chapter i introduction - Shodhganga

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Indonesia is predominantly a Muslim society in Southeast Asia where more than 80 per cent of its population follows the Islamic teachings. Various other faiths like Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism as well as local animism are also very much available. It represents one of the unique examples in global history. Geographically, Indonesia is situated between two continents, the Asian and the Australian continents. Its current borders were founded by the Dutch, notwithstanding Indonesia claims for its continuity with the pre-colonial Sriwijaya and Majq)ahit civilizations.' Indonesia has 17,508 islands spreading from Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east. 6,044 islands have been inhabited while 7,623 islands are empty. This is the landmark of Indonesia, the biggest archipelago country in the world. Irian Jaya (also known as Papua, the western part of the New Guinea island), Kalimantan (two-thirds of the island of Borneo), Sumatera, Sulawesi (Celebes) and Java are five main islands in Indonesian archipelago while the remaining islands are smaller in size. These islands, spreading 5,110 kilometres from Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east and 1,888 kilometres from Talaud in the north to East Nusa Tenggara in the south, created a 1,904.569 square kilometres that is Indonesia.^ The name "Indonesia" itself has been derived from the Greek words 'Indos' and 'nesos', meaning "the Indian Islands" and gained popular usage amongst the nationalists for its noncolonial etymology.^ By sheer size, both area and population, Indonesia is the primus inter pares for Southeast Asia. Among its more than 200 different ethnic groups, with more than 500 languages and dialects, the main components are the Javanese (45 per cent), the Sundanese (14 per cent), the Madurese (7.5 per cent), and the coastal Malays (7.5 per cent). Java, the smallest among the five main islands, is the most fertile and densely

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populated island in Indonesia and has been the centre of power since the colonial poiod. The present Indonesian capital, Jakarta, formerly known as Batavia during the Dutch rule, is located in the western part of this island thus asserting the importance of Java.

More particularly after the Second World War when most of the de-colonized societies preferred to adopt a model suited to the dominant group of their respective societies, the founding fathers of Indonesia, who declared the Indonesian independence unilaterally on 17 August 1945 which received international recognition on 27 E>ecanber 1949,^ instead of adopting an Islamic socio-political system, preferred a unique kind of secular model based on the principles of the Pancasila (Five Principles). It stipulates the five principles of Indonesia: Belief in God, Humanitarianism, National Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice. These principles were in accordance with the spirit of Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) which was declared in Jakarta on 28 October 1928. This Youth Pledge has proclaimed the unity of Indonesia as "satu nusa, satu bangsa dan satu bahasa " (one land, one nation and one language).^ As such, the mjun focus of Pancasila is humanity and concern for humanitarianism. In due course of time, the concept of Pancasila gradually percolated down to the masses and acquired socio-political legitimacy.' The political parties that have sprouted in this context, by and large, adopted the secular path of democratic progress and change. This has been proven by many hardcore Islamic groups which have come to adopt themselves to the general consensus that have emerged in favour of Pancasila, thereby, giving it a greater legitimacy in the Indonesian society. Although there are political parties in Indonesia professing extreme religious ideologies and other -ism, but when they go to the masses for articulating their programs, the general focus is on the broad

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features of Pancasila. In this context, it is interesting to note that Indonesia represents a unique example of party politics.

1.1.1 The Revolutionary Period (1945 -1949)

The abrupt surrender of the Japanese to the Allied Forces on 15 August 1945 became a very important moment for Indonesia. The Japanese defeat meant the end of its short period of occupation in Indonesia, 1942 - 1945. It also signalled a power vacuum in the Japanese occupied territory like Indonesia. The Indonesian leaders, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, ignoring the Allies' order to maintain the status quo until the arrival of the Allied forces and under the inunense pressure from the impatient youth, declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945 in Jakarta. This declaration of independence was a unilateral declaration and contrary to the promise of independence given by the Japanese government to the Indonesian people. Thus, the drafting of the Constitution for an independent Indonesia as promised by the Japanese which was underway at the end of the Japanese rule in Indonesia in 1945 was rushed to completion and amendments were adopted to fit the new situation. The decision to quicken the completion of the Indonesian Constitution resulted in the promulgation of the 1945 Constitution on 18 August 1945. The 1945 Constitution featured a Republic with a presidential system of government while adopting a unitary rather than a federal system of government for Indonesia.

Having declared the independence and promulgated the Indonesian Constitution, the Indonesian leaders in the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory

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Committee for Indonesian Independence, PPKI) decided to take an emergency measure by appointing Sukarno as the Indonesian President and Muhammad Hatta as his VicePresident. It also established a Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee of Indonesia, KNIP), which was later empowered with a legislative power due to the absence of a legislative body. Soon after his appointment, Sukarno established his Presidential cabinet on August 31, 1945. At the same time, in the absence of any political parties a unified national organization was to be established as an initial step in building a Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), a State party.* The proposed national party would act as an umbrella for the various national forces in Indonesia. It was a popular belief that the fragmentation of these forces into different political parties and organizations might disrupt the nation-building process. Besides, the decision was taken as a necessary measure in the face of a revolutionary situation at the time. However, realizing the negative consequence of the choice of a single party system and as a measure taken to show to the international community that the newly independent republic was a democratic state, the idea of a single party was withheld on 1 September 1945.' Then, it was on 3 Nbvember 1945 that the Government issued a Government Act in order to maintain the basic rights of the people and to keep the country in the track of democracy.'" Through this Act, the Indonesian Government decided to let the people to form and create any political organizations on the basis of their beliefs, philosophies and ideologies. This Government Act resulted in the emergence of different new political organizations as well as the reemergence of the old political parties established during the colonial period. At the same time, this Government Act made the realization of the idea of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) in this period impracticable. In general, this Government Act consists of:

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1. In respect to democratic principles, it is a mistake to form only a single party; 2. The Government is willing to let the people to participate in the political process through the formation of political parties as an effort to understand the various sources of political power in the society; and, 3. The existence of political parties and political organizations would help the Government in counting for the responsibility of the leaders of the freedom struggle."

This Government Act was in accordance with the principles of democracy as well as the 1945 Indonesian Constitution that guaranteed all citizens the freedoms of expression and assembly.'^ It also gave the people a chance to crystallize their political ideologies that have appeared during the national struggle period in the form of political parties. The birth of political parties during this period resulted in the formation of the first Parliamentary cabinet of Sjahrir and the dismissal of the Presidential cabinet of Sukarno because soon after the issuance of the Government Act on the freedom of establishing political parties another Government Act was issued on 14 November 1945 in which a decision was taken to transform the system of government from a presidential system into a parliamentary system. Thus, Sjahrir became the first prime minister of Indonesia and his cabinet was answerable to the KNIP. However, the parliamentary system practiced during this period was lack of a constitutional basis because of the continuance of the 1945 Constitution that was designed for a Presidential system as the Indonesian Constitution.'^

1.1.2 The Parliamentary Democracy Period (1950 -1959)

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The freedom of establishing political organizations in the Revolutionary Period was the culmination of the freedom struggle movements. As Syamsuddin Haris has stated in his book, Demokrasi di Indonesia (Democracy in Indonesia), that the foremost issue appeared in the early period of independence was the issue of the freedom of making alliances and organizations and the issue of the freedom of speech and representation.'* The Government Act issued on 3 November 1945 guaranteed the freedom of the people to form any political alliances or political organizations on the basis of any ideologies (Communism, Radical Nationalism, Democratic Socialism, Religion as well as Javanese Traditionalism) during the 1945 to 1959 period.'^ But the low level of political institutionalisation with the increasing level of political participation during this period contributed to the imbalance of stability equilibrium in the polity. The various political parties established during this period tended to polarize thereby resulting in the difficulty of arriving at a national consensus.'^ The political polarization was so extreme that during the first half of the 1950s several governments had come and gone in a quick succession. However, even though this period was severely criticized for the persistent political instability the situation in the 1950s is regarded as the real democracy enjoyed by the Indonesian people ever. The political climate in this period has always been the reference for any discussion on democracy in Indonesia." The general elections held in late 1955 was the first democratic and free election ever administered in the Indonesian history. The results of the elections depicted the plurality of Indonesian society. The foUowings are political parties of all sizes existed at the time of the first parliamentary elections in Indonesia in 1955:'*

a. Major Parties

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Partai Nasional Indonesia (National Party of Indonesia) Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) Nahdatul Ulama (Association of Ulama) Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia) b. Medium-sized Parties PSII (Islamic Association Party) Partcindo (Christian Party) Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Socialist Party of Indonesia) Perti (Islamic Education Party) IPKI (League for Upholding Indonesian Independence) c. Small Parties of Nation-wide Significance PRN (National People's Party) Partai Buruh (Labour Party) GPPS (Movement to Defend Panca Sila) PRI (People's Party) PPPRI (Police Employee's Association) Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) Baperici (Consultative Body on Indonesian Citizenship) PIR-Wongsonegoro (Greater Indonesian Union-Wongsonegoro) Permai (Proletarian People's Union) PIR-Hazairin (Greater Indonesian Union-Hazairin) PPTI (Tharikah Unity Party) Acoma (Young Generation Communists)

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d. Small Parties of Regional Significance Gerinda - Yogyakarta Partai Persatuan Dayak (Dayak Unity Party) - West Kalimantan PRD (Village People's Party) - West Java AKUI-Madura Gerakan Pilihan Sunda (Sundanese Election Movement) - West Java Partai Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants' Party) - West Java Gerakan Banteng (Buffalo Movement) - West Java PIR-Nusatenggara Barat - Lombok

The Indonesian people heavily expected that the 1955 parliamentary elections would result in the formation of a strong, stable and performing government, the bases on which they themselves had chosen to cast their vote was inevitably to bring about the contrary, disappointing outcome. The non-working coalition government and weak opposition as the result of this democratically administered elections gave a very disadvantageous result to the development of Indonesia as a modernizing nation. Even though there were four major parties that were successful in gaining the majority supports in the elections: the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, PNI), with 22.3% of the votes and 57 seats; the Masyumi, a modernist Muslim party, with 20.9% of the votes and 57 seats; the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a more conservative Islamic party, with 18.4% and 45 seats; the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI), with 16.4% and 39 seats'^ but no single party secured a majority or a near-majority seats in the 257 Parliamentary seats thereby making it difficult for developing a stable political order. The coalition governments formed before and after the 1955 Parliamentary elections

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enjoyed a very short span of life. Most of these governments stayed in power for a period between eight months to one year?° Hence they were strongly preoccupied with their survival in power leaving out their responsibility to deliver social and economic progress necessary to sustain and strengthen a liberal democratic framework. The elections failed to create condition for the emergence of a strong and stable government as well as a strong opposition, a necessary requirement for the effective functioning of a liberal democracy. Weak, unstable and non-performing governments continued to rule Indonesia during this period. At the same time, the party system remained extremely fragmented and factionalised and Indonesian politics continued to retain its excessively dysfunctional and divisive character.^ The coalition governments emerged after the parliamentary elections in 1955 failed to deliver the actual functions of a government. Some intense and irreconcil^le differences between the coalition pmtners, especially between the PNI and the Masyumi for their contrasting ideologies,^^ within the short-lived government made the possibility of an effective government impracticable. The mass-based political parties in a largely illiterate population made it even more difRcult for Indonesia to develop a stable political order. The weak economy began to decline due to lack of proper attention and management. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in its economic survey of 1961 had reported:

The most obvious symptom of Indonesia's economic weakness is the trend in its per capita income. Although the estimates are not altogether reliable, they suggest that national product increased at an average rate of 4 per cent during 1951-1957, declined by 3.2 per cent in 1958 and recovered in the following year by only 1.3 per

cent The relatively h i ^ average rate of growth, higher than India or Pakistan, reflects little more than the restoratim of pre-war production capacity, which makes relatively small investments appear to give significant increases in output The process seems to have ended, because the high returns of the fifties could not be sustained without stepping up the rate of investment... It is significant that during 1954 - 1959 per capita incomes remained virtually stagnant at approximately Rp. 1,500 per annum (except in 1957). In real terms, this level of per capita income is probably not far from pre-war level, as also seems to be the case in Burma. Growth during post-indep^dence period thus represents largely a process of economic rehabilitation and an advance just sufficient to keep up with population.^*

The record of democratically elected government during the liberal democracy period in producing economic progress was disappointing, vety contrary to the hope and expectation of the Indonesian people. They failed to convert the supports of the votCTs into political as well as economic policies. In addition, there was widespread and extreme dissatisfaction among the political elites themselves with the management of economy by various coalition governments throughout the period. The late 1950s witnessed the increase in the antagonisms among the parties, regional dissatisfactions, armed forces discontent, and the ambitions of President Sukarno combined with a shallow elite commitment to liberal democratic procedures, and eventually, to bring down the parliamentary system.

1.1.3 The Old Order or Guided Democracy Period (1960 -1965)

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Indonesian experience with liberal democracy was entirely an unh^^y one. Even though the period bore witness to the practice of democratic principles where political participation was hig|i, but the acute political instability and ethnic and political confrontations contradicted the success of this mass participation in the decision-making process.^^ It was noted that even as early as the late 1952, President Sukarno had insisted that Indonesia was feeing a political crisis 'because of our unsettled political views and the parties' jockeying for power - with the result that the situation is seen as a failure of democracy and that the people want a dictatorship.' It was in this situation that he wanted to create a 'real Indonesian Democracy' and not on the basis of the notion that '50 per cent plus one are always right which constituted a central principle of majority rule. ^^ By the late 1950s, the disenchantment with liberal democracy became so extreme and widespread that even the legally constituted governments in office were not seen as having the moral right to govern and few among the Indonesian party leaders, who operated the system since independence, had the courage to defend them in public. This conflicting political environment was a ready-made for President Sukarno to push for his own special notion of a 'real Indonesian democracy' in the form of a Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy).^^

The new system introduced by the President was conceived and presented to the Indonesian people as a solution for the immense problems faced by the nation through a thorough restructuring of the political and economic institutions in conformity with the Indonesian tradition and values. But on the contrary, the system was to function differently under the massive personal influence of President Sukarno who had pioneered the idea. With the re-promulgation of the 1945 Constitution, a Constitution that was designed for a

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presidential system of government with a heavy executive powers rest in the hands of the president as the chief of executive, through a military-backed Presidential Decree in July 5, 1959, the centre of power was shifted from the Parliament into the hands of the President. The Presidential Decree automatically discharged the previous system of Parliamentary government. The Guided Democracy was to provide the President the sort of constitutional framework which could eventually be manipulated by the President to establish himself as the master of Indonesia.^' By 1961-62, the concept had been turned into a vehicle for a chaotic, authoritarian, and adventurist regime presided over by Sukarno.

This period of Guided Democracy was characterized by attempts to involve all the major parties in the government and to reduce the significance of political parties in the decision-making process by providing the representation of so-called functional groups: youth, women, trade unions and, in particular, the armed forces, in the govemment.^^ The establishment of a National Front was another important feature of the system. The Front was filled with the representatives of all political groupings with a task of assisting the government in preparing the list of the candidates to sit in the parliament in which half of the list would be the reiM^sentatives of political parties and the other half would come from the functional groups'". Guided Democracy scripted by President Sukarno successfully replaced the Parliamentary Democracy.

With power in his hands, President Sukarno dissolved the Parliament elected in late 1955 and installed a new Parliament called a Gotong Royong Parliament. The new parliament consisted of the representatives of the political parties as well as the different functional groups and the armed forces, with a clear majority of them representing the

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latter. He further restricted the role of the political parties by issuing a Presidential Legislation No. 7/1959 on party simplification, followed by another Presidential Legislation No. 13/1960 on the recognition, control and dissolution of political party, thus revoking the Government Act issued on 3 November 1945.^^ Having banned the Masyumi and the PSI through Presidential Decisions No. 200 and 201 on the basis of an alleged involvement of some of their leadership in the Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Piagam Perjuangan Ral^at Semesta Alam (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Charter of Universal Struggle, PRRI/Permesta) rebellion in Sumatra in 1958, he dissolved all political parties existed leaving only 10 p)olitical parties which had successfully passed the tight screening test by the Govemment.^^ These parties were the PKI, the PNI, the NU, the Partai Katholik, the Parkindo, the Partindo, the Murba, the PSII, the IPKI and the Perti.^ In a short period. President Sukarno and the Army succeeded in virtually sidelining the political parties. The only political party that was capable of influencing the President's policies during this period was the PKI thereby acting as the possible rival for the Army. And it did not take President Sukarno a longer time to extend his control over the government and the polity to a degree that he could establish and administer the Guided Democracy while at the same time neglecting the basic purposes for which he had pioneered the system and the philosophy upon which he had based the new concept. Soon, for all practical purposes, under the guise of the so-called 'real Indonesian Democracy', an adventurist authoritarian regime, presided over by the increasingly more erratic and megalomaniac President Sukarno, had been imposed over Indonesia. Thus, the institution of Guided Democracy did not 'reduce instability' in the sense of lengthening the life of cabinets or reducing ministerial turnover instead transforming the democratic polity into an autoritarianism.^^ Similarly, the economy was more massively mismanaged than

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ever before, bringing the country to virtual bankruptcy. Indonesia suffered utter eccmomic cliaos and decline. A vast majority of Indonesian people faced extreme hardship brought by massive unemploymrat, acute food shortages and a raging inflation. The regime had little time of inclination to worry about these problems. The Guided Democracy did no better than the governments in the liberal democracy and failed to create the requisite socioeconomic foundations of a democracy and to give the Indonesian people the wherewitfial to act efTectively as citizens of a democratic polity.^^ The situation during this period can be summed up by the conclusion of John Legge's biography of Sukarno in which he states that in the period of Guided Democracy:

Indonesia's problem was not that an authoritarian regime had emerged but rather that the new regime, like the old one, was unable to mobilize the power that was needed if government was to be effective and if the gigantic problems of the economy were to be tackled seriously.^^

1.1.4 Tile New Order or PancasUa Democracy t*eriod (1966 -1998)

The Indonesian leaders had wasted fifteen years of independent nationhood. They could not effectively use that precious period to adapt the democratic polity to the Indbnesian reality and failed to create the necessary changes and progress in the socioeconomic framework so as to build the requisite foundations of a democratic polity. Their inability to deliver had resulted in the failed coup by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) on 30 September 1965 in which several military generals were assasinated.^' The coup ended the reign of President Sukarno and the Old

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Order, the Guided Demoaacy/' General Suharto, head of the Komando Strategis Angfuitan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command, KOSTRAD), and the most senior officer left in command, crushed tfie coup attempt Having assumed fiiU governmental control on 11 March 1966, he reorganized the economy as well as the political system leading to the establishment of the New Order, to distance his regimefix>mthe failed economic and super nationalist policies of President Suicamo's Old Order thus gradually eased Sukarno aside.'*®

Indonesia under the New Order had to begin the journey once again, to achieve the necessary socio-economic revolution leading eventually, in the long run, to a fiilly democratic Indonesia. The transition to the formal establishment of the New Order consisted of three distinct stages, covering the period from 1 October 1965 to 27 March 1%8 when finally General Suharto came to assume full control over government following his appointment by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (People's Consultative Assembly - Interim, MPR(S)) as the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. The stages are:^*

1. From 1 October 1965 to 11 March 1966: General Suharto functioning as Commander of KOPKAMTIB {Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban) appointed by President Sukarno; 2. 11 March 1966 to 12 March 1967: General Suharto, acting as the 'Chief Executive' of government based upon President Sukarno's 'Executive Orda- of 11 March 1966 to General Suharto' (Supersemar - Sural Perintah Sehelas Maret)f^ took all necessary steps to guarantee security, peace and stability in the governance of Indonesia;

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3. 12 March 1967 to 27 March 1968: Under the Decree No. 33 of the Special Session of the MPR(S), Genaal Suharto was made as the Acting President of Indonesia.

The military, one of the key political players during the Sukarno's Old Order with the already banned PKI, became the most dominant power in the New Order. Holding the notion oi dwifungsi (dualfimctions),the military argued that it must play two important roles in Indonesia: the security and the socio-political role.^^ Dwifimgsi efiTectively gave the army the rationale for a role in domestic affairs. This notion of dual functions by the military was not a good signal for a democratic life in a relatively young nation like Indonesia.

The New Order was hoped to deliverfi^edomsand expectations of the people that long had be«i taken and held for granted by President Sukarno with his Guided Democracy. The hope of reviving the political parties and party politics as practiced in the early days of the Republic was great among the masses. Nevertheless, the leaders of the New Order had proposed a differ^it blue print for the Republic. At the same time, the economic problemfiicedduring this period was too ^vere and needed immediate attention from the new regime. Harold Crouch reported that:

In 1965 prices rose by more than 500 per cent; in fact thericesoared by more than 900 per cent. Unless swift and correct steps are taken, it may sl^rocket by more than 1,000 per cent in 1966. In the 1950s the state budget sustained deficits of 10 to 30

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per cent of receipts and the 1960s it soared to more than 100 per cent In 1965 it even reached 300 per cent. Within thefirstquarter of this year, it amounted to almost the whole government expenditure in 1965.

Realizing the acute situation in the Republic, the new regime decided to create a new political structure that:

1. Could supports the economic transformation programs; and 2. Could control the side effects of die programs, especially to tame the oppositions and to restrict them from disturbing the government's economic programs.^^

Thus, the government had decided to create a new political party system based on:

1. The creation of political environment based on political consensus that would be free from ideological conflicts. Thus, the government decided to limit the party politics and to limit the movement of political parties and ret)resentative bodies. 2. The limitation of pluralistic political participation among the masses. Mass political participations would be meant for helping the success of the economic progratns carved out by the political elites.^

The government's decisions to limit the movement of political parties and the creation of a limited political party system were totally out of the expectations of the masses, especially the party elites that long had been in the periphery during the Old Order. This New Order regime under the leadership of General Suharto, with Developmentalism as its ideology,

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further weakened, abused and misused the democratic tools for its own benefits and survival.

The introduction of the GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, the Service Group) as the 'civilian hands of the Army'^^ and as a political vehicle for the new regime, further entrenched the control of the military over the Indonesian politics. In 1969, the Ministerial Regulation Number 12/1969 issued by the then Minister of Internal Affairs, General Amir Machmud, made the government civil servants out of party politics and forced them to be loyal to the government** This Government policy was not meant for liberating nor neutralizing the bureaucracyfix)mthe influence of political parties. On the contrary, it was meant for mobilizing the bureaucracy to be the loyal supporters of the GOLKAR, a political party on the guise of a service group, as a show of loyalty to the Government. This policy proved to be effective when the GOLKAR, with the full support fix)m the military and the bureaucracy, and nine political parties, the Partai Katholik, the PSII, the NU, the Parmusi, the Paricindo, the IPKI, the PNI, the Perti and the Murba, contested the long delayed election held in 1971. GOLKAR, the new comer in the Indonesian party politics, woh 62.80 % of the total votes in the election, leaving out the 'big parties' during Parliamentary £)emocracy period like the NU and the PNI as the big losers securing only 18.68 % and 6.93 % respectively.*^ This defeat was a strong indication to the end of an era of t)arty politics in Indonesia.

The political legitimacy achieved through this election further cemented the aims of the New Order regime to create a new political structure for Indonesia. They wanted to create a functioning democracy in Indonesia, a Pancasila Democracy, under the guidance

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of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In 1973, the Government decided to fiiither limit the number of political parties, from ten parties into two and one service group, the GOLKAR. This process was the culmination of the limited party system first introduced by President Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period. On the pretext of avoiding clashes of ideologies between the political parties and to achieve stability, the Government forced the political parties having similar aims and ideologies to merge into a single political body. Out of nine political parties left during this period, four Islamic parties (the NU, the Parmusi, the PSII and the Perti) were merged into a single party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unity Development Party, PPP). At the same time, the non-Islamic parties and the nationalist parties (the PNI, the Partai Katholik, the Parkindo, the IPKI and the Murba) were forced to merge into a political party called the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI). The Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI), the single most successful party during the Old Order, had been dissolved and banned by the Government due to their alleged involvement in the failed coup of 30 September 1965.^ One year after the successfiil process of forced party fusion, in August 1975 the Government introduced a new law on Political Party and Gt)LKAR known as Political Law Number 3/1975.^' The general characteristic of this law can described as follow:"

Issues Name

Number of Party

Formulas

Re^aits

Law for Political Parties GOLKAR is not a and GOLKAR political Jjarty and the relation between them is asymmetrical. Three, PPP, GOLKAR, PDI Impossibility for the creation of any new

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Aims of Party

Too normative, such as "to create a just and welfare society"; "to develop Pancasila Democracy"

Party organization

political party It does not show the function of political party as a mean for the creation of civil society and democratisation Floating mass

Party workers are up to the county (kabupaten) level only Dissolution of party President has the power to Blurred mechanism, the dissolve any political party role of the President is too much Party membership To be a member of any No clear-cut explanation among government civil political party "with the on the political affiliation servants q)proval of a super of the government civil ordinate"; to hold any post servants. in any political party "with a written consent of a super ordinate"

The floating mass, the excessive power of the President aver political parties, the different status given to GOLKAR vis-ji-vis the PPP and the PDI, the limitation on the ri^ts of individuals to join political parties and the impossibility of party formation in the future became subject of concern among the academicians and the party elites. These restrictions and manipulations of power by the Government were certainly in contradiction with the principles of democracy. However, this was what the New Order's founder wanted, a democracy that worics. This political law clearly discriminated the political parties fh)m the GOLKAR, a political party on the guise of a service group.

kavihg succeeded in the party simplification program, thus limiting a pluralistic participation, the government further tried to implement their Other objectives: an ideological conflict free political environment that would deliver political stability and economic progress. Because, as Herbert Feith described, immaturity of the politicians and

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the ideological conflicts among the c
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The legal political legitimacy achieved by the New Order through the first general election in 1971 followed by a simplified party system that contributed to a relatively stable government fiirther strengthoied its hold on Indonesia thus allowing it to reconstruct the broken economy through the first five year plan under the "Development Cabinet" in the hope of strengthening the legitimacy through practical achievements. Economic growth and development became the other legitimising sources of the New Order.^' Relying on many academically trained economists and other professionals, Suharto succeeded in the reconstruction process. Soon, the new regime succeeded in bringing inflation under control, deregulating and 'de-bureaucratising' the economy, balancing the budget, rescheduling debts incurred by the Old Order, beginning of a fiee exchange system, introducing new banking laws to oisure proper functioning of banks and importing enough rice to ensure adequate supplies.^* The implementation of the new economic policies during the subsequent period represented a revolutionary change from the extreme nationalism, economic as well as political, and the guided economy of the Old Order to one in which market forces were permitted to play an increasingly more significant role, thou^ still under the government's guidance and within limits imposed by iL The success of the economic reconstruction continued to be part of the New Order's achievement during its three decades in Indonesia.

The success of party simplification in the formative years of the New Order and the subsequent introduction of the single ideology, the Pancasila, for all political organizations became the political foundations of a new limited democracy, 'a democracy that works.'^ Many dysfunctional characteristics of the Indonesian politics during the period of the Old Order became a deep concern of the New Order. These included the following:^

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1. Intense political intolerance, aggressiveness and polarization; 2. Persecution and hounding of political opponents; 3. Personality cult and virtual one-man rule; 4. President Sukarno's obsession with performing on the world scene as a leader of liberation movements; 5. Utter neglect of the economy; 6. Breakdown of government, administration and law; 7. Overindulgence in mass mobilization and action; 8. Over dependence on demagoguery and exploitation of popular emotions.

Based on a national consensus that had developed among the Indonesian people that if Indonesia was to progress, prosper, and maintain its national unity, its politics and political institutions and processes had to be subsequently revamped to create a democracy that worked and produced the well being of the lai:gest number. The new limited democracy based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution became the formula of a political system of the New Order. It aimed at:

.. .a more realistic and pragmatic way of thinking without sacrificing the ideals of the national struggle, serious efforts to realize the ideals of economic democracy and the creation of a social, political, economic and cultural life imbued with the morals of Pancasila, in particular with the principle of 'Belief in the One and Only God.'^'

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The successful efforts by the New Order regime in sustaining their political legitimate through sustained economic progress in market-oriented policies as well as through regular parliamentary elections in every five years, contributed to its successful control over Indonesian politics for more than three decades, 1966-1998. During this period, Indonesia experienced a democracy called the Pancasila Democracy, a political structure desired, created and nurtured by the New Order regime on the basis of the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the Stpersemar. However, the 1990s became the turning point of the regime's control over Indonesia. It bore witness of the regime fatigue in which any policies introduced by the government were regarded to be wrong and inappropriate. The biggest mistake done by the regime was, as Anthony L. Smith reported in his Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan, that:

The government became increasingly intolerant of opposition voices. In 1996 Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, was overthrown as leader of the PDI in a rigged selection process. This sparked domestic unrest and was the beginning of sustained public opposition, which dramatically escalated after the Indonesian economy crashed in E>ecember 1997. Many blamed corruption, collusion and nepotism (known by its Indonesian acronym - KKN, or Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme), largely centered on the Suharto family, for the economic collapse. By May 1998 dononstrations had broken out all over Indonesia. Student-led demonstrations demanded greater democracy, while urban poor rioted against the removal of subsidies on basic commodities (mandated by the International Monetary Fund) and soaring prices. Elements of the military organized chaos and violence against the Chinese community, seemingly in a bid to provoke martial law and thus

33

save Suharto's teetering regime."

All efforts by President Suharto and the military leadership to preserve the regime were to no avail. Economic development as the basis of the regime's legitimacy started to erode. Supports from the elites were winding out. General Suharto's three political resources: coercion, persuasion and material realization,^^ had finally failed to perform. The government was in no position to force its coercive policies to the people, no persuasive efforts succeeded and there was no materialization of the programs and policies benefited to the people. Finally, General Wiranto, the head of the Indonesian military, refused to act agunst the continuous waves of demonstrations thereby removing General Suharto's last hope of retaining the power. This situation finally forced General Suharto to submit his resignation to the MPR on the morning of 21 May 1998 thus ending the 32 years of the New Order regime. He made a brief speech telling the Indonesian people that under the present situation, it was "very difRcult to perform the government's tasks and [to promote] development of the country anymore." He therefore decided to berhenti (resign) from the presidency.^

1.1.5 The Post-Sufaiarto Period (1999 - Present)

According to the Indonesian Constitution, the resignation, or in any case the failure of the President to continue his position in office, paves the way for the Vice-President to take over the full responsibility as the Chief of Executive. The resignation of General Suharto as the Indonesian President in 1998 automatically made B.J. Habibie, the then Vice-President, the third President of Indonesia amidst a period of high public demand for

34

reformasi (political and economic reform). Habibie faced a situation whichrequiredhim to be more responsive towards the opposition groups. Four eminent reformist leaders, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Amien Rais (Chairman of Partai Amanat National and former Chairman of Midtammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization in Indonesia) and Sultan Hameng^buwono X (Governor of Yogyakarta) gathered in Wahid's residence in Ciganjur to discuss the nation's future and issued an eight-point declaration - later known as "Ciganjur Declaration" - demanding a clean and democratic government based on the 1945 Constitution in order to preserve unity and to realize a prosperous society."

The proceeding political processes gave a new scenario to the Indonesian political structure. The most important process was the dramatic re-politicisation of Indonesia through the imposition of greater freedom of speech and assembly for the people. Government legislation was issued to allow the creation of new political parties, the proposal of an early general election as well as the alterations to the composition of the members of the parliament. Thus, hundreds of political prisoners were released, free elections were held in June 1999, the first since 1955, and the Parliament assumed its original role as a check on the executive power, a role that has been specified in the 1945 Constitution.^ Nonetheless, the changes that have been made by the B.J. Habibie's government failed to erase President B J. Habibie'sreputationas the continuation of the New Orderregime.The June 1999 general elections became the turning point of Indonesian political structure where the GOLKAR came a distant second to Megawati's Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, PDI-P), a break away party of the original PDI (the PDI-P won 34% of the vote with 153 seats in

35

Parliament as compared to the GOLKAR'S 22% votes and 120 seats in the Parliamait).*^ The results of the 1999 general elections dononstrated the broad continuity of the Indonesian party politics with the party politics of the parliamentary democracy in the 1950s.^ The following is the list of 48 political parties competed in the 1999 general election:^'

1. Partai Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Party) 2. Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Christian National Party) 3. Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) 4. Partai Aliansi Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian E>emocratic Alliance Party) 5. Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party) 6. Partai Umat Islam (Muslim Party) 7. Partai Kebangkitan Umat (People's Awakening Party) 8. Partai Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi Party) 9. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) 10. Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party) 11. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Strtiggle) 12. Partai Abid Yatama (Abul Yatama Party) 13. Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (National Independent Party) 14. Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love Nation Democratic Party) 15. Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 16. Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party) 17. Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia 1905 (Indonesian Islamic Union Party 1905) 18. Partai Katholik Demokrat (Catholic Democratic Party)

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19. Partai Pilihan Rakyat (People's Choice Party) 20. Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People Party) 21. Partai Politik Mam Indonesia Masyumi (Indonesian Islamic Masyumi Political Party) 22. Partai Bulan Bintang (Star Crescent Party) 23. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (Workers Solidarity Party) 24. Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) 25. Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Party) 26. Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis (Indonesian National Maiiiaenist Front Party) 27. Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence Party) 28. Partai Republik (Republic Party) 29. Partai Islam Demokrat (Islamic Democratic Party) 30. Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National Party for Maiiiaen Masses) 31. Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (All People's Deliberation Party) 32. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (National Democratic Party) 33. Partai GOLKAR (GOLKAR Party) 34. Partai Persatuan (Unity Party) 35. Partai Kehangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) 36. Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (Uni Democratic Indonesia Party) 37. Partai Buruh Nasional (National Labours Party)

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38. Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (Family Deliberation Mutual Help Party) 39. Partai Daulat Rakyat (People's Independent Party) 40. Partai Cinta Damai (Love Peace Party) 41. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party) 42. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (Solidarity of All Indonesian Workers Party) 43. Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) 44. Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika {Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Party) 45. Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Uni National Solidarity Party) 46. Partai Nasional Demokrat (National E)emocratic Party) 47. Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) 48. Partai Pekerja Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Party)

The Parliament's rejection of President BJ. Habibie's accountability speech on 20 October 1999 signalled the end of his hope to retain his presidency, thus finally ending the New Order. As a result, through a series of negotiations, promises and double crosses, AtklUrrahmdrt Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur), A charismatic trdditionalist Muslim cleric whosfc party, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakeriing Party, PKB), stoUred only 12% and SI seats in the Parliament, came from behind to gather the support of the Poros Tengah (the Central Axis of the Muslim Parties) and the GOLKAR, to capture the presidency, defeating the favourite Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P. President Abdurrahman Wahid presided over further democratisation and economic reform, but a

38

high degree of political instability and socio-political violence continued during this period. As R. William Liddle described in the conclusion of his essay, Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky Start for Democracy.

The high hopes of many Indonesians and others for the Gus Dur presidency, which began in October 1999, were largely disappointed in 2000. Even his well wishers believe that he has not mastered the politics of translating into reality the vision of democracy, religious tolerance, and egalitarian development that, as a leading Jakarta intellectual and NGO activist, he expounded for a quarter century.

.. .Throughout the year, the president seemed both distracted from important matters of national concern, as indicated by his several policy missteps and fi^uent foreign jaunts, and narrowly, pertiaps even corruptly, focused on building his personal power base and that of his party, the PKB.™

Twelve months after his f^pointment as the fourth president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid was widely regarded as a failed president. His personal legitimacy continued to decline. It was on the fateful 23 July 2001, slightly less than two years after his election, that he was removed fh)m his presidency by the MPR and was replaced by his VicePresident, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Legislators accused Abdurrahman Wahid of engaging in corruption, allowing economic reforms to languish, exacerbating regional political and social conflicts, and generally providing weak and incompetent leadership. Above all, legislators resented his refusal to acknowledge the DPR as his constitutional equal."

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Megawatis's ascendancy undoubtedly reflected the desire among national political leaders to re-establish a modicum of stability after three years of rapid, often violent, political change. Moreover, constructing a stable national government is certainly a prerequisite to achieving the stability of Indonesia as a whole. In the absence of a stable government in Jakarta, economic and regional challenges have mounted. Megawati was better positioned to achieve these goals than her predecessor did. The legislative branch was certainly stron^r than ever and the assembly had cautiously but continually amended the constitution, building broad consensus for each change. Both the legislative bodies demonstrated a willingness to accommodate demands by altering basic political institutions. Unfortunately, reasons for pessimism abound. Michael S. Malley reported that:

...offers of special autonomy to Aceh and Papua, [two most volatile regions in Indonesia], might be too little, too late... E)ecentralization has proceeded too far for the national government even to protect its economic interests, let alone reverse the process, and the fractious legislature seems an unlikely partner for a president who needs to make difficult tradeoffs in order to achieve economic reform, all the while preparing for an election in 2004.^

Political instability remained to be the phenomenon in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The multiparty system introduced by President B.J. Habibie's government in 1999 resulted in the breation of different political parties with different ideological affiliations. However, the system brought little change to the polity. From almost 200 political parties created, 141 parties were recognized by the Department of Justice and only 48 parties out of that fantastic number were eligible to contest the 1999 election. 21 parties won at least one of

40

the 462 contested seats in the Parliament while at the national level, there were five most popular parties:^^

1. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, PDI-P) with 34% of the total votes and 153 seats in the Parliament; 2. Partai GOLKAR, with 22% of the total votes and 120 seats; 3. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB), with 12% and 51 seats; 4. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unity Development Party, PPP), with 10% and 58 seats; 5. Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN), with 7% and 34 seats.

Thus, the result of thisfipeeand democratic parliamentary election produced a fractious legislature that seemed as an unlikely partner of a president. In this quasi-parliamentary structure, the president is required to maintain broad support in the legislature. Indonesia's current electoral system of proportional system almost guarantees that no single party is capable to secure a majority votes. With just 31% of the seats in the House of Representatives, and 27% in the Assembly, Megawati's party cannot govern alone. It needed coalition partners. However, the personal differences among party leaders, and ideological ones among the parties, inhibited the formation of stable coalitions. An example had been shown in the case of President Wahid who had been impeached from his office due to his weak leadership and the lack of majority supports in the parliament. As such, Megawati found it complicated to translate her more stable political position as compared to her predecessor into more effective policies. At the same time, the status of her

41

government as the continuation of President Wahid's term in office added to the difficulty of transforming the supports into good decisions and policies in a short time.

1.2 Statements of problems

The question of political stability and legitimacy in the heterogenic Indonesian polity since its independence in 1945 remains an unanswered question to this day. The experimentation of a muhi-party system in a parliamentary system of government in the 19S0s failed to provide the expected answer of a stable, legitimate and performing government. The political legitimacy achieved by the elected governments during this period of liberal democracy failed to be transformed into a stable and performing government. The fractured mandate as a result of this extreme pluralism failed to create a strong government and strong opposition. Instead tfie practice of a multiparty system made Indonesia to witiiess the frequent changes of governments.

Fearing the breakdown of the nation due to the unending crisis of political instability in the 1960s as a result of an authoritarian rule of President Sukarno, the military took over and established a presidential government, a system of government which was contrary to the previous practice of parliamentary politics. However, realizing the lack of moral and legal legitimacy of the new government and as an effort to achieve political stability in the polity, limited party politics was established and orchestrated elections were held to achieve legitimacy. Economic development was also taken into consideration in building up the legitimacy for the government. The strategy proved to be fruitful in which a stable government was performing during the course of more than three decades. But the

42

inability of the regime to provide a wider channel for the increasing interest of political participation among the masses, and more so, the failure of the system to absorb it, led to the failure of this regime to stay in power. The failure of the economy, the practical basis of the regime's political legitimacy, to perform in the late 1990s contributed further to its final departure. This situation had resulted in the instability and legitimacy crisis in Indonesia in which the regime was finally voted out of power by the popular pressure in 1998.

The failure of the government to accommodate people's participation in the decision-making process during the course of more than three decades opened the way for the reconstruction process of the Indonesian political system. The democratic practice in the early days of the Republic was an important experience for reformulating the polity. The liberal party politics that d(»ninated the parliamentary democracy in the 1950s witnessed popular participation of the people in the decision-making process. However, the instability crisis due to the lack of national consensus in an extreme pluralism in which various governments rose and fell also dominated the period.

The brief period of an authoritarian rule of President Sukarno was a painful experience of instability crisis for the Indonesian polity. And even though the subsequent military rule had provided some sort of political stability, but the lack of legitimacy of the government

and

the

imbalance

between

political

participation

and

political

institutionalisation was not an answer to the question either. A maximum political participation of the masses and an adequate political institutionalisation are necessary to create political stability and legitimacy in a democratic polity. The ability of the polity to keep the balance between these two will give an answer to the question of political stability

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and legitimacy. Party politics as an impwtant aspect of democracy needs to be redefmed in Indonesia. Party system, in which political parties interact, needs to be reformulated in order to achieve this balance. But a refonnulation of party system alone will not guarantee the answer to the crisis. Checks and balances between various oi^ans of government become another aspect of importance in establishing a stable and legitimate government.

In an effort to answer the question of instability and legitimacy crisis in Indonesian polity, a hypothesis is proposed in this study. Under the framework of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which guarantee the freedom of democratic principles, and while keeping in mind the various aspects of democracy, the process of party politics as an important aspect of democratic polity will become the core emphasis in this study. Thus, realizing the different political groupings and political currents in the history of Indonesian party politics since its independence, a moderate pluralism will provide an answer to the problem of political stability and legitimacy in Indonesia. In a moderate pluralism where three - four parties operate'*, the possibility of creating a stable and legitimate government is more apparent than in an extreme pluralism where national consensus becomes the most difficult thing to achieve. Moreover, in a heterogeneous society like Indonesia where there are several political aspirations, party system of this kind can perform a cohesive and integrative function as opposed to the extreme pluralism.

13 Aims of Research

With this background in mind, this study tries to understand the factors leading into the development of party system in Indonesia and political model wedded to the

44

humanitarian principles of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution that eventually might bring political stability and legitimacy. Iliete are two related books on the subject matter that have been written by different scholars which, however, could not provide a clear-cut study to the relationship between party syston and political stability and legitimacy. One book written by Mutfaiah Alag^pa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, dealt extensively on the problem of political legitimacy but lacking of discussion on the relation between party system and political stability and legitimacy while anoAer book written by Arbi Sanit, Politik Perwakilan didalam Order Bam (Representative Politics in the New Order) discussed about the party system under the New Order, the problems it faced and the prospect it m i ^ t have in the future. Each of the two studies concentrated oa the subject matter separately. Other studies undertaken by different scholars put the subject matter separately or if it h£^)pens to be any discussion on the subject, it is lacking in any specifity. Hence it is very necessary here to undertake a study that focuses on the process of development of party system and political stability and legitimacy in Indonesia. And in this study, th&e are three points, which become the main focus. These are:

1. liie analysis of the party politics and the political processes in Indonesian polity; 2. The reconstruction of a suitable Indonesian party system that will bring political stability and legitimacy to the Indonesian polity; and, 3. As a contribution to the study of party system in relation to political stability and legitimacy in modernizing nations, especially Indonesia, that would be useful as a complementary guide to the study of Indonesian politics.

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1.4 Methodol(^

To answer the questions posed in this research, it is necessary to formulate a suitable methodology. Besides, identification of variables involve in the researdi in order to formulate a framework of analysis to probe the hypothesis posed cannot be ignored either. Certain aspects like the method of study, units of analysis, limitations of the study as well as data collection and data analysis techniques will be discussed in the following.

1.4.1 Methods of Analysis

This research is descriptive in nature. A descriptive analysis is a fact-fmding study with an accurate interpretation aiming at the creation of a systematic description or depiction, factual and accurate about facts, tendencies and relation between phenomena under study.'^ As such, this study is hoped to provide a clearer picture on the development of party system in Indonesia that eventually bring about political stability and legitimacy. Thus the hypothesis posed in the beginning of this research will either to be supported or rejected.

1.4.2 Units of Analysis

llie unit of analysis in this research is Indonesia as a political system where superstructure and infrastructure components such as the party system, the political parties, the military, the executive, the judiciary as well as the legislature are present. Tlie interactions of these components are hoped to bring about political stability and legitimacy

46

in Indonesia. Political parties and the party system as the principal institutional means for organizing the expansion of political participation in a democratic polity will be the main focus of study. Other components like the militaiy and other governmental bodies will support the study.

1.43 Limitations of the Study

This research is limited to the study of the development of party system and the political processes in Indonesia since independence until the fourth amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This will be broadly divided into five different periods: the Revolutionary Period, the Parliamentary Democracy Period, the Guided E>emocracy Period or the Old Order, the Pancasila Democracy Period or the New Order and the Post-Suharto Period.

1.4.4 tHita Collection Procedures

Recogilizing the importance of the study, it would be more accurate when primary data are used. These primary sources would give a better foundation for constructing the fhimewbrk in the study. However, relying on primary data is not enough to construct a thesis of this kind. A great deal of secondary data is very necessary for the completion of the study. As such, library research is conducted to complete the data collection process. Related materials from books, journals, governmental documents and records, articles and news in the media are collected, selected and analyzed.

1.4.5 Data Analysis Technique

47

The data analysis process in this study is descriptive-qualitative in nature. Bodgan and Taylor argue that qualitative research as a research procedure will result in descriptive data in the form of written words or might be in the form of people and their behaviour as an object of study.'^ Recognizing the scope of study, which is in a national level, the analysis in the study will follow the chronological political processes occurred. It means that in all of the analysis, data interpretation is needed. Through this process, a clear picture of the phenomoia will be available with analysis and interpretation.

1.4.6 Chapter Arrangement of the Thesis

This thesis contains of five chapters as follow:

Chapter I

It consists of preliminary discussion of the research, dealing with the importance of the topic, the statements of problems, the aims of research, and also the chosen methodology being used in the research

Chapter II

Hie chapter discusses the theoretical background of the study and the frameworic of analysis of the study

Chapter III

The development of party systems in the history of Indonesian politics is discussed in this chapter

48

Chapter IV

The chapter focuses on the relation between party system and political stability and legitimacy as well as the analysis and discussions on the data found in the research

Conclusions

This contains the conclusions of the thesis

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Notes:

1. Smith, Anthony L., "Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan" in John Funston (ed.). Governments and Politics in Southeast Asia, ISEAS, Singapore, 2001, p. 74. 2. Indonesia 2001: An Official Handbook, National Communication and Information Agency Republic of Indonesia, pp. 7-21. 3. Smith, op. cit., p. 80. 4. Ibid, p. 82. 5. Grossart, Ian, Indonesia: The Archetypal New State in Roger Scott, The Politics of New States: A General Analysis with Case Studies from Eastern Asia, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1970, p. 133. 6. Smith, op. cit., pp. 75-76. 7. Ramage, Douglas E., Politics in Indonesia, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 6. 8. Dhakidae, Daniel, ^Partai politik dan Sistem Kepartaian di Indonesia'^ (Political Party and Party System in Indonesia), in Pilihan Artikel Prisma, Analisa Kekuatan Politik di Indonesia (Analysis of Political Power in Indonesia), Jakarta, LP3ES, 1988, pp. 189-225. 9. Ibid, p. 201. 10. Kahin, George McTuman, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1961, p. 154. 11. Wilopo, Zaman Pemerintahan Partai-partai Politik (The Era of Party Government), Idayu, Jakarta, 1978, p. 9. See Annexure - IV far details of this Government Act

50

12. UUD 1945 Pasal 25 (1945 Constitution, Article No. 28). For details on this matter see Annexure - III. 13. Yasunaka, Akio, The Sequences of "Crises" in Indonesia, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1976. He explains that the Provisional 1950 Constitution explicitly provided for a parliamentary cabinet based on popular sovereignty and universal suffrage, freedom of association and freedom of speech while limiting the role of president and vice-president to an almost symbolic one, a figurehead position, with prime minister as the chief of executive whereas the 1945 Constitution was designed for a presidential system with a heavy executive power rest in the hands of the president as the chief of executive. For details on the powers of the President see Annexure - III. 14. Haris, Syamsudin, Demokrasi di Indonesia (Democracy in Indonesia), LP3ES, Jakarta, 1995, p. 61. 15. Feith, Herbert, and Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, Cornell UP, Ithaca, 1970, p. 14. For details on this Government Act see Annexure IV. 16. Budiardjo, Miriam, Demokrasi di Indonesia (Democracy in Indonesia), Gramedia, Jakarta, 1994, p. 42. 17. In 1992, at Monash University, Australia, a seminar was held with the topic "Indonesian Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s." This is a proof that the 1950s is an important comparative variable in the discussion of democracy in Indonesia. 18. Feith, Herbert, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Cornell University Ithaca, New York, 1999, p. 61. For the complete list of the participants in this election see Annexure - VI.

51

19. Ibid, pp. 58-59 20. Rahman, Arifin, Sistem Politik Indonesia (Indonesian Political System), Penerbit SIC, Surabaya, 2001, p. 97. 21.Vasil, Raj, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, Singapore, 1997, pp. 37-38. 22. Ibid, p. 38. 23. Feith, Herbert, "Toward Elections in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, September 1954, pp. 147-48. 24. ECAFE, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1961, p. 110, quoted in Douglas S. Pauw, 'From Colonial to Guided Economy', in Ruth T. McWcy (ed.), Indonesia, SEA Studies, Yale Univ., 1967, p. 190. 25. Vasil, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 39. 26. Pedoman, 23 September 1952, cited in Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1964. 27. Feith, Hwbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1964, p. 315. 28. Vasil, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 40. 29. Ibid, p 40. 30. Scott, Roger, The Politics of New States: A General Analysis with Case Studies from Eastern Asia, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970, p. 140. 31. Vasil, Governing Irulonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 43. 32. Sen Penerbitan Studi Politik, Mengubur Sistem Politik Orde Baru (Burying the New Order's Political System). Mizan, Jakarta, 1998, p. 32.

52

33. Dhakidae, Daniel, ''Pemiiihan Umum Saksi Pasang Naik dan Pasang Sunit" in Prismano. 9,1981,pp. 25-26. 34. Budiardjo, Miriam, "Mencari Sistem Kepartaian yang Cocok" (Searching for an Ideal Party System) in the collection of essays by Miriam Budiardjo, Demokrasi di Indonesia (Democracy in Indonesia), Gramedia, Jakarta, 1994, p. 228. 35. Scott, The Politics of New States: A General Analysis with Case Studies from Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 140. 36. Vasil, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 46. 37. Legge, John, Sukarno: A Political Biography, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1972, p. 318. 38. The mastermind behind this failed coup remains a mystery. Whether it was truly masterminded by the PKI or it was purely a power struggle among the sections in the Indonesian Army, remains an unanswerable question, "Mengenang Tragedi Nasional Tiga Puluh Tujuh Tahun Lalu" (Remembering the National Tragedy 37 Years Ago), Kompas, Monday, 30 September 2002. 39. Vasil, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 46. 40. Smith, Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan, op. cit., p. 77. 41. Vasil, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 53. 42. However, the authentic letter of this Executive Order remains a mystery, nobody knows the whereabouts of the letter, not even Suharto, "Mengenang Tragedi Nasional Tiga Puluh Tujuh Tahun Lalu" (Remembering the National Tragedy 37 Years Ago), Kompas, Monday, 30 September 2002. 43. Smith, Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan, op. cit., p. 93.

53

44, Crouch, Harold, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell UP, Ithaca, 1988 (revised ed.), p. 227. 45, Aminudin, Kekuatan Islam dan Pergulatan Kekuasaan di Indonesia: Sebelum dan Sesudah Runtuhnya Rezim Suharto (Islamic Power and the Struggle for Power in Indonesia: Before and After the Fall of Suharto Regime), Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, 1999, p. 73. 46,Moertopo, Ali, Strategi Politik Nasional (National Political Strategy), CSIS, Jakarta, 1980, p. 47. 47. Used by Daniel Dhakidae in his "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia" (General Elections in Indonesia), Serf Prisma, LP3ES, Jakarta, 1986, p. 193. 48. Seri Penerbitan Studi Politik, Mengubur Sistem Politik Orde Baru (Burying the New Order's Political System), op. cit., p. 33. 49. Biro Humas KPU, Pemilu Indonesia dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955-1999 (Indonesian Elections in Facts and Numbers 1955-1999), KPU, Jakarta, 2000, pp. 50-51. 50. Look at M. Rusli Karim, Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia (The Journey of Political Parties in Indonesia), Rajawali Press, Jakarta, 1983. 51. Seri Penerbitan Studi Politik, Mengubur Sistem Politik Orde Baru (Butying the New Order's Political System), op. cit., p. 35. 52. Ibid, p. 37. 53. Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, op. cit., pp. x-xi, 54. Seri Penerbitan Studi Politik, Mengubur Sistem Politik Orde Baru (Burying the New Order's Political System), op. cit., pp. 40-41.

54

55. Noer, E)eliar, Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal (Isbm^vPancasila and Sinel& Ideology), Yayasan Peridiidmatan, Jakarta, 1983, p. 53. 56. Ibid, pp. 60-61. 57. Suryadinata, Leo, "A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty", Southeast Asian Affairs 1999. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p.l 12 58. Vasil, Governing Indonesia: National Development and Democracy, op. cit., p. 91. 59. Ibid, p. 93. 60. Ibid, p. 94. 61. Suharto, Suharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography, Djakarta, 1991, pp. 153-54. 62. Gary E. Hansen reported this Malari incident excessively in his "Indonesia 1974: A Momentous Year," Asian Survey, February 1975, vol. XV, No. 2, University of California Press, California, 1975. 63. Liddle, R. William, Pemilu-pemilu Orba: Pasang Surut Kekuasaan Politik (Elections of the New Order: The Roller Coaster of the Political PowerX P.T Pustaka LP3ES, Jakarta, 1994, p. 115. 64. From the text of the speech in S. Sinansari Ecip, Kronologi Situasi Penggulingan Suharto: Reportase Jumalistik (The Chronological Situation of Suharto's Overthrow: A Journalism Report), Mizan, Bandung, 1998, pp. 136-39. 65. "Empat Tokoh Reformasi Akhimya Bertemu" (Four Reform Leaders Meet), Kompas, 11 November 1998. There were four crucial points being discussed in this meeting. These points are: 1. Implementation of honest and fair general elections by May 1999 as a democratic way to end the transitional government by Habibie. Three

55

months after the general election, the new government must be formed through a General Session of Parliament; 2. Removal of ABRI's dual function by stages, to be completed in six years; 3. Sincere efforts to end KKN (local parlance for Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism), preceded by an investigation of Suharto's wealth; 4. Immediate dissolution of all "self-made security forces" of the MPR's Special Session. 66. Smith, Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan, op. cit., p. 80. 67. National IDemocratic Institute for International Affairs, The 1999 Presidential Election, MPR General Session and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia, National Democratic Institute, Washington, November 28,1999, p. 9. 68. Liddle, R. William, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored", Asian Survey, UCP, California, vol. XL, No. 1, January/February 2000, p. 33. 69. Biro Humas FCPU, Pemilu Indonesia dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955-1999, op. cit., p. 136. The cohiplete list of the political parties participated in the 1999 general elections is provided in the Annexure - VII. 70. Liddle, R. William, "Indonesia in 2000: A Shdky Start for Democracy", Asian Survey, UCP, California, vol. XLI, No. 1, January/ t^ebliiary 2001, p. 220. 'i'l.Malley, Michael S., "Indonesia in 2001: Restoring Stability in Jakarta", Asian Survey, UCP, California, vol. XLII, No. I, Janudry/February 2002, p. 124. Details on the status of the Presidoit and the DPR in the Indonesian polity are provided in the Constitution. See Annexure - III. 72. Ibid, p. 132. 73. Liddle, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored", op. cit., p. 33.

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74. Sartori, Giovanni, European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism^ in Political Parties and Political Development edited by J. LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Princeton UP, New Jersey, 1966, pp. 137-176. 75. Nazir, Mohd., Metode Penelitian (Research Method), Ghalia Indonesia, Jakarta, 1988, pp. 63-64. 76. In Masri Singarimbun (ed.), Metode Penelitian Survey (Survey Research Method), LP3ES, Jakarta, 1987, p. 4.

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chapter i introduction - Shodhganga

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background of the Study Indonesia is predominantly a Muslim society in Southeast Asia where more than 80 per cent of it...

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