,715, and the more
liberal figure for tonnage, 1,600, then we have a per guerrilla supply rate of 12.3 pounds per guerrilla for the two year period over which submarines had been making deliveries, or just over six pounds per year. That is not much once the chewing gum, magazines, and the like are eliminated. have been 750 tons.
Tonnage sent to Mindanao is reported to
Much of this was cached on MacArthur's orders
and much of it was sent to the islands to the north, so the Mindanao guerrillas did not use nearly this amount.
Fertig's guerrilla strength
was estimated at between 25,000 and 40,000, with most sources agreeing on 36,000. Ifwe use the accepted strength figure along with the 750 ton figure for supplies sent to Mindanao, we have a 1'igure of 41.6 pounds per gurerrilla between March 1943 and September 1944 when the last submadrine put in at Mindanao.
Regardless of how the allocations per
guerrilla are computed, the conclusion is the same.
guerrillas had by far the largest allocation of supplies per guerrilla, but even this tonnage does not suggest an adequate resupply rate to the guerrillas.
Ifthe 41.6 pounds per guerrilla were armmunition alone,
through a couple of which it was not, it was barely enough to get hinm good fire fights.
It is obvious that the guerrillas fought mostly with
heart and with the hope brought by the submarines. The distribution of the supplies was a different problem.
SWPA generally regarded the Mindanao guerrilla movement as the best organized of the guerrilla organizations inthe Philippines and as the center of resistance in the archipelago.
Furthermore, MacArthur's plans
called for returning to the Philippines with Mindanao as his first ob~jective In the islands and subsequently using the island as his toehold for the push north to Manila. U
Mindanao had much to recommend it
as a location for pre-positioned supply storage, for Mindanao was relatively convenient to MacArthur's supply lines and the island was not heaivily garrisoned with Japanese. 2
Ger~eral MacArthur had written
Fertig a letter directing him to act *ýs his supply point for furnishing supplies to the other islands.
Fertig was also to hide stores of
supplies on Mindanao for future use by the invasion force and for the guerrillas to use when the invasion force arrived. *
He was not to use
the weapons against the Japanese so as not to invite retaliation and
182 increased Japanese anti-submarine activity.
In this last regard
Fertig was directed to keep submarine deliveries Pbsolutely secret. Fertig could keep the arrival time and location of the submarine rendezvous secret, but he could not keep the arrival of the submarine secret after the fact.
The arrival of a submarine was a cause for
great rejoicing among the Filipinos on Mindanao, and they celebrated its coming with fiestas.
These celebration activities had a salutory
effect on the morale of the guerrillas and strengthened the resistance movement as a whole.
In any case, with "ISRM"
matchbooks and candy
wrappers turning up frequertly on the desks in Japanese Army offices, the conclusion to be drawn by the Japanese was pretty evident. The distribution requirement called for extensive planning on the part of both Fertig and the guerrilla commander who unloaded the shipment of supplies from the submarine.
Cargadores had to be brought
toyether in sufficient numbers to carry the supplies but not so soon as to betray the pending rendezvous.
A banca fleet and lighters had to be
gathered, again under the same stipulations.
Supply routes through the
mountains had to be planned for and then given additional security where needed.
If a submarine brought go tons of supplies, it would take 3,600
cargadores to pack the supplies across the mountains if each man carried 50 pounds and carabaos were not used.
The supply column would have extra
cargadores and a security force, so put the column at about 4,000 men. If they had a march of 14 days, seven days each way, and they ate two meals a day,
the column would require 112,000 meals which would have to
be carried with the column or provided for along the way. each cargadore would have to be paid for his labor. could multiply very rapidly.
And, of course,
The logistical problems
183 By Spring 1944 the supplies were cornig into Mindanao rapidly for redistribution to the north. 27Inevitably, coammanders both on Mindanao and elsewhere wouldl complain that they were receiving fewer supplies than they felt were due them and that they needed. W
allegations were made that the 28
got the best equipment in the
These complaints have been heard for as long as there
have been armies and quartermasters.
Perhaps itcould be called
"trickle-down supply,' but il.was inevitable given Lhe tonnage brought in that the Individiial unics would not receive much.
Company I,3rd Battalion, 94th Infantry on Leyte received the following 9
supplies on March 11, 1944 from Mindanao:
three carbines, one sub-
machine gun and one Browning automatic rifle. 29 These weapons were added to the less than 30 rifles Company I already had. The Japanese learned of the submarine deliveries primarily from their agentr.
Their intelligence reports showed a continuing and growing
concern with the submarine deliveries. U
They had inflated notions of what
the submarines 'Nere accomplishing, for their reports speak of guerrillas unloading 'parts of five airplanes" from one submarine.
They also believed
that the submarines were apparently bringing in field artillery *pieces
and anti-aircraft guns.
They thought that the delivery of small
arms ammunition was plentiful and that each guerrilla carried between 20 and 30 rounds of rifle ammnunition. 0
They fixed the f~vorite rendezvous
locations used by the guerrillas very quickly and accurately and sent large forces into these ar-eas to control them.
The Japanese focussed
especially on Pagadlan Bay, Butuan Bay and the east coast.
submarine visits increased, the Japanese tracked an increase inthe guerrilla activity. They believed that a large number ot Amlericans
184 they do not say how many
were being landed on Mindanao by submarine.
By mid-1944 18 percent of the Japanese submarine sightings were off the Mindanao coast, and they had the submerines delivering supplies most often at Butuan Bay and Illana Bay.30
Figure 4 depicts the actual
rendezvous locations at Mindanao between March 1943 and September 1944. Along with this new Japanese attention to the submarine deliveries came an unwelcome change in Japanese policy on the treatment of Americans. It went from very bad to very much worse.
The Japanese proclaimed that
any unsurrendered American found in the islands would be executed on the spot after January 25, 1944.31
They meant it,
and a relentless
search for Americans hiding in the mountains commenced.
radioed to Fertig before January 25th, and therefore, before the socalled "amnesty" period was up:
"Report thirteen American nationals,
among then women and children, have Just been slaughtered by the Japanese on Panay.'
Fertig's brother Claude and his wife who was eight months
pregnant were on 24 niy, and they had barely escaped by seccrids the Japanese patrol which had killed the 13 Americans and their Filipino friends and workers. On being notified of this new situation, MacArthur reassigned the patrol submarines to an evacuation role, and Fertig coordinated many of the evacuations by radio from his headquarters. were evacuated from the Philippines. was pitiful.
In all, 472 people
The condition of many of the people
Captain Olsen of the Angler picked up 58 evacuees in
March 1944 from Panay, among them Claude Fertig, his wife and his newlyborn daughter.
He had this to say of their condition:
"The ship was
immediately infested with cockroaches and body and hair lice.
percentage of passengers had tropical ulcers, plus an oder that was unique
SUBMARINE RENDEZVOUS POINTS MINDANAO MAR':H 5, 1943
SEPTEMBER 30, 1944
EACH DOT () Represents one submarine landing
186 in its intensity."
He called the boat's compartment where the people
were billeted the "Black hole of Calcutta."
This description is
accurate and is borne out by Louise Reid Spencer in her book Guerrilla Wife in which she details the many months her family, the Claude Fertig family and ethers spent avoiding and fighting the Japanese in the mountains of Parny. A number of the 472 Americans were evacuated from Mirdanao.34 One of the most gruesome evacuations took place on Mindanao and stemminci from an event that took place just off Sindangan Point near Sindangar Bay on September 6, 1944.
By Summer 1944 the Japanese had begut, trans-
porting American prisoners from the Philippines to labor camps In Japan, Korea and Manchuria.
The ships were of all types, from military troop
ships to merchant vessels.
On September 7th, five ships of a seven
ship convoy transporting American prisoners were sunk.
were not permitted to leave the ship as it sank, for Japanese guards gunned them down in the holds from the hatches above.
Many who did
manage to escape from the ships were shot or clubbed to death in the water by hysterical Japanese guards.
Only 80 of the approximately 800
prisoners survived from the five ships, and they made their way ashore at Sindangan Point.
Five hundred corpses washed ashore with them.
There they were picked up by guerrillas,
and later those wha were still
alive were put on the Narwhal near Siari Bay.35 The submarines themselves were always subject to danger on their guerrilla supply missions.
As already described, the Filipinos would
have a fiesta on the arrival of a submarine, and they could put a fiesta together on very short notice.
Many a submarine commander f It his
heart in his mouth when he surfaced to carry out his super secret
187 mission only to find a bar
ed dancing girls waiting o3rthe shore.
The Jaoanese were rarely more than a few miles away, so the •aptain's misapprehension w•s well-founded.
in one instance Commander Latta took
the Narwhal right up to a pier at Nasipit in Butuan Bay, probably the only time an PAmerican warship had tied up to a pier to discharge cargo in enemy territory.
The Narwhal was in a later visit to proceed up
the Agusan River itself to discharge cargo and pick up 32 evacuees.
beached, and with the Japanese only three miles away, the crew commenced "sallying" -- runniig fore and aft the length of the ship -- to rock the boat from the sandy shoal upon which she was lodged.
If a submarine was unable to keep a rendezvous, become difficult very quickly.
The boat could steam to another location
if need be, but the cargaJores and banca fleets could not be shifted quickly at al 1 . rendezvous, as well. W
dignitaries had been invited to see the submarine
then the guerrilla leader could "lose face" very quickly
World War II submarines spent about 90 percent of their time on the surface and submerged only to avoid attack.
Sometimes they would
lie off the coast of Mindanao submerged waiting for the signal fror' the guerrillas ashore or just observing the rendezvous area.
The water was
so clear in place.; that on a moonlit night, and often during 'he daylight hours, a pe,-son could sit ashore, especially on a hill, 11arl. object resting on the white sand. what else, a submarine. protect the submarines.
and see a huge
The dark object looked just like,
The guerrillas would go to great lengths to When Parsons left Mindanao on July 15, 1943 he
sat in a boat which "resembled a greenhouse."
It was piled high with
petted palms lashed to the railings, banana leaves hanging from the guy
188 wires and a coconut tree strapped to the mast. like a small island in Pagadian Bay.
It was supposed to look
On occasion the submarines ran afoul of the Japanese and had to defend themselves.
The Narwhal had several close calls near Mindanao
but managed to survive the depth charges. 42 The submarines were also vulnerable to air attack because they spent so much time on the surface. A friendly air patrol in the area almost always improved the securit. of a submarine.
But towards the end of the war the American submarines
were not necessarily any more secure with American fliers aloft.
seems that the Armj Air Force pilots enjoyed forcing a submarine -- pilots called them "pigbcats" -- to dive just for sport.
The only submarine to
be lost supporting the guerrillas was the Seawolf which was mistakenly sunk by Navy pilots from the carrier Midwa from Australia to Samar.
while the Seawolf was steaming
The Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA FroirMay 7, 1942, all policy relalive to guerrilla activities and guerrilla recognition emanated directly from GHQ, 540A.
the supply effort to the guerrillas and to coordinate the resources used in gathering intelligence information in the Philippines MacArthur created the Philippine Subsection of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) on October 21, 1942.
The AIB was itself organized on July 6, 1942 to train,
equip and diipatch agents to collect intelligence behind enemy lines in the Southwest Pacific area.
The AIB was supported equally by the United
States, Australia and the Netherlands Erst Indies. sections:
The AIB had four
special operations, secret intelligence, combined field
intelligence and propaganda -- sections A-D.
Section C, combined field
intelligence, was the United States' responsibility, and this section
189 handled the Philippine Islands. The Philippine Subsection was charged with establishing military intelligence and secret service nets.
On April 15,
1943 the Subse'tion The PRS was
was redesignated as the Philippine Regional Section (PRS).
responsible for agent penetration, intellige.ice net organization, guerrilla supply and control,
political direction and the coastwatchers.
Colonel Courtney Whitney assuiled control of the PRS on May 24, 1943, and he reported directly to MacArthur's chief-of-staff, Major General R. K. Sutherland,
thereby, cir-cmventing the chain of command.
anything having to do with guerrilla recognition but he did not handle intelligence.
After the PRS was established, the AIB ceased its
connection with activities in the Philippines.
On June 2, 1944 the
functions of the PRS were divided between two sections, the G-3 and G-4.
The guerrilla activities within the Southwest Pacific Area are generally divided into three phases.
The first phase was the study of
the guerrilla movement by the AIB while working under the operational control of the SWPA G-2. established in this phase.
The Special Philippine Subsection was In phase two, beginning iiiJune 1943,
Philippine Regional Section war established with Whitney at the helm. In phase three the functions of the Philippine Regional Section were decentralized and the direction of the guerrilla movement was apportioned among the General Staff sections for purposes of efficiency. of the PRS was retained as a coordinating agency.
On Major General Sutherland's recommendation,
Colonel Whitney fv"'x the United States to run the newly created PRS. Whitney had been a lawyer in Manila for many years and knew a great many
He was tasked with expanding the program of promoting
istance activities inthe Philippines.
To this end he organized,
trained and dispatched the intelligence teamis and coastwatcher groups that were sent to the islands. support for the guerrillas.
The section also oversaw the logistical Whitney soon became a close confidante
of MacArthur, and his reports were the first seen by MacArthur each 47
Apparently, there was a disagreement between General Willoughby, the G-2, and Whitney over the potential usefulness of the guerrillas. Keats records that Parsons related tczFertig during Mindanao that this fundamental disagreement existed.
his first visit to Willoughby felt
that there was no genuine resistance in the Philippines and no chance that any would arise.
Therefore, there was no reason to send any guns
or ammunition to the Philippines.
Whitney thought otherwise, and
he further believed that the guerrillas had potential value for combat against the Japanese. 48Whitney made the mare convincing argument, because the submarines sailed laden with arms and anmmunition. to another weakness of GHQ in the business of running a guerrilla resistance.
He asserts that Willoughby went "regulation" in running the
guerrilla operations, something of which Fertig constantly complained,
and that he put in charge of the AIB "a grizzled old campaigner who did 49 know much of clandestine operations but did know Army regulations." The Army drew its own conclusions on how well its nwn leadership carried out guerrilla operations.
In referring to the World War II
experience, the Army's current manual on doctrine for supporting guerrilla operations readJs:
"Military professionals generally did not understand
191 the art of guerrilla warfare and many of them regarded it as illegal and dishonorable.
The strategic and tactical relationships of guerrilla
forces to conventional forces were rarely appreciated ,50
further observes that the headquarters running the gueri lla operations would often shift the responsibility for organizing, supplying and exploiting guerrilla forces from the cognizance of one s aff section to arother or pass the problems off to a special agency whe" they became too difficult.
Colonel Ind supports this contention
nd writes that
some officers in MacArthur's headquarters questioned the sincerity of the guerrilla irtelligence reports and had a general indtfference to the reports.
An internal Army report on the gurrillas drew the same
concluslons by saying that some officers at GHQ,
SWPA "questioned the
dependability of Filipinos" dnd differed or how to use them as guerrillas.
An unhappy exampe of this lack of trus
case of Mnjor Villamor.
GHQ did not believe the report
penetration party on the situation in the Visayas.
' seen in the Villamor's
Villamor, a highly
decorated Filipino national hero was discredited, over the objections of Ind and Willoughby.
It was not until
rclla .er tht tar in 1959
when President Dwight Eisenhower publicly exonerated Villamor at a White House cerenony that the wrongheadness of the GHQ doubters was atoned.
Perhaps the key fir-re in the AIB structure was the man who ran Spyron, Commander Parsons.
Born a Tennessean, Parsons had gone to the
Philippines in 1921 at age 19 aboard a merchant ship.
A bright young
man, he had a long list of accomplishments to his name by 1941.
first served as secretary to General Leonard B. Wood, the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines, and had later been supervisor or manager in telephone and telegraph, trading and import, lumber and stevedorliig
192 He joined the Navy Reserve on January 6, 1932 and was called
to active duty on December 14, 1941.
His tale from that point is a
remarkable adventure which rivals the most creative fictional adventure For his service !,'ring the war he received the Navy Cross and
the Bronze Star.
He was one of only four Americans to ever receive the
Philippine Medal for Valor, ard only nine people had ever received it The only other Xmericans to receive this medal were MacArthur,
Nimitz, and Wainwright.54 Parsons was MacArthur's agent to the Philippine
movement, and he was charged with assessing its potential and its needs. He had the authority to take whatever action was necessary to ensure that the movement was unified to the greatest degree feasible.
made six trips to the Philippines in all, and he made three visits to Mindanao:
Spring 1943, October 1943,
and February 1944.
Like Villamor, To
Parsons was widely Known and recognized throughout the Philippines. ensure the Filipinos'
respect, but primarily because he preferred to
work that way, Parsons traveled unarmed and without a disguise on every visit.
Parsons was short and slender, and the years had ,ivwn his skin
a chestnut color.
He looked like a Filipino, and he knew how to move
unobtrusively among the Filipinos.
He har many close calls with Japanese
patrols, but he managed to allude capture during all his visits.
is the more remarkable because the Japanese had publicly put a price on his head of 100,000 pesos -- $5U,000 in gold -- a staggeringly large sum to a Filipino, especially in the jq4Q's.
Unable to catch Parsons
or his brothers-in-law, Army Captain Tom Jurika and Navy Lieutenant Stephen Jurika, the Japanese settled for executing Mrs. Jvzrika, mother of Parsons' wife Katsy.
She was beheaded on August 25, 1944 with a
193 group of 29 other internees and buried in a mass unmarked grave.
Parsons worked fo: Whitney in the Philippine Regional Section, but he coordinated with Captain A. H. McCo>lum, the 7th Fleet staff officer who coordinated the submarine deliveries and designated the coastwatcher station locations in the Philippine islands.
who was the Southwest Pacific Force Intelligence Officer, recalls that Parsons "was more or less working for me.'
In either case, Parsons
was essentially a messenger and liaison officer with no command authority. Because he was gone to the Philippines so much of the tine the politics between the Amy and the Navy in Brisbane did not bother him that much. But the politics did follow him to Mindarnao once, for on his first visit to Mindanao Parsons and Charlie Smith had flipped a coin on disembarking the submarine to see who would lead the "Fifty" Party, as it was called. Parsons won the toss, either at the time.
but the issue lacked any real significance to Later, when both were radioing their reports back
to Australia, each kept the contents of his report secret from the other, and Parsons used a Navy code whereas Smith used an Amy code.
as head of the party, believed Smith should send his reports through him, Parsons,
to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
Smith said he
represented Amy intelligence and that, because Parsons worked for AIB, he had no right to withhold information from the Army.
Fertig, a senior officer, for allowing the other to even use the radio. The incident merely served to confinn Fertig's worst opinions of GHQ and the people who worked there.
It was especially irritating to him because
he knew that the reports were assk.ssments of his leadership and the potential of the Mindanao guerrilla organization.
194 As described earlier, MacArthur wanted absolute secrecy for The training camps in Australia where Filipino
his submarine deliveries.
recruits from the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment and the 2d rilipino Infantry Battalion in California were Indoctrinated and trained for intelligence teams was closely guarded.
The submarine operations wtre
kept so secret that even the penetration parties did not know the date of their departure.
An agent would be roused from bed, put into a
pair of dungarees, and joined with a labor crew loading a submarine in the middle of the night.
Then or one trip into the submarine, he would
be kept inside and a confederate agent would leave the submarine to take His personal gear would be brought aboard
his place in the lebor crew. the vessel for him later.
In this manner the coast.watcher teams and
special intelligence agents made their way to the Philippines. The AIB operations were not part of the Office of Strategic The OSS
operations, nor were they supported by the OSS.
by President Roosevelt and the Congress in July 1941.
The first American organization of its kind, it was patterned after the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) functions. and overseas,
The OSS had two
One was to conduct research with units in the United States and to provide agents to gather, analyze and evaluate
strategic information and report it.
The second function was to sabotage
lines of communications behind enemy lines and to aid and tL'ain resistance groups and encourage underqruund forces with propaganda. General William J. Donovan repeatedly off'4rd to send OSS agents to assist MacArthur in the guerrilla operations in the Philirpines and elsewhere in the SWPA theater.
MacArthur consistently refused the
offers, and Willoughby assured MacArthur that they were not needed.
195 D. Clayton James describes the GHQ position, MacArthur was "not about to have Allied personnel in his theater who were not under his control, as would have been the case with the OSS."5
MacArthur already had
several organizations available to him in Melbourne.
He had the British
SOE to conduct sabotage and espionage, he had the Netherlands Indies Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS),
and he had the Australian propaganda
units and their coastwatcher network. his counterpart to the OSS, resources available to it.
For MacArthur the AIB would be
although it would have far fewer financial
MacArthur did his best to keep the OSS out of his theater, and the small amount of work done by the OSS on the Philippines reflects this.
There are virtually rnoOSS reports on the Philippine resistance
movemnent., and the information the OSS did put together was brief, summary in nature, and came from intervIews and not from their own agents in the Philippines.61 In a rare instance, an agent from the War Department, Captain Harold Rosenquist, did manage to make it to Mindanao through the good offices of Major Steve Mellnik and General Sutherland.
escaped from Davao Penal Colony, and Rosenquist was in the business of springing POW's in Europe.
Mellnik had met Rosenquist at a debriefing
at the Pentagon, where Rosenquist became intrigued with the possibilities for liberation of the Davao prisoners.
He made his way to Australia
where Mellnik, who now headed up the Philippine Section in Willoughby's G-2, sponsored the idea.
Willoughby and Sutherland supported Melinik,
although Whitney disapproved of the idea.
Rosenquist, now an AIB agent,
arrived alone at Davao just after the prisoners had been removed from the prison.
These prisoners were among thcse who were >2-ownod and shot
196 at Sindangan Bay.
The incident raised some fundamental questions between
Fertig and GHQ on command relationships, command authority within the 10th Military District, and the capabilities and mission of the guerrilla organizations, 62 The conclusion must be that the GHQ,
SWPA support to the guerrillas
was fundamentally important to the success of the rsistance movement. In tile main,
the support could not be sufficient in amount to redress the
balance between the Japanese and the guerrillas. concluded,
As Pobert R. Smith
"Late--and, it would appear, often overcautious--recognitlon,
encouragement and help from outside the Philippines hardly nourished the guerrill& movement." 63 guerrillas:
But as one observer said of supplies to the
"It may also be worthy of note that in many ways the man in
the guerrilla movement was much less important for there were ten ready The loss of a weapon, on the other hand,
and willinn to take hir place. 64
was much more seriously felt."'
The work Parscns achieved in con-
solidating the resistance forces wis successful beyond what could have been expected of one man and so f.•w supplies.
The important contributi'on
of the submarine visits and the penetration parties was the clear signal it sent to the Filipino people and the guerrillas that "The Aid" would one day come to their country.
As such, the belief in the future of
the Philippines remained alive, and the Japarese were caused to tie up much needed combat forces to suppress the resistance movement and to stem the trickle of supplies which were reaching the guerrillas.
CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES 'For discussion of this aspect see: Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 1962, pp. 112-113; Marco J. Caraccia, "Guerrilla Logistics-, Student Thesis, Army War College, April 8, 1966, p. 37. 2
Ltr Col W. W. Fertig, HQ 10 MDOffice of CG In the Field to Datu Gumbay Piang, Cotabato Area of Aug 4, 1943, in Corresponuence Files, 10th Military District. 3
Letter, Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Fertig to General Hugh j. Casey, July 1, 1943. 4
Ibid. This theme of GHQ's "desire," or lack thereof, runs through much of what Fertig has to say about the GHQ support. He never really seemed to believe that MacArthur's staff of "sycophants" ever really cared what went on in Mindanao. 5
U.S. Aerosp;.ce Studies Institute, Air University, Concepts Division, "The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare (WWII)," December, 1962. Ways in which U.S. airpower helped guerrillas is found on p. 235 (hereinafter ASI, "Role of Airpower"). 6
Edward Dissette and H. C. Adamson, pp. 13-16.
Guerrilla Submarines, 1972,
U.S. Seventh Fleet, Memorandum, subject: "Submarine Activities Connected with Guerrilla Organizations in the Philippines," no date (hereinafter 7th FLT Memo). 8
Ibid. The text ot 0his report varies 'lilhtly from the tables, but the differences are small. 9 For discussion on various positions see: Ibid.; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, 1956, pp. 132-133; Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau:Our et Weapon in the garAgainst Japan, There was 1958, pp. 181-182; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 181-182. a large amount of electronic intelligence available to the War Department on Japanese fleet movements gained through breaking Japan's code. The coastwatchers validated much of the information.
10General Headquarters, Far East Command, O9p!tions of the Allied Intelli ence Bureau, 1948 (hereinafter GHQ, FEC, ArT The Navy records i e that both boats were assigned in OctoberT143. The Narwhal may have been, but the Nautilus certainly was not. See 7th FLT Memo. Dissette and Adamson give No-v-emer1943 for the Narwhal's assignment and add that the cargo subs were made available +o theP-lpine Regional Section 197
198 because President Quezon convinced President Roosevelt of this necessity. Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 23, 80. 11Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 23; GHQ, FEC, AID, p. 69. Ind, AIB, p. 182. 12U.S. Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum, U.S. Navy. (Retired1, 1973, Tape 12, p. 560; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 23, 80-82, 95, 130, 132-133. 13 Latta was killed when the Lagarto was sunk by the Japanese minelayer Hatsutaka on May 4, 1945 in the Gul ff) fam. See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 19441945, 1959. 4
I 1nd, AIB, pp. 122, 125-126.
i For discussion Pf this first delivery to Mindanao see: William Wise, Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" and the merlcan-Fipino Iuerrllas of World War II, 1968, pp. 77-78, 84-85; Wissette, Guerrilla Submarires,p. 35; Rnd-IB, pp. 164-161; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the GuerrillaSoldters in the Phtltppgnes, pp. 164-167;-John 1945, Keats, The Fo Alone0,19 192-93; Rafael Steinbery, Return to th nes, a7., p. 27; Peralta on Panay had radioed GHQ in eary 1943: "Still hoping grass arrives before the horse dies" in reference to the need for supplies. Charles Andrew Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945, 1972, p. 71. 16 1nd, AID, p. 164; Wise, Secret Mission, pp. 136-137; Edward Haggerty, Guerr-FTla Padre, 1946, p. 23; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarine, wRakns, Never Say Die, 1961, p. 194; Reminiscenespp. 72, 7 McCollum, Tape 13, p. 595. 17Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. Rendezvous, p. 1
330, 342; Whitney, MacArthur:
18jose Demandante Dormal, The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay-u World War II, 1952, p. 87. 19
Headquarters, Philippines Conmand, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date, p. 234, Appendix I, p. 4. 20 21
p. 145. 22
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, Ingham,
Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 199; Wise, Secret Mission,
Forbes J. Monaghan, Under the Red Sun: A Letter Frowi Manila, 1946, p. 223. 23 The Navy claims 1,325 tons;see 7th FLT Memo. The 1,600 ton figure comes from an Amwy Department historian, see Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement,"no date, p. 216 (hereinafter OCMH,"Resistance Movement").
"Role of Airpower," p. 140.
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: The CaLpaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, 1966, p. 309 (hereinafter SCAP, ReorAs, I); Uldarico Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, 1952, pp. 302-304; HCMh, "Resistance Movement," p. 216; Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 596; Ind, AIB, p. 125. 26
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 332.
26Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 336-337. 29
Elmner Lear, The Japanese Occupaion of the Philippines, Lute, 1941-1945, 1961, p. 87, r n. -I-t i-sittle wondaer that the gerlas on Leyte thought they were in a "begging position" when it came to getting supplies from the 10th Military District. See also page 88. 30
1nformation on submarines appears throughout but see: General Headcuarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," En_ y Publications No. 359, Part I, pp. 3, 6-8, 18-20, 36, 56-57, 63 and Parti, pp.. 21, 62. 31
1ngham, Rendezvous By Submarines,
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp.
34Ind, AIB, pp. 203-204.
Contains the names of those evacuated.
Dissette, Guerrilla Submlarines, p. 157; See also Keats, T Fought Alone, pp. 387-390, 397 Steve Melilnik, Philippne Diary 139 1945, 1969, pp. 290-291- Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 239; D. Clayton Ua-mes, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, 1975, p. 511. 36
Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, Die, pp. 193-194. 37
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 327.
Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines,
p. 100; Keats, They Fought Alone, p.
Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 1j, p. 601; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 84. 41Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 274-2J5. 42
For example see Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, 107; Ind, AIB, pp. 195-196.
0issette, Guerrilla Submarines,
44For discussion on the AIB see: HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," Appendix 1, pp. 3, 5; General Headquarters, Far East Command, A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units: Introduction to the Intelligence Series, 1948, p. 46; Ind, AIB, Foreward. 45
SCAP, Reports I, p.
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance Movement, p. 71; James, Years of MacArthur, II, pp. 509-510. In all there were 264 intelligen'a party missions sent by the AIl to tla rh'"ippines. Among these parties, 164 ,,l' a1•A778 MIA. 'nd, AIB, p. 72. agents were KIT; 6 WIA, 75 ý 47
Rendezvous, p. 132. 4 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 202-203, 34b. 8
1nd, AIB, p. 174.
Headquarters, Department 'f thO Amny, Special Forces Operations, Field Manual 31-20, September 197I p. 96. 51
1bid.; See also OCMH,
"Resistance Movement," p. 228.
1nd, AIB, p. 157.
The Parsons story is the subject of ''veral books and makes truly remarkable reading. Colonel Ind include-. a chapter on Parsons in hi- book on the AIB. The booksýbout Parsons are annotated in the bibliography. 55
See especially Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 170, Reminiscences - McCollun, Tape 19, p. 688; Ind, AIB, pp. 159-188; Louis Morton, The Fall of Nhe Philippines, 1953, p. 160; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 2856
Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 136; Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 595. 57
Keats, They Fought Alone, op. 212-213.
58 See Ind, AIB, p. 123; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 65; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 285; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," pp. 227228. 59 James, Years of MacArthur, II, pp. 510-511; See also Riiiniscences McCollum, Tape 13, p. 594. 60IId, AIB, p. 12; Willouahby, Guerrilla Resistance Movement,
201 For example see Office of Strategic Services, "Guerrilla Resistance in the Philippines," July 21, 1944 and "Japan and It, Occupied Territories During World War II," in A Guide to O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, 1, 9-77. 62 Mellnik, Philippine DIary, pp. 282-286, 288, 290; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 387-390, 397. 63 Robert Ross Smitn, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, 61
and Military Factors," 1963, p. 31.
See also page 44. Gene Z. Hanrahan, Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, 1954, p. 16. 64
CHAPTER 8 OPERATIONAL EMPLOYVI:NT OF THE GUERRILLAS Thus far the discussion has focusedJ on who the guerrillas were, how they were organized, and what the circumstances were under which the guerrilla organization grew. guerrillas did
This chapter will discuss what the
how they fought, how they survived, and what real
effectiveness their operations may have had on the Japanese operations on Mindanao. Guerrilla Tactics and Logistics Support Aside fromn General MacArthur's orders to avoid combat with the Japanese, there were some imperatives of the guerrillas' circumstances which dictated that this would be so irrespective of MacArthur's orders. Although the guerrillas wanted to engage the Japanese inoffensive operations, thereby violating the spirit of MacArthur's orders, pitched battles with the Japanese were not feasible because of the small amount of ammunition and number of weapons dvailable to the 10th Military *
Furthermore, pitched battles meant heavier guerrilla casualties,
and with no doctors or medicine with which to treat the wounded, most wounds were ir ~he long-run rnorta factor when he wrote:
Colonel Fertig identified another
They [Eilipinoil are damned fine guerrilla fighters, but they never will be first class combat troops, as we do not have officers to lead them, and absolutely no way of 2 giving them the sound training necessary to make combat troops. W
So Fertig implemented what he called his "pillow defense.)'
ground the Japanese soldier occupied was that beneath his feet he moved he gained new ground, but he lost all that he had.
tactic inmind, Fertig deployed the guerrillas near their own barrios. He believed that near their own homes they would fight better, and they would certainly be easier to feed and clothe.
Because they were in the
barrios where their families lived, the guerrillas rarely accepted combat with the Japanese near the barrios.
When the Japanese patrols
conducted a sweep through a barrio, the guerrillas would withdraw. The Japanese feared the bruising guerrilla attacks when they did come, and at the Davao Penal Colony, where guerrillas would snatch soldiers guarding prisoners working in the fields, the Japanese would actually walk in the middle of a prisoner fomiation for security. Whereas elsewhere in the Pacific Theater the Japanese were feared for their night fighting abilities, in the Philippines the situation was quite the reverse.
The Filipinos owned the night.
The Filipinos would
use soyac traps, pointed bamboo stakes driven into one foot above the ground on both sides of a trail.
As a Japanese patrol would come along
the trail, the guerrillas would fire several shots and shout. The Japanese soldiers w--' dive into t:he high grass onto the spikes. U4
Filipinos would then kill them with bolos.
The guerrillas claimed that the Japanese soldier was easy to 5 detect at night because he smelled badly from poor personal hygiene.
During the daycime the Japanese were easy to track because al'
soldiers wore distinctive "tabby toe" boots, a soft boot with a separate toe for the big toe.
The Filipinos often took the uniforms from dead
Japanese in order to have clothes to wear, and they looked much like
204 Japanese soldiers because of their dark skins and small stature.
the Filipinos of necessity went barefoot and the .Japanese never did, so 6 that is how they could be distinguished from each other.
Japanese tactics were stereotyped, therefore predictable, and thus they were easily ambushed.
They woulr move troops in "boxcars,"
the huge trucks used to move sugar plantation laborers before the war. The "boxcar" could hold 150 troops.
The Japanese always moved at the
same hour of the day, and they rarely had a choice of roads on which to travel.
Their tactics on contact were always the same, and ambushes
7 became almost set-piece, choreographed affairs.
Lieutenant Colonel McGee wrote of the Filipino
as a fighter:
It active and aggressive to a fault. "Most of the Filipino leaders are is difficult to keep than from exceeding authority, encroaching on the domain of others and to make them serve under others.8 The Japanese even admiitted to the fighting spirit of the Filipino: stubborn and widespread. !W1
Even when flight is impossible because of
enveloping ur surprise attacks, the bandits do not surrender but resist to the end."
The Japanese also related the increase in aggressiveness of the guerrilla to the increase in ammunition being brought in by submarines. They experienced disruption in their rear areas, especially in bukidnon from Grinstead's forces. Wwas
The Japanese even believed that a Chinese force
operating in Cotabato with the 119th Regiment, which would have been ebad omen since the Chinese had almost uniformly remained cut of t~ie 10 fighting and had not chosen sides.
The Japanese intelligence on the size of the guerrilla force was never good, and except for the one time when they so badly overestimated
205 Fertig's strength in Misamis, they consistently underestimated the guerrilla numbers.
Lieutenant Colonel Bowler believed that the Japanese
estimated his strength at five percent of what it really was.11
intelligence from early 1943 until 1945 had the 10th Military District with a nucleus of 100 Americans and a few Filipino headquarters staff membprs; 3,000 Filipino and American guerrillas; and, 2,000 "rebellious Moro bandits."
They never had the guerrilla strength above 6,000 on
Mindanao, only one-sixth of the actual strength.
They did have the
order of battle and unit designations correct, except they called the 10th Military District "10 Army Group," using their own military notation, and they always had Fertig shown as "Major General" or on occasion as "Brigadier General.''
Casualties for the guerrillas are harder to pin dcwn.
Ross Smith concludes that there are no reliable casualty figures for the Philippine guerrillas accept for those on Norttiern Luzon.13
Japanese give their own figures, plus estimated guerrilla casualties in As a sample, the Japanese reported their
their intelligence reports.
own casualties as 13 officers and 325 enlisted killed in action and 20 officers and 454 enlisted wounded for all of the Philippines during a five month period January through May 1944.
For the month of June 1944
alone, the Japanese claimed that the Kyo Group on Mindanao engaged 2,690 guerrillas in 51 engagements, was one of four groups. June on all of Mindanao.
capturing 79 and killing 75.
The Kyo Group
This report showed 18 Japanese killed in The Mindanao guerrillas claimed 100 Japanese
casualties for every on" uf their own.
Father Haggerty concluded that
over the period of the Japanese occupation he conducted 300 times as many baptisms as he did funerals,
and most of the funerals were conducted for
206 people who had died of malaria.
The distances traversed by the guerrillas in Mindanao grectly affected their tactical schemes, efforts.
ability to communicate, and supply
For example, to go from Iligan to Misamis took six hours by
banca or as long as three days on foot for the 25 mile trek through the jungle.
The overland route from Misamis to the east coast of Mindanao
took three weeks one way.
A courier system was established, much like The runners would travel
the messenger systems of the earlier Greeks.
unescorted except through areas patrolled by the Japanese where they would pick up armed guerrilla escorts.
The "bamboo telegraph" was
faster but the message almost always became distorted in the sending. Guerrillas figured a 30 day period for Japanese Informarits to travel the length of the Agusan River to Davao to report of guerrilla activities near Butuan to the Japanese commander at Army Headquarters.
without cargadores t guerrilla could make only seven miles a day through jungle occupied by hostile pagans or Moros.'
News among the guerrillas could travel in another way and that was by newspaper.
McLish's unit periodically published the Free Man with
news received on shortwave radio broadcasts and in magazines brought by the submarines.
Father Haggerty published the Ateneo War News prior to
Mindanao had fewer such "free press" papers than did 17 islands. some of the guerrilla organizations in the northern the surrender.
The problem faced by Colonel Fertig in providing food for the guerrillas and cargadores has been alluded to In Chapter 7. food for travel,
carabao meat was cut inte thin strips, dipped in tuba
vinegar and brine, and ctied in the sun.
The jerky-like substance,
called tapa, cured in two days and would remain preserved indefinitely.
207 Another coimion practice was to simply tie a live chicken to a waist belt. In one unique case, a guerrilla "quartermaster" walked a carabao to the edge of a cliff, slit its throat, and rolled it over the edge of the cliff into the sea.
It was taken aboard the Athena, the flagship of
the guerrilla navy which was waiting below, cut up and cooked. The Church of Mindanao solved many of the guerrillas'
and intelligence problens in addition to looking to their spiritual welfare.
Priests were the only truly secure means of sending messages
between guerrilla commands,
both on and off the island.
There was no
central clearing house to screen credentials of emissaries. emissary without credentials "was to send him to sure death."
To send an Fertig
used Father Hueley, a Jesuit Superior, to screen his emissaries, and F.,tler Haggerty carried many messages within Mindanao.
would perform their ecclesiastical duties during the day, but at night many would dress like peasants and work with the guerrillas.
Mindanao a priest was freed by the Church to serve his parish as his conscience dictated, and some accompanied guerrillas on their combat missions 20 Civilians in many cases worked as double agents and counterintelligence agents for the guerrillas, duties with great inherent risk. The Moros were especially good ac this slice that was their modus operandi when dealing with others in any case.
Japanese counterintelligence was
not very effective, for evidently their soldiers were not very circumspect in their private conversations with the Filipinos or among one another when Filipinos were near. "Those EFIlipino agert'
A Japanese intelligence report concludes that who mingle among the men of the units quickly
discover our activities and plans." 21
In some instances the propaganda
208 war had a humorous tw~ist.
A Japanese coimmander in Surigao published a
leaflet offering a 1,000 peso reward for "the severed head of Sergeant Paul Marshall, U. S. Amny."
Marshall made up a leaflet of his own
offering a reward for the Japanese officer's head
then nailed it on
the officer's door one night. 2 Production and maintenance of weapons and daily necessities on. Mindanao was always a problem for the guerrillas.
ordered to police up their cartridge casings after an ambush so they could be refilled and reused.
Failure to bring back the casinoJs could
mean reassignment to the guerrilla fern 9
a demotion and loss of face.
Bullets were made from lead poured into handmade sand molds or fashioned from ".30 caliber" curtain rods.
.Oiatol was removed from Japanese anti-
ship mines and mixed with low-grade miner's dynamite to make powder for I~.
the cartridges. firecrackers.
An alternative source was powder from duds and Chinese Fuses were made from tinfoil, potash pernangenate an
Cannons were made from brass pipes and catapults
from bamboo and rubber inner tu~bing.
Homemade grenades were made of
coconuts charged with dynamite, or a dynamite stick with a short fuze would be placed in a tin can and the remaining spacL filled with nails, 9
pieces of chain, nuts and bolts. pitch.
The top of the can was sealed with
Dynamite was found inmany of the old mines on Mindanao.
b~inbs were made from beer bottles filled with gasoline, stoppered with 0
a detonator and connected with a safety fuze there was rarely any gasoline.
a rare device because
The guerrillas naturally preferred the .45 caliber Thompson subw
machine gun and the .30 caliber Browning automatic rifle over their homemade arsenal ancient weapons anc6
But in a pinchi they would make
---- - --- - ---
a paltik, a homemade shotgun.
With a block of wood, Piece of water
pipe, copper wire and a nail a guerrilla could make one of these devices designed to use a shotgun shell.
They were said to be "effective."
SWPA wanted to wean the guerrillas to the lightweight carbine, but in the meantime the Enfields, Springfields and captured Japanese rifles had to be repaired.
An ejector spring for the Enfield could be fashioned in
two days using only a hammer, chisel, from an automobile spring.
rattail file and a steel strap
Items other than weapons were in short supply, too.
soap was produced by rirst burning coconut palms and then n.,,king lime from roasting coral or sea shells. the lye. soap. henna."
When blended together this created
With coconut oil mixed with it the lye made a good lathering
Its one fault was that it
tended to dya the haira "brilliant
Another method of making soap was to boll shreds of coccnut,
then add an extract of hardwood ash to the coconut oil. when stirred and boiled together made soap.
The ash and oil
Ink for printing currency
and making typewriter ribbons could be rmade by mixing soot with glycerin. Perhaps the favorite necromancy was making the native tuba drink.
To make tuba one first bled the sap from a frond on a coconut
tree, then fermented it with pulverized tanbark from a mangrove tree. Alcohol was extracted by using a still made from a Socony can with bamboo tubes runnihng beneath a stream for condensation.
If the guerrilla
lived in Cotabato Province he would extract alcohol from the mash of a gabi root (potato). with a little egg,
The alcohol was used to run gasoline engines.
chocolate and sugar the tuba made a poteat 9.6 percent
proof cocktail, and many of the guerrilla units took great pride in bottling the best tuba in the area and sending the "best labels" to other
210 guerrilla commanders as gifts. one occasion:
As McLish is purported to have mused on
"It's not high-test, end it's not Old Orandad, but it'll
get you there, or get you drunk."23 The best that can be said about the radios used by the guerrillas is that they represented state of the art equipment for the time and the place.
To carry the radio, its engine and its barrel of lubricating oil
took 50 cargadores altogether.
The American equipment was not jungl3-
proof, and it was generally too large for loading into the submarines and for portage through the mountainous rain forests of Mindanao. Colonel Fertig used the American HT-g transmitter rigged with a special parabolic-type antenna to communicate with GHQ in Australia.
HT-9 was American made and not able to withstand the wet tropical heat. It broke down often, and Fertig replaced it with a more rigorous Australian TW-12.
Fertig also used a 3BZ radio transmitter as a mother
radio to talk to his many feeder stations which used the compatible Australian ATR4As.
The ATR4A transceivers carried two-and one-half watts
of power, and, on occasion,
these radios would themselves reach Australia.
Fertig also used the Australian Kingsley receiver and employed a larger Dutch-made set with the observers near Davao. charged by bicycles hitched to a generator.
Radio batteries were reA more elaborate method
used by Pendatun in Cotabato was to remove the differential and axles from a truck, bolt paddles to the wheel flanges, and suspend the device on a platform over a swift mountain stream.
Power was transmitted
through the differential into a drive shaft which was hooked up to a generator. the stream.
The gears could be shifted to adjust to the rate of flow of The OSS had developed the SSTR series
of radios -- SSTR
stood for Strategic Services Transmitter-Receiver -- and this -s one
211 case where the OSS would have been of great assistance to General MacArthur.
The SSTR radios were used in the European Theater and else-
where in the Far East, and they were much more sophisticated than those used by the guer-illas.
The Mindanao guerrillas had their own navy, a small coastal fleet which was a hodge-podge of boats.
The captured Nara Maru was a
60-foot Japanese-made diesel motor launch which the guerrillas ran on clean
starting, clean burning coconut oil.
The Nara Maru was armed with
a .50 caliber gun salvaged from a smashed B-17 from the 19th Bombardment Squadron.
The gun had a recoil spring improvised from rubber tubing.
The Athena was a two-masted sailiig ship skippered by the legendary Zapanta of The River.
She mounted a muzzleloader fashioned from four-
inch pipe which fired balls cast from melted fishing weights. a crew of 150 armed with 20 autonatic rifles. she had a one-cylinder diesel auxiliary.
Not a pure sailing ship,
The Athena accounted for a
Japanese Mitsubishi medium bomber brought down with her 20-millimeter cannon, a submarine-type deck gun. Another unique ship was the So What, Waldo Neveling,
a 50-foot boat skippered by
a German citizen and soldier of fortune whom Fertig
commissioned in the U. S. Army.
The So What was armored with steel
circular sawf, on her gunnels and was used to convoy supplies, to raid Japanese inter-island ccmenmorce and to protect thl mouth of the Agusan River.
Another Nindanao guerrilla naval vessel was The Bastard.
Bastard was a 26-foot whaleboat wh-i'was captained by Australian Jock McLaren. inch guns
She mounted a 20-millimeter cannon in the bow, two twin .30amidships, and a .50 caliber gun slightly aft.
because she mounted an 82-millimeter mortar in her stern.
She was unique A fiesty
212 little ship, The Bastard unhesitatingly sailed into Japanese controlled ports in broad daylight, sprayed the wharf with automatic fire, shot mortars at Japanese boats, turned tail and ran.
Her crew even
challenged the Japanese to duels by sending them written invitations, and she stood-to and engaged enemy strafing aircraft as if she were a heavily arned battleship. Ultimately Fertig established a
=onvoy system to protect the
inter-island delivery of supplies which had been brought by submarine and to escort the bancas which carried inter-island commerce among the Filipinos.
)he vessels went out in groups of 10 with escort launches and
small, fast sailboats, mounting machine guns or 20- or 3027 millimeter cannons. The Mindanao guerrillas 1,d a number of "Farm Projects," at 'least that is what they called them, operating on the island.
scale which must have seemed like that used to build the Panama Canal, and with malaria attacking the workerý just as it did in Panama,
Mindarao guerrillas built "Farm ProJect Number 2," a 7,000 foot runway. The labor crews,
pagan Subi)nons who were chosen for their limited con-
tacts outside of their tribe, and Chr',stians took a year to build the airstrip put into the middle of a giant forest.
They worked at night
by firelight and camouflaged the field uy day.
It took nearly a year
to construct the airstrip.
Colonel Fert..) h~d begun building airstrips
early because he thought they could be made useful to ttie guerrilla movement.
Later he built them when instructed to do so by GHQ to pre-
pare the island for the American invasion. anchor in the air assault on Formosa.
Mindanao was to be the
The guerrillas built the airfields
and covered them over with topsoil and planted crops on them.
213 was needed then was a bulldozer to scrape the dirt from the runway.
craft could land at night with torches burning at each end of the runway. The Japanese were aware of the airfield conistruction, but seemed to make little effort to end the activity.
In one intelligence report the
Japanese concluded that the guerrillas had constructed a large underground hanger at the airfield near Domikan,
"Farm Project Number 2," a
the ingenuity and determination of the Mindanao capability beyond e'.en 28
guerrillas. The coastwitcher stations in the Philippines were very successful in transmitting weather reports three times each day and reporting enemy ship and aircraft movements.
Some of the results were almost spectacular.
Information from coastwatchers led to the victories in the first Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the "MarianasTurkey Shoot."
The information from the coastwatchers was compared with that
received from ULTRA - decoded Japanese electronic communications - to verify ship locations.
Off the coast of Mlindanao,
a troop convoy of 49
merchant ships and light escort vessels moved just off Surigao enroute to Davao.
The coastwatchers acted quickly and watched excitedly ds
Halsey's fleet units pinned the convoy to the shore.
A Grumman pilot
bombing Da/ao City had seen the convoy arid had flashed the warning to the battle fleet.
Thirty-two vessels were sent aground in the bays along
the coast by American aircraft.
The Filipinos appeared in large numbers
with bolos to welcome the Japanese ashore to Mindanao.
They left no
survivors, and the ships were stripped of materials as they lay floundering on the coral reef.
214 Japanese Counterguerrilia Tactics The guerrilla.; were in a dilemma when deciding how often to engage the Japanese.
If they attacked too often, or were too successful,
then the civilians were open to reprisals arid the guerrilla bases became the objective of punitive expeditions.
Through mid-1943 the Japanese
apparently believed that a show of force would be enough to reduce the Japanese conmmanders were given ;nstructions that the "Guerrillas must be suppressed to the utmost to maiintain a state of order beFore the enemy invaes. 30Thebuid-u onMinana ofJapanese forces for the Amnerican S
invasion was to have little initial effect upon the guerrilla activities or support because for many months after the surrender the Japanese had been content for the most Part to control only the larger towns and to leave the jungle to the guerrillas.
With the exception of the concerted
effort to eliminate Fertig and his guerrilla headquarters, the Japanese had not expended large nLmnbers of men in pursuit of the guerrillas.
in late 1943 and early 1944 they launched some brutal operations throughout Mindanac in conjunction with their cdeclaration to kill every living American still free in the itlands. *
Fertig had gotten wind of these
attacks from intelligence sources in Manila who said that General Jiro Harada, commander of the 100th Division, had been ordered to end the guerrilla resistance once and for all.
The same sources said that an
entire division of soldiers specially trained in anti-guerrilla tactics was being sent to Mindanao, but this was not the actual case. uapanese attack did hit the island very hard.
Hedges and Bowler barely
escaped the net throw~n over the island, and Fertig was driven deeper into the Agusan River Valley.31 The Japanese were now preparing for the
215 invasion by American forces, for by crly 1944 it was clear what direction the war in the Pacific ws taking.
The Japanese high comiand
esti.aated that throughout the Philippines a minimum of 24 battalions would be needed in the rear areas to guard against guerrillas with seven divisions needed to meet the invasion effort, a ratio of three front-line troops to every one soldier tied down in rear area security. The Japanese command was ultimately to conclude that "It is impossible to fight the 4nemy and at the same time suppress the activities o, the guerri 1las. 32 The Japanese knew that MacArthur's instructions to the guerrillas was to organize, build strength and gather intelligence.
understood the tactics being used by the guerrillas when they did engage the Japanese:
"The enemy draws us out by using small units and than
carries out an enveloping attack with his main force," or when outnumbered he lies in wait in the jungle "for our return and attacksfiercely.'"
But understanding the guerrilla tactics was not the same as defeating W
the guerrillas themselves.
The Japanese were insulted and outraged at
having to fight an enemy wno would not give them a stand-up fight.
ing with a foe who struck silently and quickly and then melted away ran counter to their training and to their military code.
This was ironic,
of course, because these were soldiers who slaughtered innocent women and children.
The Japanese tactical method was to quickly arrive in
force in an area with mortars, machine guns and plenty of ammunition and t'Rn deploy in the expectation that the guerrillas would accept the>' challenge to arms.
"Their optimism was boundless,
to the contrary, and they would plug away for four cr five hours."
guerrillas would tease tne Japanese with just enough fire to delay his
216 advance, thereby permitting the civilians to escape into the jungle. In the meantime the guerrillas would withdraw to favorable ground in the hopes of luring the Japanese onto untenable ground.
The Japanese were
reduced to dumping leaflets from the air over guerrilla strongholds "calling the guerrillas yellow, urging then to come out and fight like 34 mnenlike the Japanese soldier, who is not afraid to die for his Emperor."
The Japanese employed much the same concept in tactics against the Filipino guv!rrillas as they did against the guerrillas in China. The Japanese had two types of operations:
"alertness," which was con-
ducting rear area security, and "mopping-up,' which was an expansion of 9
the geographical area to be occupied by using punitive expeditions and the standard tactical concepts of encirclement. 35These tactics, regardless of how skillfully executed, were doomed to failure, however. The local Japanese commnanders who were charged with conducting counterguerrilla operations did not recognize the political nature of guerrilla warfare, principally because they never understood the nature of the people they
The counterguerrilla operations were, for the most part,
conducted by occupation forces.
Inmany instances the soldiers' first
to solve the gu~errilla problem by military means alone. The impulse w'.is few successes that the Japanese had were related miore to the personality and character of an individual
This was the case in
eastern Surigao Province' where the Japanemse coimmander had treated the people well and pacified the area, to Colonei Fertig's consternation. There isno real evidence that the Japanese ever organized a counterguerrilla force or formulated a counterguerrilla strategy that was centrally directed. *
The better trained Japanesp soldiers had beer.
indoctrinated in the tactic of infiltration as a battle technique, and
217 they had used it elsewhere when confronting large conventional forces. But they never adapted the technique to the counterguerrilla efforts 36 and therefore failed to realize the full potential from their troops. When their c~ounterguerrilla tactical operations failed the Japanese resorted to the one tactic with which they seemed comfortable,
anid one which required the least manpower and creativity from the commander.
This tactic, of course, was terror. To dissuade others from
joining the guerrillas, the Japanese would hang the head of a local guerrilla at the entrance to the family's barrio with a sign on it reading, for example, "Bad man of the woods~." 9
Torture, internment and1
mass executions were coemmonly used tools, and entire areas were declared "bandit zones," the crops destroyed, and the civilians ordered to leave. The Japanese understanding of the impact that their terror tactics
would have on people was good only to a point; for example, guerrilla leaders were paranoid of strangerss because the Japanese hired Filipino
to kill resistance leaders. This tactic had its intended
effect because the Filipinos were unable to trust any but their closest friends, which iswhy the priests became so important for conmmunicating personal messages between guerrill3 commnanders.
But the Jlapanese failed
to come to grips with the rezl effect of their policies which was that the policies actually drove more people to the guerrillas, just the 37 reverse of their intended effect. U
some cases the local Japanese commiander simply made his dedl
with the guerrillas.
When the Japanese commuander inMisamis Oriental
Province was unable to pacify the area, he negotiated an agreement with Governor Palaez.
Palaez agreed to keep McLish's guerrilla force from
attacking the Japanese garrisons if the Japanese would agree to stay out
218 of the area.
The Japanese commander demanded and received one concession,
and that was the right to send patrols periodically through Medina. a town on Gingoog Bay.
Palaez agreed, and every two months the people of Medina
the town. would leave the streets as the Japanese patrol passed through
There were cases in the Philippines where high-ranking Japanese commanders dealt in the black market, and in some rare cases where they sold captured American weapons to the guerrillas.
There is not evidence
of the latter occurring on Mindanao. The Japanese tactics and policies failed to either pacify Mindanao or defeat the guerrillas. *
The Japanese blamed this failure on having too
few troops to root out the guerrillas and on the terrain of the island which gave the guerrillas sanctuary.
In addition they lamented the
rampancy" of the Moro tribes and the guerrillas "radio
activities" which brought the submarines to Mindanao.40 The Japanese were never able to exploit the wealth of the island
the lumber, chrome, iron, manganese and coal -- and the Filipinos would not build airfields or bridges nor" raise crops for the Japanese willingly. Two Japanese divisions plus their support troops were tied down on Miridanao, and these suffered continued attrition from guerrilla inflicted casualties and from diseasz.
While it was beyond the capabilities of
the guerrillas to bring the Japanese to any kind of decisive engagement, their tactics were, indeed, effective. *
The effectiveness of the guerrillas
can be measured by the continued resistance of the civilians to the Japarnse and the necessity for the Japanese to station over two divisions of soldiqrs on Mindanao to combat the guerrillas.
The Japanese soldiers
continued throughout the occupation to suffer casualties, and the success of the guerrillas gave heart to the civilians so that they would continue
219 to resist. American ForLes Invade the Philippines Assistance had been provided to the guerrillas in good measure becaLse the American leadership thought that they would be valuable to the prosecution of the war effort itself.
The Joint Chiefsof Staff
had concluded that Mindanao would be the anchor for the assault on "the vital Luzon-Formosa-China Coast Area."
Mindanao could be reduced
and secured in twu months because "Several thousand guerrillas under U.S. Army command are operating on and control many parts of the island," and "Prior to the operation the strength of the guerrillas can be augmented by men and materials."141 The Montclair Operation plans for the reoccupation of the Western Visayas-Mindanao-Borneo-Netherlands East Indies were formulated to carry out a landing on Mindanao on November 15, 1944 with a subsequent strike at Leyte Gulf on December 2U, 1944.
Mindanao was to be designated
GOA #1 (6uerrilla Operational Area Number One) of 14 GOA's.
Halsey discovered a weakness in the air defense of the Philippine Islands over Mindanao wille supporting landing operations in Morotai with his carrier task forces.
His pilots tested the air defenses over the Visayas
and found them to be weak as well.
He recommended an immediate change
in the initial landing site, and MacArthur agreed.
The Montclair plans
were scrapped, and the Victor plans quickly drawn up.
Leyte would now
become the site of the first assault on October 20, 1944.
guerrillas on Mindanao did not know it at the time, Mindanao,
largest island in the archipelago, would be the 21st island to be invaded.
220 After the landing on Luzon, MacArthur never really had authority to continue the liberation of the southern islands in the archipelago. Had Eighth Amny troops and shipping been needed elsewhere at the time, it is doubtful if these additional landings would have been conducted. At Yalta in February 1945 the American Joint Chiefs had told their British counterparts that they had no intention of sending major American forces to conquer the southern islands.
.asue that the Filipino guerrillas and the rewly activated Amiy of 43 the Philippine Conmmonwealth could take care of the rest of the country."
This concept for the use of Filipino forces was explicit in the staff study for Operation Musketeer which had as one of its stated assumptions that support would be provided by the guerrillas to reoccupy the islands and to assist SWPA forces inthe re-establishment and defense of the constituted government of the Philippines. 44For whatever reasons MacArthur may have undertaken the liberation of Mindanao, the Mindanao guerrillas were very relieved thot he had done so.~ They had experienced great disaprointznent when the first blow had not fallen on Mindanao, they had had no clue that itwould not, and they certainly did not relish the prospect of engaging single-handedly the by-passed Japanese troops. Lieutenant.General Tcmioyuki Yamashita, overall commnander of the Philippine defenses, had written off the 100,000 man 35th Amny in the Visayas under Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki.
Suzuki was to tie town
as many Allied divisions as possible in the Visayas and Mindanao. Suzuki planned to make his stand in east-central Mindanao where he "hoped to set up a little self-sustaining empire that could hold out indefinitely." 46 Fertig's guerrilla force cf 36,000 would have had a tough time dislodging such a force which could still be formidable.
221 Suzuki was not able to establish his small empire for he was killed April 16, 1945 while attempting to reach Mlndanao. Lieutenant General Gyosaku Morozumi commanded the 30th Division and had overall command of all Japanese forces east of Lake Ldnao. Lieutenant General Harada still commanded the 100th Division and forces in the rest of the island.
These were not first-rate troops.
Division, the better of the two, had come from Korea but had lost four of its nine battalions to Leyte where they had been annihilated.
eight battalions of the 100th Division had been living the easy life. Not more than 10 of its officers were regulars,
and the quality of the
junior officers and noncommissioned officers was "lamentable.'
of the division were Korean conscripts, soldiers not normally enthusiastic for their fate decreed by Emperor Hirohito. trained and the units widely scattered.
The troops were poorly
They were understrength, poorly
equipped and their communications were inadequate.
The leaders had a
defeatist attitude, and the troops were complacent because they had been by-passed by MacArthur's forces.
they felt that they could
cope almost indefinitely with the guerrillas, a less worthy foe in their estimation than the American forces.
But guerrillaattacks and air strikes
had destroyed most of their transportation capability, and they had just enough military supplies to defend initially against a conventional invasion force, although not enough to sustain the fight. fight only the guerrillas they would fare better. preventives left, 3nd medical supplies were short.
If left to
They had no malaria When they left the
settled areas for the interior, food would .iolonger be plentiful. Ultimately, if the "littlt! empire" did not work, they would be left to their deaths by one of three means:
disease, starvation or combat.
222 Spring 1944 the total Japanese force on Mindanao totalled 55,850, only 1~
15,000 of which could be considered anyt~iing approaching combat effective. Against this force the United States threw in42,000 combat troops, 11,000 service troops and approximately 36~,000 Filipino guerrilla troops.
American forces In Central Mindana
Bugo-Del Monte Area Co~mmand 24th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 162nd Regimental Combat Team, 41st Nfantry Division Battalion, 163rd Infantry 30rt 18hRegimental Combat Team, 40th Infantry Division 3rd Battalion Combat Team, 164th Regimental Combat Team, Americal Division X Corps Troops The place of the 10th Military District in the organization for the invasion isshown In Figure 5.49 On April 17, 1945 the 24th and 31st Infantry Divisions landed at Cotabato, drove east to Davao City anI north to Join the 108th Regimental Combat Team which landed at Macajalar Bay on May 10th.
Figure 6 depicts
the invasion strategy, one which nearly duplicated the Japanese attack on the American-held island in 1942. On June 30, 1945 MacArthur announced that the organized enemy resistance on Mindanao had ceased with the capture of Davao City, and the victory operation was officially declared U
closed with mopping-up and security missions continuing. to the American soldiers and Filipino guerrillas.
This was news
was to coimment that "There were many hard weeks ahead for the GI's who 50 no newspaper to tell them that everything was well in hand." Soldiers of the 24th Division regarded the post-Davao operations as "the hardest, bitterest, most exhausting battle of their ten island campaigns of the war." 51 By August 15th, American Army casualties had reached 820 killed and 2,880 wounded.
Of the 55,850 Japan~ese in Central Mindanao,
X CORPS INVASION OF MINDANAO APRIL 17
SCALE-MI LES 2
AXIS OF ADVANCE
225 47,615 were accounted for by August 15th as dead, wounded or surrendered. That left 8,2ý5 Japanese -- Lsing Japanese sources -- for which there was no accounting.
These soldiers probably slipped into the Jungil and
died of starvation, disease, or fell prey to the guerrillas, Moros or pagans.
Figures are nowhere recorded for estimated guerrilla casualties.
The Intelligence Mission of the Guerrillas The most important missiur that GHQ,
SWPA had given to the
Philippine guerrillas was that of gathering intelligence information. In a report made to the U. S. Congress after the war the information gathering effort by the Filipinos received this assessment:
the most dramatic examples of practical intelligence in the war,
Southwest Pacific Area, is represented in the development of the Philippines underground.'"53
Carlos Romulo, had this to say:
Japanese plans, copies of their most secret advices, military dispatches, accounts of troop movements, number and location of enemy planes, all had been reported by native patriots directly to The entire Japanese plan in the Philippines lay open here for GHQ. General MacArthur to see and set his plans by... Everything was carefully worked out between a powerful Force working on the outside and a weaker but no less valiant force working from within.54 The relationship between GHQ, SWPA and the Philippine resistance movement was a classic demonstration of how Otto Hdilbrunn descrihes the cooperation between a regular force and its client guerrilla force. lationship has two primary facets:
The ideal re-
the partisans collect and pass en
information to the sponsoring army, and the army "seconds its own intelligence officers to the partisans."'
The Mindanao guerrillas were involved with relaying information from other islands through the 10th Military District communications equipment and in sending intelligence information on their own circumstances in Mindanao.
There were the usual sources of information available to
226 the guerrillas, such as civil servants and service industry people, and there were also some other, less usual, treated as neutrals,
Priests were generally
so they were able to move freely in Japanese
occupied areas and thus they could carry intelligence as well as personal messages to the guerrilla leaders.
In Davao Illocano natives were hired
by the Japanese to work as laborers in ammunition dumps, and in the Japanese headquarters in Davao.
Many of these young men had
college educatiors and hed bilingual capabilities.
Perhaps the most
unique source of information for Colonel Fertig was the mistresses of the ranking Japanese officers.
Before General Homma left the Philippines
his mistress was a good source of information.
And one of Fertig's
couriers had a cousin who was the Filipino lover of General Morimoto's mistress.57 Kobayashi,
The Jcpanese sou. es were not so productive, for Colonel the 14th Area Army operations officer, claimed tvat "While
the Americans steadily received intelligence from their guerrillas, our group never gave us any information that we could use."' 5 8 that their information was useful, lengths.
the guerrillas often went to great
For example, when reporting the location, number and type of
antiaircraft guns, the guerrillas would sometimes make pencil-and-paper rubbings of the guns'
serial numbers on the identification plates to
prove the accuracy of their information.
The consensu, was tnat the Mindanao guerrillas were proficient in the gathering of information for use by the invading forces for planning the Victor V operation.
The Commanding General,
had directed his 3ubordinate commanders to utilize the guerrillas for the gathering of infnrmation:
"The Force Commander will utilize guerrilla
forces for information gathering agencies and establish direct signal
227 communication between the local guerrilla intelligence net and his own
The reports contributed to quicker decisions, a
reduced requirement for patrolling, and they enabled the coimmander to
conduct pursuit operations more aggressively. 62Ussers of the information received from guerrillas on Mindanao agreed that the sketches of enemy positions and concentrations and hand-drawn maps showing details not shown on photographs were invaluable.
Maps were especially important be-
cause even though there had been extensive surveying by Army engineers of the area before the war, the printing of the maps had not been completed before the Japanese attacked.
The fight on Mindanao and in
the Visayas was done on oil company maps and sketch maps. 63 The estimates
of enemy strength was another matter, and all sources generally agree that the estimates of Japanese troop strength was invariably high.
sources say that estimates were 'exaggerated," but that implies a will64 ful manipulation, which may or may not~ have been the case.
Major General Willoughby diplomatically fin~ds in this propensity to overestimate the enemy strength a "richness and variety' in gu~errilla reporting.
MacArthur's historians wrote that "within its limits of
accuracy" the information from Mindanao was very useful in planning *
The 31st Infantry Division called their intelligence
reports "models of accuracy," but tempered this praise by stating that their real value was realized when the reports were carefully collated U
with other sources.
Willoughby agrees that the use of aerial photos
combined with the guerrilla reports gave a very reliable picture of the actual situation. 65 The information was sufficiently accurate that the *
Eighth Army found it gained little by sending in their own intelligence agents ahead of the landing on Zamboanga.
Little new information was
228 learned from that which had already been provided by the guerrillas and aerial reconnaissance, and the agents if detected could compromise the Eichelberger prohibited any teams from
secrecy of the landing.
entering Central Mindanao before the landings there.
The American estimates of the Japanese strength on Central Mindanao are instructive.
Historians accept the figure of approximately
55,000 Japanese personnel on the island: 12,850 Japanese noncombatant civilians.
over 43,000 troops and nearly Eighth Army estimated the
strength at 34,000, X Corps put the estimate at 40,000 and Colonel Fertig estimated that there were 42,600.67 Robert Ross Smith.
This latter figure comes from
A 10th Military District intelligence summary of
February 1945 puts the estimate of Japanese strength at 69,140, however.
The Japanese were convinced that the guerrilla intelligence was 69 accurat2 for they were on the receiving end when the bombs struck home. Colonel Ind relates the story that the Japanese released an official communioue which declared that the Americans had "perfected a new aerial bomb which was attracted by concentrations of ammunition and fuel.''
The guerrilla intelligence effort was not without its detractors, howev.r.
General Eichelberger, who commanded the Eighth Army, had nothing
qoo, to say in his unofficial comments about the guerrillas or about their information gathering capabilities.
In briefing the Commanding
General of the 40th Infantry Division on the Victor I operation for ':he landings on Panay and Western Negros, he directed that "no credence is to be given guerrilla reports and tactical decisions are not to be affected by them." 71
He was no more enthusiastic about guerrilla
intelligence for the Palawan landings: be guerrilla reports."'72
"...My bete noire is going to
These observations by Eichelberger came from
229 his diaries and letters *o his wife, so they may be more representative of Eichelberger's opinions than the conclusions reflected in his official Eighth Amy reports.73
Eichelberger did write of Mindanao that "We did
have considerable information about dispositions of enemy troops. since guerrilla forces on Mindanao were the most efficient and best organized in the Philippines.'74 passage.
Ie said nothing of enemy strength in that
He did make some criticism of the strength estimates reported
by the gue-rillas, however:
"Part of my personal aggressive policy in
Mindanao...was based on erroneous intelligence of the Japanese strength."
Eichelberger had pushed the 24th Division hard, had them strung out over 50 miles, and Eichelberger himself was at the head of the column.
problem here was evidently not overestimation of the Japanese strength but rather underestimation of their strength.
General Eichelberger was
also to claim that the guerrillas overestimated the Japanese strength
as they followed the Japanese rctreat up the Agusan River Valley. The Mindanao guerrilla intelligence reports were not always accurate
the 162nd Infantry found when it followed a guerrilla sketch
map and attacked in the wr~ng directf,,n from the enemy's Certainly, it
is difficult to estimate enemy strength in a Jungle, and
Fertig believed that the increased movement of 03panese units because of air attacks made the reporting even less reliable.
The 24th Infantry
Division observed that "Information of the eneray and of the Mindanao roads end trails prior to the operations was sketchy.
greatly exaggerated the enemy strengths and dispositions. were much more reliablp ,,79 Division had this to say
Oddly, on this last point the 31st Infantry "Guerrilla reports were usually more accurate
than civilian reports reflecting, naturally, at least a bit of military
with any military operation So it seems that, just as
anywhere in the world,
there was both good and bad intelligence informa-
tion supplied to the invasion forces.
But Colonel Fert~g had a solution,
albeit macabre, to the problem of accuracy and credibility.
elaborates: Once, when Headquarters disbelieved Fertig's estimate of Japanese casualties, rrtig sent them two demijohns fillel with matched pairs of ears that the Moros had collected. Headquarters never publigly dojbted Fertig's estimates of enemy casualties thereafter.°. Tactical Employment of the Guerrillas with the Invading Forces The success of the guerrillas in fighting along-side the regular forces was much the s-ame that they had in providing intelligence informaThere had to be cooperation between the tion: there were mixed reviews. invasion forces and the guerrillas so that the operational plans of the .vading forces were not adversely affected by guerrilla activities. Coord-ination was needed to ensure that bridges,
roads or facilitics
requirO ly th• attacking forces were not destroyed.
The commander had
to ensure that guerrillas did not affect enemy movements planned for by the conventional force, such as attracting undesired reinforcements or 82 preventing the movement of reserves in response to a feint.
br.ad concept the guerrillas would launch an offensive prior to the Anerican assault to clear or isolate objectives.
Then they would fight
along with the conventional units to secure further objectives, and, finally, the guerrillas would conduct the mopping-up operations.
order to satisfy the command and control ove- the guerrillas necessary to carry out these tasks, the commander X Corps was given operational control over guerrilla units attached to his combat units.
231 10th Military District retained administrative control.
had a Guerrilla Subsection in the general staff G-2 and the expectation was that the guerrillas would be used to the maximum in sabotage and 84 harassing operations and intelligence gat!hering.
Eighth Army gave many missions to the guerrillas which they were expected to fulfill on Mindanao.
These missions were very diverse, and
for the most part the guerrillas carried out the missions as expected. They would initially assist advance parties by providing security and information to signal and intelligence teams and hydrographic survey lI
They would provide combat intelligence, guides, interpreters,
and reinforce conmmunications and reconnaissance agencies.
assist pilots downed behind Japanese lines and conduct harassing ambushes and sabotage in enemy rear areas. Guerrillas could destroy aircraft and coastal guns prior to the invasion as well as attack areas deep in the
enemy's rear after the invasion.
They could provide labor for local
working parties, cargadores for supply movements, guards for prisoners of war and provide sec~urity guards for roads, supply dumps and key bridges.
The guerrillas could provide supplemental supply in certain
rare instatices, assist with the evacuation of the wounded, and provide a military police function to restore order ir.liberated areas.
guerrillas could assist civil affairs units in identifying and interrogating * U
collaborators and in working with the local civil governments.
although their capabilities were limited to do so, the guerrillas could fight alongside the conventional force as a conventional unit integrated
into the tactical planning and organization.
They would more usefully
be employed inmopping-up operations in this regard. By April 1945 the guerrillas had "added greatly to the woes of Morozumi and Harada' with demolition of supplies, roadblocks, bridge
232 destruction and attacks upon smal
intelligence reports had pinpointed targets for bombing, thereby eliminating the need for an advanced aerial reconnaissance.
was achieved, and aircraft were destroyed while on the ground by both air attack and sabotage.
During January and February 1945 the guerrillas had seized the Dipolog airstrip in Northern Zamboanga and had held it while surrounded by Japanese.
Marine pilots flew out of Dipolog to carry out bombing
in Zamboanga City 150 miles away.
On March 8, 1945 two reinforced
companies of the 21st Infantry, 24th Division flew into Dipolog to reinforce the defense of the airfield initially and then to provide blocking forces in the north for the invasion force that landed at Zamboanga City on March 10th.
The guerrilla forces under Captain
Donald J. Lecouvre, 121st Infantry, 105th Division provided blocking forces in the Bolong area and at Moroc for the attacking elements of the 41st Infantry Division.
The original plan for a larding on Mindanao called for an assault in Cotabato at Malabang.
After a hotly contested fight over the
Japanese-held Malabang airstrip, elements of Marine Air Group 24 (MAG-24) and the guerrillas'
108th Divisioii were able to seize the airfield.
April 5th, the Marines were operating out of Malabang. guerrillas had cleared the entire area of Japanese,
and two days later,
only four days before the planned Eighth Army landing at Malabang, Colonel Fertig radioed Eighth Army that the landing could be made unopposed in either Malabang or Parang, 17 miles away.
The landing site
was changed to Parang at the last moment, and the Malabang airfield, now renamed Titcomb Field, was used by MAG-24 to support the drive
233 eastward across Mindanao.
The guerrillas supported the advancing forces as they pushed the Japanese farther back into the interior.
Guerrilla units were attached
to regular units and shifted from one to the other too often to summarize here.
There were some unconventional units formed, even
in comparison to the already unusual organization of regular and guerrilla units.
Lieutenant Colonel Bowler led an attack on Japanese
positions at Sarangani Bay with an oddly configured provisional battalion.
The battalion wes made up of antiaircraft troops from
Battery B of the 496th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion, acting as infantry, S,
and a guerrilla combat company from the 118th Infantry, 106th Division. The battalion used engineer LCM's dnd was supported by Marine close air support.
Also participating in this attack were elements of the
guerrilla 11th Infantry and the 108th Division.
battalion received very high marks for its fighting qualities.
Generally speaking, however, the use of the guerrillas in the conventional combat formations did not work well.
The U. S. troops in some cases
were actually unaware that Filipino soldiers were also fighting the Japanese in their area, and this made integrated tactical formations especially difficult and hazardous.
The Commanding General,
concluded that the guerrillas performed their many other missions well but "it
is a mistake to use them in the attack as they are criticaily
short of equipment and have little understanding of the tactical principles involved in offensive combat."'93 With Japanese forces broken and retreating into the Waloe area, which had been the last location of Fertig's headquarters before the American invasion, X Corps assigned the primary operational mission to
234 the 10th Military District to "establish and maintain contact with hostile forces." 94 With~ Frank McGee coimmanding, the 107th Division took over from the 24th Division in late July and continued to hunt down Japanese stragglers until the surrender on August 15th.
felled by a sniper's bullet on August 7th, signalling symbolically the end of the American-led guerrilla movement on Mindanao.
CHAPTER 8 ENDNOTES 1
For example, see Jack Hawkins,
Letter LtCol W. W. Fertig to General Hugh J. Casey of July 1,
Never Say Die, 1961,
John Keats, The Fouht 2 Alone, 1963, p. 225. General Alberto tactic as the "minuet technique" Bayo, Castro's mentor, escred tis advance when the enemy withdraws, withdraw when the enemy advances. 4
James Dean Sanderson, Behind Enem Ingham, Rendezvous By §ubmarine: -The to
Lines, 1959, p. 158; Travis r fiharles Parsons and the
Guerrilla - Soldiers in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 108-109; Margaret Utlnsy-, "Miss U," 1948, p. 137; Joseph F. St. John, Leyte Calling,..., 1945, pp. T--75. 5
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 343.
Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau:
Our Secret Weapon in
the War Against Japan, 1958, p. 178. 7
See for example Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 94-97.
From Correspondence Files, 10th Military District, Ltr LtCol Of course McGee, CO lO6t1 Div to Maj Herbert Page of December 26, 1943. this statement alluded to politics which were often related to the fighting abilities of the leaders. 9 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, ATIS, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Eny Publications, No. 359, April 28, 1945, chelberger took the opposite Part I, p. 7 (hereinafter ATIS, ); General view of the fighting qualities of the Filipinos. Of the guerrillas on Negros he concludes that they "are outstanding for their willinqness to eat rather than to fight." Of those on Cebu he observed that "-very time the Japanese advance on those little brown beggers they are incitned to take off with speed and discretion." Eichelberger does not comment on the fighting qualities of the Mindanao guerrillas but does say that the 10th Military District organizaticn was the best that he had observed. See Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Elchelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945, 1972, pp. 245, 270, 274, 295. 10 1
7, 71; ATIS II, p. 42.
Steve Mellnik, Philippine Ciary 1939-1945. 1969, pp. 235
ATIS, I, pp. C, 5; ATIS II, p. 49; See also Utinsky, "Miss U,"
13Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 1963, p. 692. It would be possible to research the Philippine Archives' 10th Military District holdings, however, and a reasonably accurate accounting might be painstakingly derived from the personnel reports and casualty lists of all the units which are contained there. 14 ATIS, I, p. C; ATIS II,pp. 13-14; Figures for Mindanao alone can he reconstructed using the 10 d&y reports of each punitive expedition. As a side note, the Japanese removed their dead fr-m the battlefield "tied on poles like wild pig carcasses" and would sometimes blrn their dead and even badly wounded on a funeral pyre at an ambush site. See Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 128; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 146. 15Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, 1946, p. 66. 16Mellnik, Philipie RiDiary, pp. 250, 261; William Wise, Secret Mission to the Phi lppines Te tory of "Spyron" and the AmericanFilipino Guerrillas of World War I1, 1968, p. 87; Ltr Fertig to Casey: Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 60. 17See Hawkins,
Never Say Die, p. 167; Haggerty,
p. 11. 18
Die, p. 139; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp.
Forbes J. Monaghan, Under the Red Sun: A Letter From Manila, 152. 20 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 133; Utinsky, "Miss U" is very good on how the priests were integrated into the resistance movement. 21Adalia Marquez, Blood on the Rising Sun, 1957, entire; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 309. 1946, p.
Never Say Die, p. 157.
For samples see: Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 133, 136, 145; Hawkins, Never Sa Die, pp. 179-180; Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 83; Wie, Secret Mission, p. 99; ATIS, I, p. 22. 24
Alone, pp. 25
Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 152, 342.
Quote from Ingham, RendezvousB Submarine, p. 64, see also page 88; Ira Wolfert, American ur a n the Philippines, 1945, p. 109.
For information on radios see: Ind, AIB, pp. 167, 207-209, 214; Edward Dissette and H. C. Adamson, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 75-76; Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 88, 157; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 212; Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the O.S.S. (OffTce of Strategic Services), 1976, pp. 137-1 40. 27 1ngham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 171-176; Ind, AIB, p. 168; Wise, SpecialMission, pp. 90-91, 93; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 310311, 3• Ha3; chardson, One-Man War: The Jock McLaren Stor'y, 1957, p. 1Z6. 28
For information on guerrilla airfields see: U.S. Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum, USN, (Retired), 1973, Tape 13, p. 596; Ltr, Fertig Lo Casey; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 193-197; Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 1942, p. 307; ATIS, I, pp. 3, 20, 24, 47, 71, 78; ATIS, II, pp, 55, 62. 29
See Monaghan, Under the Red Sun, p. 245; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Operations of the Allied Intelli ence Bureau, 1948, p. 57; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 112; CourtneyWhitney, MacArchur: His Rendezvous With History, p. 135; Ind, AIB, p. 210; Keats, T ht Alone, pp. 404-405; First Demobilization Bureau, "Philippine Operations, "Phse Two (Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki), October 1949," pp. 7-8; Ronald Lewln, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat )f Japan, 1982, general. 30
General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase II (December 1942 - June 1944), Japanese Monograph No. 3, 1946, p. 53. 31
Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces During World War II," June 1973, p. 56; Headquarters, Philippines Command, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date, p. 39; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 343-344. GHQ,FEC, Japanese Monograph No. 3, pp. 41-42; Gene Z. Hanrahan, Japanese Operations Against Guerril a Forces, 1954, p. 20. 33
Both quotes are from Ingham,
II, p. 1; ATIS,
Gene Z. Hanrahan, Book, 1952, p. 132.
I, p. 7. Rendezvous By Submarine,
Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics:
pp. 89, 107. A Source
36 For general discussion on Japanese counterguerrilla tactics see See also Department of the Army, Deputy apJnese Operations. Hanrahai, froStaff Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook Chie f for the S,,ppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations," 1960, p. 39 for U.S. Army concepts (hereinafter DA, DCSOPS, "Handbook"). 37
For discussion see Bert Bank, Back From the Living Dead: The Infamous Death March and 33 Months in a Japanese PriL)n, 1945, p. 41; DA, XSPS, "Handbook"-for discussion of the tactic.
Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 254-255.
9 Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, 40
GHQ, FEC, Japanese Monograph No.
p. 172. 3, p.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Future Operations in the Pacific: Report by the Joint Staff Planners, March 10, 1944, pp. 10, 21; See also General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Basic Plan for Montclair Or~erations," February 25, 1945, pp. 3-4 for the concept. 42
Rendezvous, p. 152. 43D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, 1975, p. 104. 44General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Staff Study Operation 'George' Musketeer Operations," October 11, 1944. pp. 1, 9. 4SA number of reasons are given for the decision to use American forces to liberate the southern islands. A good jiscussion is in James, Years of MacArthur II, pp. 739-740. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, The fiberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1§9, 1959, pp. Mi-,240. 46 47
Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 587. For discussion of the Japanese units on Mindanao see especially:
Ibid., pp. 587-589, 621-623; Smith puts combat and combat service troops at 28,600 which includes 7,350 civilians recently inducted into the Army; Army Air Force totalled 8,000, Navy totalled 6,450. See also Stanley Falk, Liberation of the Philippines, 1971, p. 134; Headquarters, 31st Infantry' Division, Historical Report Thirty-First Division in the Mindanao Campaign 22 April - 30 June 1945, no date, p. 6; James, Years of MacArthur II, p. 549; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II, Part II, 1966, p. 549; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 386, Fertig had put the force as high as 74,000 one year earlier; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Staff Study Operation Victor-Five," March 8, 1945, p. 2; Saburo Hayashi, Kogin: The Japanese Amy in the Pacific War, 1959, p. 127; General Headquarters, Far East Co"mand, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase III, Defense of Leyte by the 35th Amy, 1944-1945," Japanese Monograph No. 6, 1946, p. 10. 48
Sinith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 648.
4931st Division, Historical Report, p. 12. See also Department of the Army, Order of Battle of the United States Amy Ground Forces in Wcrld War II: Pacific Theater of 0perations, 1959. The actual relationship of the 10th MDis never rall secifled clearly, or at least it does not appear often in the 8th Amy or X Corps reports. On this organizational diagram, the 108th RCT has been added. it was not with the initial invasion force but has been added to the diagram for consistency.
Years of MacArthur, II, p. 747.
52Smith, Triumph in the Philipines, pp. 647-648, 692, 694; See also Morisin, The Liberation of the Phlippines, ' pp. 251. The figures differ somewhat between Smith, Morison, and the 8th Army report of the action. None of the three give estimated guerrilla casualties. 53
Quoted in Charles Andrew Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945, 1972. 54
Carbos P. Romulo, I See The Philippines Rise, 1946,
Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare,
1962, p. 113.
1nd, AIB, p. 213.
57Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 135, 203. 58
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: The Cameaigns of MacArth1ur in the Wcifc, Volume 1, 1966, p. 302 f.n.1, (hereinafter SCAP, Rep rts 1).Taken from the Interrogation Gga-, ff. Files, G-2, Historical Section, 59
Keats, The Fought Alone, p. 402. 60Headquarters, X Corps, Histor of X Corps on Mindanao 17 April 1945 - 30 June 1945, 30 June 1945, p. 61; Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, 1950, P. 217. 61
Headquarters Eighth Amy, Field Order No. 26, March 20,
Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, p. 54.
Headquarters, Eighth Amy, Report of the Commanding General Eighth Amy on the Mindanao Operation, no date, p. 104; 31st DivisIon, Historical Rort, pp. 71-73; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, "The Philippines Guerrilla Resistance Movement," no date, pp. 226-227 (hereinafter OCMH, "Guerrilla Resistance Movement"); Conmander Amphibious Group Si::, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "Report of Amphibious Attack on Zamboanga, Mindanao," March 26, 1945, pp. 52-53. 65
Charles A. Willoughbyand 1954, p. 215; SCAP, Reports, 1, p. p. 66; Headquarters,-iTgThl Army, Am n the Palawan and Zamboanga 66 67
HQ, 8th Amy, Report:
John Chamberlain, MacArthur 1941-1951, 309; 31st Division, Historical Report, Report of the Commanding General ghth Operations: Victor III and IV, no date,
Smith, Triumph in the Philippines,
Tenth Military District, Intelligence Summary, 1945, p. 6. 6
gATIS, I, p. D.
Ind, AIB, p. 156.
Luvaas, Dear Miss Em, p. 251 f.n.
73R. R. Smith finds some of Eichelberger's criticisms of guerrilla intelligence overstated and points out instances where it was much better For example compare Ibid., p. 249 than Eichelberger allowed that it was. and Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 608-609. 74
Eichelberger, Jungle Road,
Luvaas, Dear Miss Em, p. 255.
Ibid., p. 293.
77William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: Intantry Division, 1948, p. 148.
A History of the 41st
7810 MD, INTSUM No. 13, p. 2. 79 Headquarters, Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, Mindanao Historical Report of the 24th Infantry Division (V-5 Operation 17 April 1945 - 30 June 1545 Philippine Liberation Campaign, no date, p. 109. 80
31st Division, Historical Report,
Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 411.
For example see Hellbrunn, Partisan Warfare, pp.
Headquarters, 30 June 1945, p. 2.
X Corps, Field Order No.
38 "Operations on Mindanao,"
84See HQ, 8th, Report: V-Ill, V-IV, p. 80; GHQ, SWPA, Staff Study, V-5, p. 2; GHQ, SWPA, Staff Study, V-4, p. 2; Smith, Triumph in the lT-ippines, p. 586; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Opera.tionsnsstructions No 91, February 14, 1945, p. 11. 85
The sources which contain samplet uf these various capabilities of the Mindanao guerrillas are too numerous to list here. Histories, staff studies, personal accounts and lield orders already cited contain Four that contain some interesting examples but which have not examples. been cited above are: Headquarters, USAFFE, "Operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, 41st Infantry Division at Zamboinga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands," USAFFE Board Report No.256, April 16, 1945; and Combat, 1940-1945, 1946; History of the 31st Infantry Division Tra
241 Headquarters, Third Engineer Special Brigade, Eighth Army, Third Engineer Special Brigade Historical Report, 1 May 1945 to 31 May 19451, Jn11! 1945; Charles W. Boggs, Jr., Marine Aviation in the Philippines, 1951. 8
6 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 623; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II. Part I, 1S66, p. 356. 87
Herdquarters, Eighth Army, "Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Mindanao Island," no date, pp. 7-8. The previous September 9th the carrier based aircraft using guerrilla reports were able to destroy 68 enemy aircraft in one attack: 60 on the ground and 8 in tho air. Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 297. 88
Falk, Liberation of the Philippines, p. 135; HQ, 8th Amy, Report: V-II V-ITV, pp. 106-107; HQ, 8th ArMny, Report: Mindanao0 eration, p. 3; Roert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps ation n World Wa-rII, 1952, p. 496. 89 McCartney, The Junileers, pp. 144, 149; Smith, TriuMp in the Philippines, pp. 59275W.-701H,"Resistdnce Movement." Lecouvre was a forie-r U7S. Army enlisted man. 90
24th Division, Historical Re2ort, p. 9; Boggs, Marine Aviation, 128-129; Smith, h nthe nriui hilippines, p. 621;'Eichelberger,
Junge Road, p. 219. 91
Short summaries are contained in: Ulda-ico Baclagon, Phiipine Campaigns, 1952, pp. 378-381; HQ, X Corps, History, pp. 62-64; DA, OrdT l, p. 452. ? Bat
Smith, Triumph in e Philippines, p. 647 f.n.; Headquarters, Sarangani Bay TasFForce, Karanni a peration 4 July 1945 to 11 August 1945 (Historical Report), no date. HQ, 8th Army, Report: One-Man War, p. 151. 94
Headquarters, X Corps,
June 19, 1945.
p. 95; see also Richardson,
Field Order No.
37 (Operations in Mindanao),
O:HAPTER 9 CONCLUSION There are many lessions which can• be drawn from a study of the resistance movement on Mindanao.
The trap which awaits the unwary in
arriving at these lessons is the likelihood that the rhetoric of the heroic literature on the subject will seduce the reader into advocacy 4nd sympathy rather than objective appraisal of the infomation.
This was a
heroic people who waged a desperate fight against a cruel c-::4ueror.
estimated 1,000,000 Filipinos died in the war, and this with no Philippine battle fleet at sea or grand army in the field.
It is very difficult to
read the personal accounts of life under the occupation and not feel personally involved somehow,
Still, a dogged effort will reveal certain
truths which consistently appear throughout the reading, and it
these facts, distilled and closely scrutinized, that the picture of the Mindanao resistance movement emerges. The methodology used for the study proved to be a sound one.
four aspects of the model -- terrain, culture, occupation policies, external support -- do provide a simple, workable framework for testing the potential for a resistance movement to succeed.
In this particular
case, the Mindanao resistance movement lended itself wel'
to study using
this method. The terrain on Mindanao favored the guerrilla, and its obstacles cuuld be overcome to some degree by rrodern communications -- the radio. 242
243 Guerrilla groups could be widely separated within secure mountain sanctuaries yet still be bonded together by communications.
of how to survive in the jungle and mountainous terrain was perhaps the M4 ndanao querrillas' greatest asset. The culture of the Filinos on Mindanao would seem to have militated against the successful establishment 3f an organizqd reri3tance movement because of the language, rioligicus, and social differences among the populace.
But here is where the American leaders played a crucial
role in bringing unity to the mnvement.
The Americans were considered
neutral in the struggle for political puwer on the island, and ultimately the Americans were the only antagonists against the Japanese who had nothiig to gain from leadership within the movement other than survival and revenge upon the Japanese.
the Americans were the thread
which drew the diverse Filipino groups together, the Japanese themselves provided the mortar which held them tightly bound. The occupation policies if the Japanese conqueror did more than any other single factor to unite the Filipino people in resistance to the occupation.
For many Filipinos the issue was clearly one of survival.
ior others the broader, more abstract ideological issues of freedom and democracy drove them into resistance. one of good versus evil.
For some the test became simply
Both the Christians and the Moros saw the
Japanese occupation as a threat to their religion and an assault upon their pe sonal systkyn of valuLs.
A proud people, the Filipinos on Mindanao did
what they had done historically -- they resisted.
For whatever reasons,
the Japanese government never understood that the basic tenets of the occupation policies could have only the one predictable effect: compel the Filipino people to resist.
244 The external support provided to the resistance movement by GHQ, SWPA, though limited inactual tonnage, contributed to the success of the resistance movement far beyond its apparent capacity to do so.
aimmunition and weapons helped the guerrillas sustain the fight at a 1W
minimum¶ level, and the radios helped bind the guerrilla groups together. But the real significance of the submarine visits was two-fold:
the recognition of leaders and the shipmient of supplies to them, General M
MacArthur was able to tie the guerrilla force together under one central commiand and give them credibility in the eyes of their fellow Filipinos. The submarines brought hope to the Filipino people, and this was the second and most important significance of the submarine visits.
submarilnes repretnted the keeping of a promise, and they were a tangible sign that one day the Filipino people would be rid of the conqueror. There are many other lessons which can be drawn from the resistance movement on Mindanao, but there are an equal number which do not have clear anz:wers.
The success of the Mindanao guerrilla movement would seem to
say something about the type of leaders best fitted to lead a guerrilla resistance, and it does to a point.
But the leaders on Mindanao were
unique men who inmany ways were ideally suited to lead the movement. They were at home in the culture and environment to large degree, they had *
reputations for being businesslike and apolitical, and they were older and presumably wiser, More important, most of them 1,id bona fide military credentials
United States Army conmmissions
which gave them widely
Their succr-s was greater because they were on
Mindanao than itmight have been elsewhere because of the unusual situation caused by the need to have neutral leaders for the Moros and Christians. Another unanswered question is just how successful were Mindanac's
245 guerrillas? They were surely not as effective against the Japanese as They were not larger
many chroniclers of the movement have concluded.
than life, nor were they unequalled among other guerrilla soldiers in the world, as somne of the more romantic accounts suggest.
were extremely courageous, inured to hardship, and tough fighters. what affect did they have upon the Japanese?
They tied up Japanese troops
on Mindanao which could have been used elsewhere, but they did not cause any change inJapan's ability to wage war in the Pacific.
They did not
deny the use of ports and airfields on Mindanao to the Japanese, nor did they bring an end, or even a reduction, to the oppressive, cruel policies which brought death and poverty to many Filipinos.
This does not imply
that they were not successful, however, For their real value was that they were a symbol of resistance.
They were a manifestation of Filipino
pride, an alter ego for the nearly 2,000,000 Filipinos on Mindanao who lived under the yoke, and they were a source of refuge for many.
the guerrillas were "little more of an annoyance than the mosquitoes" to the Japanese.
Even so, any camper who has lain awake nights combatting
mosquitoes knows what toll the experience can take on the human constitution. of the American The contribution of the guerrillas to the S-r',:ess -
invasion is clear, and it is widely accepted that many lives of American soldiers were saved through the contributions of the guerrillas to the planning for the invasion of Mindanao and during the invasion itself. Still, just how much they contributed to the success of the invasion depends on the objective sought to be achieved.
Did they fight as regiments
alongside American regiments? No.
Did they save lives and hasten the
invasicn of the Philippines? Yes.
The question which this suggests to
us today Is do we fully appreciate how to realize the full potential from
246 e guerrilla force, and by extension, do our military and State Department leaders today fully understand how to do so? This question provides a lead to further research that might be pursued.
In addition, it is temipting to propose research which will
compare the resistance movemient in the Philippines with the resistance movements elsewhere during World War 1'..When it is 1iiuded to at all, the Philippine resistance is often passed aside as an "internecine struggle."
But I suspect that the Pnilippine resistance was far more
widespread and united within the population then inmany other resistance movemients and as well led as most. The most fertile area open to further research into the Mindanao resistance movement itself is an oral history which could be conducted with the surviving American memibers of the Mindanao guerrillas.
A major con-
tribution could be made on how the Mindanao guerrillas were first organized and what personal relationships growth of the organization.
Inmany respects this paper has only barely
tapped the potential for the study of this guerrilJa organization. The statement that this paper makes is that the Mindanao resistance movemlent was successful, and itwas successful in part because of the role Americans played in its est~ablishmnent and sustainment.
For the student,
the Mindanac resistance r )vement provides a model of a successful resistance and provides some clues to the requirements for success of any resistance movement.
For the man-.at-arms, it is an example of courage,
ingenuity and duty.
For the strategist, the Filipino resistance is an
example of' a successful resistance and should be usec' for studying United States' policies for acting in this arena.
10th MILITARV DISTRICT UNITS:
JANUARY 31, 1945
(Notations are made of some of the Americans serving in these units to provide a measure of American leadership in the Mindanao guerrilla organization) 10th Military District Headquarters Established: September 18, 1942 Commanded by: Colonel Wendell W. Fertig Personnel: Chief of Staff - LtCol Sam Wilson (Manila businessman) Deputy Chief of Staff - Maj. M. M. Wheeler (USNR) G-2 - Maj. H. A. Rosenquist Signal Officer - Capt. James Garland "A" Corps, Western Mindanao, Headquarters Established: January 1, 1944 Commanded by: LtCol Robert V. Bowler (38 years old, taught economics at Washington State U. Owned fisheries in Alaska. Reserve officer called to active duty before the war) Personnel Strength: officers - 142; enlisted - 798. Personnel: G-2 - Maj. Chandler B. Thomas G-3 - Capt. Donald H. Wills Units: 105th, 106th, 108th, 109th Divisions, 121st Separate Regiment and the 116th Separate Battalion. 105th Division Established: January 23, 1943 Commanded by: LtCol Hipolito Garman (Filipirio) Personnel: officers - 324; enlisted - 4,270. Units: 106th Regiment, 107th Regiment, 115th Regiment, 121st Separate Regiment - Lt. Donald Lecouvre (former U.S. Air Corps enlisted man). This regiment fell also under "A" Corps. 106th Division Established: October 7, 1943 Commanded by: LtCol Frank McGee (Mindanao planter before the war. Former U.S. Army officer with World War I service. West Point graduate). Personnel: officers - 298; enlisted - 3,595. Units- 116th Regiment - Maj. Herbert Page (68 years old, former Philippine Constabulary officer. Mindanao planter at Glan, Cotabato before the war), 118th Regiment Maj. Salipada Pendatun (Filipino), 119th Regiment, 116th Separate Battalion. Operated independently under "A" Corps also. 248
249 107th Division Established: May 1, 1944 Commanded by: First commander was LtCol Clyde C. Childress (Battalion commander in 61st Division, PA, before the war). Childress was evacuated to join U.S. Amy forces on Leyte January 1945. Succeeded by LtCol Claro Laureta, a Filipino PA officer. Personnel: officers - 141; enlisted - 2,308. Units: 130th Regiment, 111th Provisional Battalion - Lt. Owen P. Wilson (unsurrendered sergeant, U.S. Air Corps), 112th Provisional Battalion - Lt. Anton Haratik, Sternberg Detachment - Lt. Adolph Sternberg, Jr. (unsurrendered sergeant, U.S. Air Corps). 108th Division Established: December 14, 1942 Cnmianded by: LtCol Charles W. Hedges (Age - late forties. With Kolambugan Lumber Mills on Mindanao before the war.. Held U.S. Army Reserve commission. After Japanese invasion he commanded Gen. Fort's Motor Transport Co.) Personnel: officers - 974; enlisted - 13,012. Units: 105th Regiment; 108th Regiment; Maranao Militia Force separate command (for political reasons), 124th Regiment, 126th Regiment, 127th Regiment, 128th Regiment, 1st Provisional Regiment, 2nd Provisional Regiment, Separate battalions - 4 units, Separate companies - 5 units. 109th Division Egtablished: March 14, 1943 Commanded by: Originally commanded by LtCol Robert V. Bowler. Succseded by LtCol James R. Grinstead (age in midfifties. Retired U.S. Army officer - service in Mexico; World War I: twice wounded, received DSC; Philippine Constabulary officer in Moro campaigns. Mindanao planter in Cotabato before the war. Also succeeded to command 106th Division). Personnel: officers - 327; enlisted - 3,987. Units: 109th Regiment, 111th RegIment, 112th Regiment - Capt. William McLaughlin (former sergeant, 31st Infantry; commissioned when war broke out), 117th Regiment. 110th Division Established: September 15, 1942 Commanded by: LtCol Ernest E. McClish (Manila businessman before the war. Nov. 1941 assumed command of a PA regiment being mobilized. Left hospital rather than surrender to Japanese. Evacuated to Leyte January 1944). Personnel: officers - 317; enlisted - 5,086. Units: 110th Regiment, 113th Regiment, 114th Regiment - Capt. Paul H. Marshall (U.S. Army Private First Class who escaped from Davao Penal Colony April 3, 1943 with 9 other Americans. Succeeded McClish on his evacuation to Leyte).
(1) There were changes from time-to-time in the guerrilla unit leadership. This listing reflects only the January 31, 1945 leadership as shown in General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines," Marrh 20, 1948. (2) Some 187 Americans have been listed as having fought with the guerrillas in Mindanao. Not all can be named here for the positions all held are not in the available records.
After "A" Corps was es-abi1shed, Fertig maintained the 107th and 110th Divisions under his immediate control, while Bowler, with all of the remaining units, reported to Fertig through "A" Corps Headquarters.
Figure 7 shows the operational boundaries of these guerrilla divisions in the 10th Military District.
MINDANAO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION JANUARY 1945
121st SEP REGT
116th SEP BN
100 Figure 7
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY The sources listed in this bibliography contain brief annotations concerning the usefulness of the source of the study of the resistance movement in the Philippines or on the content of the source where appropriate.
In the cases of unpublished documents, the location of the
source is indicated in parentheses in most cases.
that the source is located in the Philippine Archives, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis; (USACGSC)
indicates that the source is located
at the United States Army Comimand and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth,
DA) shows that the source is found in
the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington,
DA) means the source is at the Chief of Engineers,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Department of the Amy, Washinqrton,
Other notations for locations are expressed in full. 1. Correspondence Chief Histories Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army letter to Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army of June 20, 1973 over Mr. Smith/jd/30861, subject: "Status of Membersof Philippine Military Forces during World War II." (OCMH, DA). Correspondence File No. 65, drawer No. 4, "Correspondence, Re: Guerrilla Activities 10th Military District," dated August 4, 1942 to September (PA, NPRC). 11, 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig (CO, 10th MD, USFIP) to General (CE, DA). Hugh J. Casey (APO 500, San Francisco) of July 1, 1943. A lengthy letter detailing Fertig's activities just after the surrender; solicits GHQ, SWPA assistance.
254 Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, USA to Marine Aviation History Board of February 25, 1948. (Marine Historical Center, Washington, D.C.). DiscusLes Marine air operations on Mindanao. Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, CE to Lieutenant Colonel George A. Meidling, CE, Office of the Chief of Engineers, GHQ, FEC of June 13, 1949. (CE, DA). Refers to Fertig's activities prior to the surrender. Alludes to study being written on engineers in the Philippines. 2.
The Deisher-Couch Papers, no date. (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA). Jacob D. Deisher was an unsurrendered American who fled to the jungle on Mindanao to avoid Japanese capture.
Fertig, Wendell W. "Guerrillero" Part I, no date. (CE, DA). Chapter One of an unpublished memoir. Discusses Fertig's activities as a USAFFE engineer prior to the surrender. Covers period July 1942 to May 1943. 95 pages. _ "Notes Written from Memory in August 1942 on the Mindanao Invasion." No date. (CE, DA). Covers Fertig's activities summer 1943. 19 pages.
"The Reminiscences of Captain Stephen Jurika, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)," Vol. II. U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., No date. (Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.). Jurika was a brother-in-law of Cdr. Charles Parsons, USN. "Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum, U.S. Navy (Retired," Vol. II. U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 1973. (Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.). Adm. McCollum was the Intelligence Officer of the U.S. Navy Southwest Pacific Force. 4.
Commander Amphibious Group Six,U.S. Pacific gleet, Task Group 78.1 "Report of Amphibious Attack on Zamboanga, Zamboanga Attack Group. Mindanao." March 26, 1945. (USACGSC). "Philippines Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. and Halmahera," CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin 125-44. August 15, 1944. (USACGSC).
255 General Headquarters, Far East Command, Historical Section, First Demobilization Bureau. "Japanese Monograph No. 1, Philippine Operations Record, Phase I November 1941 to July 1942" (Originally "14th Army Operations," Vol. I). No date. (circa October 1946). (USACGSC; OCMH, DA).
""Japanese Monograph No. 3, Record, Phase II December 1942 - June 1944." (USACGSC, OCMH, DA).
Philippine Operations Octooer 1946.
"• "Japanese Monograph No. 4, Operational Preparations of the 14th Area Army in the Philippines, Phase III July 1)44 to (USACGSC, OCMH, DA). November 1944." No date (circa October 1946). .. "Japanese Monograph No. 6, Philippine Operations Record, Phase III, Defense of Leyte by the 35th Army, 1944-1945." October 1946. (USACGSC; OCMH, DA). General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section. "A Brief History of the G-2 Section GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units: (USACGSC). Introduction to the Intelligence Series." July 8, 1948. GHQ,
". "Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (USACGSC). August 19, 1948. ".
"Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in
July 29, 1948.
"Basic Plan for Montclair General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Are;. (USACGSC). Operations." February 25, 1945. Plan for reoccupation of the Western Visayas-Mindanao-BorneoNetherlands East Indies Area. !
Operati'_n "Civil Administration and Relief of the Philippines," Stipin__ Stand in Oer-ating Procedure Instructions No. 27. November 15, 1944. (USACGSC). "Report on Conditiuns in the Philippine Islands," ________. (USACGSC). Information Bulletin. June 1943.
"Instructional Notes on Philippine Civil Affairs." (USACGSC).
" u"Operations Instructions No. 91. No. 97.
in the Zamboanga Area," Operations
February 14, 1945.
"Operations in Mindanao," Operations Instructions, (USACGSC). Ma7-ch 11, 1945.
Release." October 25, 1944. tribute to the Philippine resistance.
"• "Staft Study Operation George: Musketeer Operations." (USACG5C). October 11, 1944. Procedures for control and utilization of Philippine guerrillas. Speaks specifically to Mindanao guerrillas.
256 Zamboanga). on Mindanao).
"Staff Study Operation Victor-Four" (Operations on (USACGSC). February 12, 1945. "Staff Study Operation Victor-Five" (Operations (USACGSC). March 8, 1945.
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacleic Area. Allied Translator and "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Eneiy Interpreter Section. April 28, 1945. (USAcGSC). Publications No. 359, Parts I and II. Translation of Japanese intelligence reports, Watari Groups, reports B Nos. 152-159.
". "69 Brigade Combat Report on Philippines Operations," Enemy Publications, No. 289. January 19, 1945. (USACGSC). "Trial Records of Filipino and Chinese Guerrillas ano Civilians'and Japanese Soldiers and Civilians," Enemy Publications, No. 398. September 22, 1945. (USACGSC). General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Section. Japanese Occupation," 2 Volumes, March 1, 1948. (USACGSC). "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines." Karch 1, 1948. (USACGSC). The definitive source on the organiation of the major Filip'no guerrilla organizations. Headquarters, "A" Corps Western Mindanao, Tenth Military District, U.S. Forces in the Philippines. "History of the 'A' Corps Western (PA, Mindanao, Tenth Military District," Vol. I. March 31, 1945. NPRC). The oily unit history available on the Mindanao guerrillas. 397 pages, typed, bound in the field. Very detailed at the small unit level. Only known copy to have survived is at PA, NPRC. Headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. Operations Maabangaramy Instructions Nc. 94 (Operations in Support of the 8th Area). March 14, 1945. (USACGSC). -arng-NCotabato Headquarters, Forty-First Infantry Division. Field Order No. 11 (OperaMarch 24, 1945. tions in Tawi Tawi Island Group, Sulu Archipelago). (USACGSC). "U.S. Army Recognition Headquarters, Philippines Command, U.S. Army. Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date. (Archives, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.). Excellent source which outlines the policies used for recognizing and certifyinq the guerrillas. Some history. 223 pages plus 42 appendices. "Sarangani Bay Operations 4 July Headquarters, Sarangani Bay Task Force. 1945 to 11 August 1945 (Historical Report)." No date. (USACGSC).
257 Headquarters, X Corps. Administrative Or-der Nu. 4 to accompany Field Order No. 38. July 9, 1945. (USACGSC). Junr'
• Field Order No. 37 (Operations in Mindanao). (USACGSQ.
. Field Order No. 38 (Operations in Mindanao). June 30, T945.(USACGSC). "History of X Corp- on Mindanao 17 April 1945 30 June 1945-."r-June 30, 1945. (PA, NPRC). Headquarters Third Engineer Special Brigade, U.S. Eighth Army. "Third Engineer Special Brigade Historical Report, 1 May 1945 to 31 May 1945." June 11, 1945. (USACGSC). Headquarters, Thirty-Second A.itiaircraft Artillery Brigade Ared Command. "Special Report, 32d AAA Brigad& Aiea Command 1 January - 31 MaTy 1946." No date. (USACGSC). U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. "Notes from conference Col. James D. Taylor, G-1 Sec. USAFFE and Col. Kreuter, Li~ison Officer with Philippine Army H-ddquarters." October 15, 1944. (USACGSC). Policies for incorporating guerrillas into the Philippine Army. Recognitiou policies, adninistration. OperatTons Record: DA).
"Japanese Monograph No. 11, Philippines Air ?hase One," February 1, 1952. (USACGSC; OCMH,
" _ "Operatic' of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, 41st Infantry Di'ision at Zamboanga, Mindanao, P.I.." USAFFE Board Report No. 256. April 16, 1945. (USACGSC). Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. "The Replacement Battalion: Its Organization and Operation," U.SA Trainiig Group Publication No. 01. Manila, July 15, 1945. "-A.S---. Procedur..- for inducting former guerrillas into the Philippine Army. Headquarters, Army Forces in the Western Pacific, Combat History Division. "Triumdi in the Philippines 1941-1946, Vol. III, Enemy Occupation: Japanese." No date. (PA, NPRC). Headquarters, U.S. Army Services of Supply. I.igistics Instructions No. 97/SOS (Based on GHQ, SWPA Op~rations Instr,.ction No. 97 dated March 11, 1945). March 22, 1945. (USACGSTC). Logistics support for Victor-V Operation, invasion of Mindanao. Headquarters U.S. (USACGSC).
Field Order No, 26.
March 20, 1945.
258 "Operational Monograph on the Mindanao Operation, Victor V 17 April - June 1945." No date. (PA, NPRC). Study of Japanese Operations on Mindanao Isard.' Nodate. "Staff (PA, NPRC). "Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Mindanao Operation: Victor V." No date. (PA, NPRC).
"• "Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Palawan and Zamboanga Uperations: Victor III and IV." No date. (USACGSC). " _ "Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Panay-Negros and Cebu Operations: Victor I and Victor II," Vol. T. No date. (USACGSC). Contains references to the strategic importance of Mindanao. Imperial General Headquarters, Japanese Army. "Recent Situation in the Philippines," Army Section Report. March 31, 1944. (USACGSC). Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. War Department. "Future Operations in the Pacific: Report by the Joint Staff Planners," JCS 713/1. March 10, 1944. ,USACGSC). Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch. Resistance in the Philippines," R&A No. 23578. July 21, (USACGS C).
"Law Enforcement in the Philippine Islands," R&A -T..-ept ber 25, 1944. (USACGSC). A discussion of the Philippine Constabulary under the Japanese is included in the study of police administration.
"• "Philippine Interview Summary: Misamis, Misamis Occidental Province, Mindanao Island," R&A No. 965c. August 16, 1943. (USACGSC). Contains a detailed ,ap of Misamis. "Promi-!nt Moros of Mindanao and Sulu," R&A No. 2826. February 16, '.46. kdSACGSC). Compilation of aAilable information on some 100 Moro leaders on Evaluate their loyalty to the resistance movement. Mindanao. "The Government of the 'New Philippines' (A Study of the Present Puppet Government in the Philippines)," R&A No. 1752. May 15, 1944. (USACGSC).
"The Programs of Jdpan in the Philippines,"
Assemblage-NoT-3, Supplement No. 1, R&A No. 2440. (USACGSC).
July 29, 1944.
" _ "Studies Based on Census of the Philippines, 1939," Report No. 9. March 19, 1942. (USACGSC). Seventh Fleet Command File Memorandum. "Submarine Activities Connected with Guerrilla Organizations in the Philippines." No date. Written by Captain A. H. McCollum, USN. See McCollum under Oral Histories supra. Tenth Military District. Intelligence Summary No. 13. (PA, NPRC). The Philippine Archives has Dec. 1944 and Feb., Aug. 1945 Intelligence Summaries.
February 1945. Mar.,
Thirty-First Infantry Division. "Historical Report Thirty-First Division in the Mindanao Campaign 22 April - 30 June 1945." No date. (Archives, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.). Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division. "Mindanao Historical Report of the 24th Infantry Division (V-5 Operation 17 April 1945 - 30 June 1945 Philippine Liberation Campaign)." No date. (USACGSC). U.S. Army Visayan-Mindanao Force (1941-1942). "Historical Report Visayan-Mindanao Force: Defense of the Philippines 1 Sept 1941 10 May 1942." No date. (Archives, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.). Primary source for details on events preceding the surrender. Written by MGen Wm. F. Sharp. 702 pages. U.S.
Navy. "Citation for Legion of Merit ICO Commander Samuel Joseph Wilson, USNR." April 21, 1947. (Naval Historical Center, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.). • "Ex-Commander Charles Parsons, United States Navy Reserve," Official Navy Biography (Naval Historical Center, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.).
U.S. War Department, Planning Division, Office of Director of Plans and Operations, Army Service Forces. "Future Operations Against Japan (A Logistic Plan to Support the JCS 713 Series, Hisory of Planning Division, ASF," Vol. A. March 13, 1944. (USACGSC).
"•_"Logistic Study for Projected Operation! Pi " ne Base Development ASF-P-SL-5, History of Planning Division, ASF," Vo'l. 5. February 26, 1945. (USACGSC). (PA, NPRC). "Visayan-Mindanao Forces." Fil No. 25, Philippine Archives. Contains official documents relating to the formation of Che Visayan-Mindanao Force. Western Defense Command. "History of Philippine Gu.Žrrilla Radio Activity as Coordinated by Western Defense Con•iand Signal Section," Ch. 10, Incl. 7 of "The History of the Western Defense Command, 17 March 1941 30 September 1945," Vol. III. No date. (OCHM, DA).
5. HMonphs Arellano, Alfonso, Major, FA, Philippine Army. "Facts About Filipino Collaboration: An Analytical Study." Student paper. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 22, 1977. (USACGSC). "Guerrilla Logistics." Caraccia, Marco J., Lieutenant Colonel, QMC. Student thesis. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April (USACGSC). 8, 1966. Annotaged bibliography. Good for background. Nothing on the Philippines. "The Poilippine Archives." Unpublished Clement, Patricia McDermott. manuscript. National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Mo., (PA, NPRC). May 8, 1981. Assessment of the archival holdings in the Philippine Archives. Overview of events in the Philippines December 1941 to September 1945. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff for Operations. "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of (USACGSC). Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations." December 1, 1960. Prepared within the Special Warfare Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Office. Outlines general principles underlying guerrilla environment. "Japanese Atrocities." August 20, Fourteenth Antiaircraft Command. 1945. (USACGSC). Monograph prepared for local use from Japanese and American diaries, intelligence reports, and official sources. Very explicit. "G-3 Guerrilla Affairs Division." No author; no date. (PA, NPRC). Monograph prepared for internal use by the Philippine Archives staff. Brief assessment of 48 major Philippine guerrilla units. Ney, Virgil. "Guerrilla Warfare and Propaganda." Masters Thesis. Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 1958. Devotes a chapter to the Philippine resistance movement. "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," Supplemont B of "The (OCMH, DA.. Philippine Campaign, 1944-1945." No date. Evidently preoared as part of an internal historical document. Provides good baLKground. "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, Swith, Robert Ross. and Military Factors." -- epa'ei'tient of the Army, Office of the Chief (USACGSC). of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1963. Contains a good pre-World War il history. Has perhaps the best bibliography available on guerrilla activities in the Philippines.
261 "The Status of Menbers of Philippine Military Forces During World War II." Department of the Amy, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C., June 1973. (Archives, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.). A study prepared for the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, Litigation Division. Examines disciplinary, financial and command structures of Philippine and U.S. Armies. U.S. Aerospace Studies Institute, A "The Role of Airpower in GuerUniversity, Maxwell Air Force Contains a discussion of the 6.
%';liversity,Concepts Division. I'irfare (World War II)." Air js;. j'csr " 1962. errillas. 0 ,,.-o
The following sources are first hand accoun_ 'itten either by a person involved directly in the Philippine resistance or about a person involved in the Japanese occupation. Appel, Benjamin. Fortress in the Rice. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951. Fiction based on facts of the conflict between the Hukbalahap and USFIP guerrilla units. Celebrated novel which focuses on an American guerrilla.
Bank, Bert. Back from the Livin Decd: The Infamous Death March and 33 Months in a apanese Prison. Tuscaloosa, Al.: Major Bert Bank, ±945. Includes account of life in Davao Penal Colony. Author was interned in 4 separate camps. Chapman, James and Ethel. ca to the Hills. Lancaster, Pa.: Jacques Cattell Press, I947. Story of an American educator and his wife who lived 20 months in the jungle on Negros before capture by the Japanese. Dyess, William E. The Dless Storg. New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1944. Dyess was interdnavao Penal Colony before his celebrated escape. Book published to inform Americans of life in Japanese camps. Earle, Dixon. Bahala Na...Come What May. Berkeley, Ca.: Howell North, 1961. Story of Mission ISRM. Good oi how SWPA penetration parties operated in conjunction with the guerri'las. Eichelberger, Robert L. Our Jungle Road to Tokyo. New York: The Viking Press, 1950. Personal memoir by the commander of the 8th Army. Contains a chapter on the Mindanao operat on.
262 Galang, Ricardo. Secret Mission to the Philippines. Manila: University Publishing Co., 1948. Account of a coastwatcher expedition sent by AIB to Mindoro Island. Gunnison, Royal Arch. So Sorr No Peace. New York: Viking Press, J944. Very good account y a correspondent interned at Santo Tomas. Details life outside camp as well. Haggerty, Edward. Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 0946. Haggerty w,;sa priest who moved with the guerrillas. Very good on details cf day-to-day survival. One of the best sources available on Mindanao guerrillas. Harkins, Philip. Blackburn's Headhunters. New York: W. W. Norton, 1955. Account of-one of the guerrilla units on Luzon under Volckmann's command. Taken from Lieutenant Donald Blackburn's diaries and personal interviews. Hawkins, Jack. Never Say Die. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1961. Written by a Marine who escaped from Davao Penal Colony. mained to fight as a guerrilla or, Mindanao. Good account.
Travis, Ingham. Rendezvou Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Gi:errilla- oiers n t Phlippines. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1945. Good on Parsons's activities on Mindanao. Keats, John. The- Fought Alone. Philadelphia: J. B. Lipoincott, 1963. Originally to be published as They Fought Alone: Fertig and the Mindanao Guerrillas with Wendell Fertig as co-author. Only source w-hch discusses the political jockeying for leadership of the Mindanao guerrillas. Very strong in praise for Fertig. Must reading Partially fictionalized but based for study of Mindanao guerrillas. on Fertig's personal papers. Lacking in dates, structural continuity. No documentation - assumption is that Fertig approved Keats' account. Contains list of names o? all Americans who fought with the Mindanao guerrillas. MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Contains MacArthur's personal recullections of the Philippine guerrillas. Marquez, Adalla. Blood on the Rising Sun. New York: DeTanko Publishers1957. Personal account of a Filipino news reporter who became a do'.bleagent after the Japanese killed her husband. McCoy, Melvyn H. and S. M. Mellnik. Ten Escape from Tojo. New York: Farrar and Rinphart, 1944. Adventurous account of the escape from Davao Penal Colony on Mindanao. Details guerrilla participation.
263 Mcllnik, Steve. Philippine Diary 1939-1945. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. Mellnik escaped from Davao Penal Colony, joined the guerrillas on Mindanao and later worked in the G-2, GHQ, SWPA in the Philippine section. Very useful source. Mojica, Proculo L. Terry's Hunters JThe True Story of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas). Manila: Benpayo Press, 1965. Nothing on Mindanao guerrillas. Has good bibliographv. Good on various groups on Luzon. Monaghan, Forbes J. Under the Red Sun: A Letter from Manila. New York: Decldn X. McMullen, 1946. Account by a Jesuit priest on Luzon. Illuminates role of the clergy in the Philippine resistance. Panlilio, Yay. The Crucible. New York: MacMillan, 1950. The famous "olFo"ne--Yay" of Luzon. Account of Mestiza (female) guerrilla ieader. Broadens concept of Philippine guerrillas. Reynolds,
Bob. Of Rice and Men. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1947. Personal account of life in Japanese internment camps. Nothing on Mindanao.
Richardson, Hal. One-Man War; The Jock McLaren Story. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1957. Adventures of an Australian working with the Mindanao guerrillas. The best account depicting life as a gucrrilla on Mindanao. St. John, Joseph F. Leyte Callinin... lew York: Vanguard, 1945. Coastwatcher _ ioewored it D. Richardson on Leyte. Richardson was Kangleon's emissary to Fertig. Scott, Hugh L. Some Memori2s of a Soldier. New York: Century, 1928. Scott served as Governor of Sulu. Good for understanding Moros, U.S. tactics and policies in dealing with che Moros, and pre-war Mindanao. Spender, !.ou13e Reid. Guerrilla Wife. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1945. Day-by-iy account of life for Americans under the Japanese occupation. Spencer's husband was a guerrilla on Panay; she lived in the mountains. Details on Claude Fertig and his family who were close friends of the Spencers. Claude Fertig is Wendell Fertig's brother. Stevens, Frederic H. Santo Tomgas Internmen. Camp 1942-1945. United States: Stratford House, -4. Exceptionally detailed account of life as an internee in Japanese internment camps. Stewart, Sidney. Give Us This Day. New York: W. W. Norton, 1946. Includes e in Japanese internment camps. Personal account of Davao Penal Colony on Mindanao.
264 Utinsky, Margaret. "Miss U." San Antonio: Naylor, 1948. American nurse wo worked with the Philippine underground and later joined a guerrilla unit on Luzon. Volckmann, R. W. We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philip ines. New York: W. W. Norton, 1954. One of the "standard" sources on the Philippine resistance. Volckmann was an American colonel who 3ed a guerrilla unit on Luzon. Weinstein, Alfred H. Barbed-Wire Surgeon. New York: MacMillan, 1948. A medical doctor 's perspective on the Japanese internment camps. Details the medical problems faced by the internees as well as the routine of camp life.
ry of Spyron" Wise, William. Secret Mission to the Philippines: The and the American - Filipin Guerrillas of World War II. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968. Details how Commnander Parsons forged the link between GHQ, SWPA and the Philippine guerrillas. Mindanao guerrillas covered. Wolfert, Ira. N.2rican Guerrilla in the Philippines. New York: Simon and Schuste~r-.945. Stcry of Lt. I. D. Richardson, USN, assistant to Colonel Kangleon, leader of the Leyte guerrillas. Wolfert was a correspondent who also covered the First and Third U.S. Armies in Europe and the landings on Guadalcanal and in the Solomons. Brings a broader perspective to his writings )n the guerrillas. 7.
Betrayal in the Philippines. New York: A. A. Wyn, Abaya, Hernando J. 1946. Strong anti-c:ollaborationist statement. Some information on guerrillas under the puppet government. Agoncillo, Teodoro A. The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Quezon City, Philippines: R. P. PhiliPines, 1941-45, Two Volumes. Grcia Publishing (o., 1965. Has compleL bibliography with many primary and unpublished sources. Provides Filipino sources on the subject which are not readily found elsewhere. Best source for integration of the guerrilla resistance into the larqer framework of the historical period. Baclagon, Uldarico S. Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines. Manila: M. Colcol and Co., 1956. Good amalgamation of the Filipino experience in the guerrilla environment. Baclagon is an acknowledged authority on Philippine military history. •
Good on how guerrilla organizat ons were initiallyfoiied. Draws heavily on GHQ, SWPA, "Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philipp'ines" (see su.ra) and uses unpublished monograph on the 10th Military District prepared by the Philippine An~iy.
They Chose to Fight: Negros and Siguijor Island.
The Story of the Resistance Quezon City, P.I.: Capitol
Baclagon was a guerrilla leader on Negros. Source describes Fertig's role in establishing the guerrilla organization on Negros. Bayo,
Alberto. 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, ed. Robert K. Brown, trans. Hugo Hartenstein and Dennis Harber. United States: no pub., 1963. Handy checklist for organization, tactics, weapons.
Beck, John Jacob. MacArthur and Wairwriwht: Sacrifice of the Philippines. Albuquerque. University of New Mexico Press, 1974. Good for background on high level discussions in U.S. Government leading to MacArthur's departure for Australia. Bernstein, David. The Philippine Story. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947. Excellent overview ot U.S.-Shilippine relationship and Philippine society. Blacker, Irwin, R. Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas: Great Stories From Rogers' Rangers to the Haganah. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1954. Provides samples of other successful guerrilla groups. Good for comparison. Boggs, Charles W., Jr. Printing Government Written for the detailed account of forces on Mindanao.
Marine in the Philippines. Washington: Office, AviatKon 1951. Marine Corps Historical. Division. Contains air support for the guerrillas and the invasion
Campbell, Arthur. Guerrillas: Day, 1968. Useful for beckgruund. movement.
A Histrry and Analysis.
Does not address Philippine resistanze
Daugherty, William E. and Morris Janowitz. A Casebook. Baltimore: Johrns Hopkins Press, L."engthy treatment, goud for background.
osychclo ical Warfare 9. Little on the Philippines.
Day, Beth. The Philippines: Shattered Showcase of Democracy in Asia. New York: M. Evans, 19/4. Separatist pressures on Mindanao Little on resistarce movement. are covered. Dissette, Edward and H. C. Adamson. Guerrilla Submarines. New York: Ballantine Books, 1972. Only book Good on Parsons's role in supporting the guerrillas. which details the submarine support to the guerrillas. The text contains no documentation, so information is not always verifiable. The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Dormal, Jose Demandante. Resistance Movement in Panay During World War II. Manila: Diamond Historical Publications, 1952. Excellent account of 6th Military District based on radio messages, Covers relationship with Mindanao diaries, official documents. guerrillas.
266 Dunlop, Richard.
Behind Japanese Lines:
Rand McNally, 1979.
With the OSS in Burma.
Provides insight into OSS operations in the Far East. Useful for comparison with AIB penetration party activities in the Philipp•ines. Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. Asian and Axis Resistance Movements, (from The Military History of-World War II: Vol. 16). New York: FrankTin Wtts, 1965.. Introductory material. Brief treatment of the Philippine resistance. Nothing on Mindanao. Elarth, Harold Hanne. The Story of the Philippine Constabulary. Los Angeles: Globe Printing, 1949. Extremely good account, particularly of the PC's cdmpaigns against the Moros. Contains biographical section on Americans who fcught as members of the Constabulary. Falk, Stanley. Liberation of the Philippines. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971. General treatment of the Allied invasion of the Philippines. Useful for introduction to this campaign. Feldt, Eric A. The Coastwatchers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Account of the intelligence teams working in the Southwest Pacific. Focuses on the daily operatioAs, survival aspects. Forbes, W. Cameron. The Philippine Islands, Vol. I. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928. Good background nistory for under' anding the pre-war Philippine culture. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan. Japan Yearbook 1943-1944. Tokyo, December 1944. Contains useful material from Japanese viewpoint on events in the Philippines. 40th Infantry Division: The Years of World War IIT, 7 December 1941 - 7 Apri1 . Baton Roiige: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1947. UnoffTcial history. 40th ID had one unit in Mindanao invasion. Frank, Benis M. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Victory and Occupation: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations In WorlUdWaF rI, V. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968. Describes use of Merine aviation in support of the Mindanao invasion. Mentions Marine POW's in Davao Penal Colony. Friend, Theodore. Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929-1946. New haven: Yale University Press, 196S. E-cellent study of ýhilippine society and politics under the U.S. and Japan. Extensive annotated bibliography.
267 A Guide to 0.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports I: "Japan and Its Occupied Territories During World War II." Washington: University Publications of America, 1977. Contains the little research done on the Philippines by the OSS during this period. Hanrahan, Gene Z. Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics: A Source Book. New York: Columbia University, 1952. Translations of principal Chinese works on the subject. (USACGSC) Useful for comparison with tactics of Philippine guerrillas against the Japanese. * Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces. The Jo Hopkins University, July 1954. (USACGSC). Very good for understanding Japanese concepts for fighting -,slstance forces. Does not address Mindanao specifically.
Hayashi, Saburo. Kogun": The Japanese Am in the Pacific War. Quantico, Va. : -The Marine corps Assn., •959. History of Japanese plans and policies. Account of operations in the Philippines; makes no mention of the guerrilla resistance. Perhaps this book is important because of this omission because it reflects Japanese military priorities. Heilbrunn, Otto. Partisan Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1962. Very good integration of orld War II partisan movements. on Philippine resistance. Theoretical study.
History of the Thirty-First Infantry Division in Training and Combat, 1940-1945. Baton-Rouge: The Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1946. •A official history. Horn, Florence. Orphans of the Pacific. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941. Good picture of the Philippines on the eve of the Japanese invasion. Chapters on the Moros, mining industry, Japanese, Chinese, pagans, the Church and Americans. Hurley, Vic. Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary. New York: E. P. Outton, 1938. Describes small unit patrolling and tactics used by the U.S. Amy and Philippine Constabulary to fight the Moros. Swish of the Kris. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1936. Very good for unerstanding the Moros. One of the few books available on the subject. Ind, Allison. Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Se.ret Weapon in the War Against4a-n. New York: David McKay, 1958. Of 1ittl value in documenting the growth and structure of the AIB. Consists of a series of vignettes or "war story" anecdotes on the more celebrated AIB projects. Has information on Parsons' missions and the submarine deliveries.
268 Iriye, Akira. Power and Culture: The Japanese American War, 194141945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. Background for understanding the clash of cultural values in the Philippines. James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, Vol. I, 1880-1941-(1970); Vol. I1, 1941-1945 (1975). Good for understanding MacArthur's role in shaping the Philippine Extensive bibliography. Army and his concept for using the guerrillas. Johnson, Chalmers A. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The of Revolutionary China 1937-1945. Stanford: Stanford Emergence 4 Univers ty Press, 1962. Useful for Study of the Chinese resistance to the Japanese. understanding Japanese policies and tactics against resistance movements. The Knights of Bushido: The Shocking Russell, Edward F. Langley. History of Japanese War Atrocities. New York: E, P. Dutton, 1958. Study of Japanese torture and brutality. Russell did a similar study on the German Nazis. Lear, Elmer. The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941-1945. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1961. In-depth case study of the Leyte resistance movement. Good for Lacking in comparing Mindanao and Leyte guerrilla organizations. use of U.S. Government documents, but has extensive bibliography nevertheless. Many letters, interviews, Philippine documents.
Lee, Chong-Sik. Counterinsurency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940. Santa Monica: The Rand CorporatiWon,17. Case study of Japanese planning for insurgency and counterguerrilla warfare. Based un Japanese documents. Good for understanding Japanese approach. Lewin, Ronald. The American Ma,ic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan. New York: Farrar Straus G'roux, 1982. -'ovidesa basis for understanding how the intelligence informaiT tion coming from the Philippines assisted GHQ, SWPA and the War Department in integrating the information received from electronic sources. Luvaas, Jay, ad. Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972. Contains opinions gleaned from diaries and letters of the commander, U.S. 8th Army on the invasion of Mindanao. Madej, W. Victor, ed. Japanese Armed Forces Order of Battle 1937-1945, Vol. 1. Allentown, Pa.: Game Marketing Co., 1981. Edited version of the "Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces" Issued by the U.S. Army. Manchester, William. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964. Nei York: Dell Pulbshing, 1978. Contains brief but valuable references to the Philippine resistance movement, particul.urly on the aspects of collaboration.
269 McCartney, William F. The Jungleers: A Histo1 y of the 41st Infantry Division. Washington: Infantry Journal Press,"1948. An unofficial history. Miksche, F.D. Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements. London: Fafer and Faber, 1950. Some theoretical construction. Focuses on European experience but makus references to Asian resistance movements. Molnar, Andrew R. and others. Under rounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. Washington: The American University, 1963. Good theoretical and factual background for the study of resistance movements. The Philippines 1946-1954 is discussed in one chapter. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1959. rrilla activity. Emphasis on naval aspects of Mindanao invasion. Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Provides setting for the guerrilla movement. Best published discussion on the series of events leading to the surrender of USAFFE forces on Mindanao. Ney, Virgil. Notes on Guerrilla Warfare: Principles and Practices. Washington: Command Publications, 1961. An earlier theoretical work on guerrilla warfare. Includes a chapter on the Philippines. Porter, Catherine. Crisis in the Philippines. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942. Focuses on Philippine culture and politics. Describes Japanese role in the pre-war Philippine economy. Powers, Robert D., Jr. "Guerrillas and the Laws of War," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare. US. Naval Institute (Menasha, W~sc.: George Banta, 1963), pp. 23-27. Background for understanding extra-legal qualities and claims to legal legitimacy of the resistance fighter. Recto, Claro M. Three Years of Enemy Occupation: The Issue of Political Collaboration In the Philippines. Manila: People's Publishers, 1946.
Strongly presentedritlonaie for forgiving those who collaborated with the Japanese. Contains appendices of historical documents useful for understanding the collaborationist issue.
Romulo, Carlos P. I Saw the Fall of the Philippines. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1942. Written by a journalist, a close friend of President Quezon, who became an officer o, MacArthur's SWPA staff. Romulo is the Philippine Foreign Minister in 1982.
270 I See the Philippines Rise. Garden City: Doubleday 7--T.References to the guerrillas throughout. Somewhat overstated in its rhetoric. Mother America: A Living Story of Deocracy. Grden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1943. Describes impact of American political values on Philippine culture. Roosevelt, Kermit. War Report of the 0.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services). New York: Walker, 1976. Comprehensive account of the OSS. Valuable for comparison to AIB. Leads to questions of what OSS might have offered CHQ, SWPA had it been used in that theater. Sanderson, James Dean. Behind Enemy Lines. 1959. Stories on World War II guerrillas. guerrillas. Background only.
Nothing on Mindanao
Sawyer, Frederick L. Sons of Gunboats. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1946. Story of small American coastal Navy which operated In Philippine waters to assist U.S. Army in pursuing Filipino guerrillas during the pacification campaigns. Valuable for understanding dynamics of the "sea war" between Fertig's guerrilla navy and the Japanese gunboat fleet. New York: Frederick Seton-Watson, Hugh. The East European Revolution. A. Praeger, 1956. Chapter on East European resistance movements is a useful comparison for understanding the Philippine resistance. i of MarineCarps Aviation in World War II. Sherrod, Robert. Washington: CUat orces Press, 1952. Details Marine close air support and bombing on Mindanao In support of the invasion forces and the guerrillas. Smith, Robert Aura. Phiipine Freedom 1946-1958. New York: Columbia University Press,1958. Useful in Good on integration of U.S. and Filipino cultures. understanding the cultural/political basis for the resistance movoment. Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philippines. Washington: Government PrInting Office, 19T3. Very detailed account on U.S. invasion of Mindanao. Some good detail on how the guerrillas were used. Smythe, Donald. Guerrilla Warrior: The Earl y Life of John J. Pershinl. New York: CharTles Scribner's Sons, 1973. Very useful for understanding the unique relationship which Extensive bibliography existed between the Americans and the Moros. citing rarely found sources.
271 Stafford, David. Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: A Survey Toronto: of the Special Oparations Executive, with Documents. University of Toronto Press, 1980. Of some marginal utility for understanding how the SOE worked with the AIB under GHQ, SWPA. Philippine Collaboration in World War II. Ann Steinberg, David Joel. Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967. The best English language assessment cf the collaboration issue. Very good on describing how the guerrilla resistance movement impacted on the governing of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation. Return to the Philippines. New York: Time-Life Steinberg, Rafael. Books, 1979. Has first chapter devoted to guerrilla activities. Concise overview, good for introduction to the subject. Good bibliography. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. A background introduction to ancient Chinese military precepts which influenced the Japanese. Represents the ideal theoretical construct against which actual Japanese military policies can be measured.
MacArthur: Reports of General Forces. for the Alliedof2-i Supreme Commander nso Geea Pacific i th~ Reort Jon. 0perations Tland Area, The Vol.CmII, Parts in the Southwest Japarese and II. ashington: Government Printing Office, 1966. •Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Vol. 1. Washington: Goveriment Printing Office, 1966. Very good detail on Philippine guerrillas. Mari, organizational structure, radio nets, intelligence team deploymerc. Toland, John. But Not in Shame: The Six lnths After Pearl Harbor. New York: Random House, 1961. Very good on the events which immediately preceded the establishment of the guerrilla organizations throughout the Philippines. The Twenty-Fourth Infantr' Division: A Brief History. Kokura, Kyushu, Japan: U.S. Army Military Institute, 1947. An unofficial history. U.S. Amy, Department of the Army. Order of Battle of the United States Army Ground Forces in World War II: Pacific Theater of Operations. Washington: 1959. • Special Forces Operation (U), Field Manual 31-20. Washington: September 30, 1977. Doctrine for assistance to resistance forces.
Stability Operations: U.S. Ar-by Doctrine, Field Manual 31-23. Washington: October 2, 1972. Doctrine for assistance to resistance forces. Army Special Forces, Training SThe Role of U.S. Circular 31-20-1. Washington: October 22, 1976. Basic concepts for assisting resistance Forces. Small Wars Manual. Washington: Government PrintU.S. Marine Corps. ing Office, 1940. Good for understanding U.S. doctrine for operating in a guerrilla environment during the pre-World War II period. Counter uerrilla Valeriano, Napoleon D. and Charles T. R. Bohannan. Operations: The Philippine Experience. New York: Frederick A. Praegei, 1962. Focuses on post-World War II period but draws lessons from the pre-war and wartime experience. Bibliography provides good leads to background reading. Vreeland, Nena and others. Area Handbook for :he Philippines, DA Pg. 550-72. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Comprehensive picture of the Philippines: history, culture, geography, politics, and so forth. Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. Whitney supervised the guer'illa activities in the Philippines Book contains L, chapter devoted to the Philippine for MacArthur. guerrillas. MacArthur 1941-1951. Willoughby, Charles A. and John Chamberlain. York: McGraw-Hil l eV.o the Philippine guerrilla movement. Devotes one chapter on GHQ, SWPA view. Noth-ig on Mindanao.
Willoughby, Charles Andrew. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the New York: Vantage Press, 1972. Philippnes194i-1945. the introduction, this book is a verbatim reproduction Aside f of GHQ, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines" cited above. The book's value is that it mdkes these documents available through public library circulation. Zich, Arthur. The Rising Sun. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1977. General treatment of Japan's early successes in World War II. Introduction to Japan's policies in the conquered territories. 8.
Chynoweth, E. G. "Lessons from Military Engineer, XLVI, No. Chynoweth commanded the why the U.S. failed to meet successfully.
the Fall of the Philippines," The g9-372. 313 (September-October 1954), Visayan Force. Expresses his opinion the Japanese invasion of the Philippines
273 Fertig, Claude E. "American Engineers with the Filipino Guerrillas," The Miliiary Engineer. XLI, No. 283 (September-October, 1949), 366-368. Written by Wendell Fertig's brother. Relates events on Panay: how American civilian engineers became guerrillas. "Logistical Support of Guerrilla Warfare," The Review, XLI, No. 6 (MayJune 1962), 49-68. Good introduction to the many problems of supporting guerrillas logistically. Kuder, Edward. "The Philippines Never Surrendered," The Saturda Evenin Post, (A Five Part Series), Vol. 217, No's 33, 343536, 37, lFebruary 10, 17, 24, March 3, 10, (1945). Kuder was an educator who had worked among the Moros for many years. These articles are detailed accounts of the events in Lanao Province from the Japanese invasion through September 1943. See also Kuder's article "Moros" in the Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. TV, No. 2 (1945). "Stone Age Cavemen of Mindanao," National Geographic, Mac Leish, Kenneth. Vol. 142, No. 2 (August, 1972), 219-249.
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